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Preface
What motivates people, intrinsically and extrinsically?
—The Question That Never Gets Old—
Human behavior is captivating, and what is even more fascinating are the forces that
drive human behavior. These forces can be intrinsic (e.g., innate preferences: loss aver-
sion, reciprocity) or extrinsic (e.g., monetary or non-monetary rewards, peer groups, lead-
ers, work environment). The insight opens up many interesting questions, especially with
respect to the relationship between employers and employees in organizations: Should em-
ployers turn a blind eye on under-performing outcomes of employees, as an act of leniency?
If employees are averse to losses, what is the implication for their wage contract? Why
do employers negotiate wages with prospective employees? Does employees’ reciprocity
play a role in such wage negotiations? How does the current pandemic affect employees’
performance and mental health? Which leadership skills of employers help to mitigate
the impact of the pandemic? How do good leaders affect employees’ productivity and
well-being, especially in times of crisis?
In this dissertation, I attempt to understand better these motivating forces and delve
deeper into their effects and implications on various work-related aspects. Chapter 1 looks
at the implication of loss aversion on the optimal wage contract. Chapter 2 examines how
reciprocity plays a role in wage negotiations. Chapter 3 studies the effects of the current
pandemic on employees’ performance and mental health, and how good leaders might take
a mitigating role. The overview of these three chapters are as follows:
Chapter 1. In Chapter 1 titled “Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Stochastic Con-
tracts”, I examine whether stochastic contracts benefit the principal in the setting of moral
hazard and loss aversion. Incorporating that the agent is expectation-based loss averse and
allowing the principal to add noise to performance signals, I find that stochastic contracts
reduce the principal’s implementation cost in comparison with deterministic contracts. Sur-
prisingly, if performance signals are highly informative about the agent’s action, stochastic
contracts strictly dominate the optimal deterministic contract for almost any degree of
loss aversion. The finding has an important implication for designing contracts for loss-
averse agents: the principal should insure the agent against wage uncertainty by employing
stochastic contracts that increase the probability of a high wage.
Chapter 2. Chapter 2 titled “Wage-Setting Mechanisms with Reciprocal Workers”
examines a firm’s endogenous selection into posting a public wage or bargaining wages
in private negotiations with workers. In a static wage-bargaining model, I incorporate a
x
behavioral insight that workers are reciprocal in that the more rent they receive at the
wage bargaining stage, the higher quality they deliver at the production stage. The main
result is that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which a low-surplus firm self-
selects into a public wage offer and a high-surplus firm self-selects into private negotiations.
Negotiating wages with reciprocal workers, firms face a tradeoff between quality and net
surplus: a high bargained wage induces workers’ reciprocity, yielding firms high quality;
but workers may be able to extract a considerable share of the surplus through negotiations,
yielding firms a low net surplus. To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first to
provide a behavioral explanation for why firms may choose to bargain wages with workers.
Chapter 3. Chapter 3 titled “Work Environment, Mental Health, and The Pandemic:
How COVID-19 affected loan officers’ work in India” is joint work with Kristina Czura,
Florian Englmaier, and Lisa Spantig. This chapter focuses on issues related to working
during the pandemic, in an industry that has been severely affected by the crisis and where
work from home is hard to implement due to the nature of the tasks and technological re-
strictions: microfinance. We document how the work of loan officers changes during the
pandemic as compared to before, how employees are impacted in terms of work organi-
zation and mental well-being, and whether leadership can play a mitigating role. To do
so, we collect panel survey data from over 500 employees of a large Indian microfinance
organization from December 2019 to December 2020 and use administrative records of per-
formance indicators to characterize the work environment. We document that: first, even
though the working environment has become more challenging, the tasks required from
loan officers have not changed; second, perceived stress worsened at the early stages of
the pandemic, but showed signs of improvement at the later stages; and third, leadership
seems to be positively related to loan officers’ performance pre-pandemic and subjective
well-being during the pandemic.
Chapter 1
Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and
Stochastic Contracts
1.1 Introduction
The interplay between risk aversion and incentives is central to the moral hazard literature,
especially in designing an optimal contract. In this literature, one of the very few general
results, as Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) argue, is the informativeness principle. This
theory, going back to Holmstrom et al. (1979), Holmstrom (1982), and Grossman and
Hart (1983), states that a wage contract should contain only informative signals about the
agent’s effort. Despite the well-established paradigm, many labor contracts are stochastic
in that they include noise that does not provide any statistical information about the
agent’s effort.1 This gap between theory and observed contracts suggests that a traditional
approach focusing solely on risk aversion might give a partial and incomplete picture of
the moral hazard problem.
Although loss aversion is a fundamental concept in behavior economics and is well-
established with ample experimental and field evidence, the interplay between loss aver-
sion and incentives remains understudied in the moral hazard literature. More recently,
Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2004) argue that loss aversion drives much of human
behavior. “In a wide variety of domains”, as Rabin (2004) puts forward, “people are signif-
icantly more averse to losses than they are attracted to same-sized gains”. One prominent
realm in which loss aversion plays an significant role is the domain of money and wealth
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). It is thus important to incorporate loss aversion in the
analysis of the optimal wage contract, and to better understand how loss aversion affects
the tradeoff between insurance and incentives in the moral hazard model.
1In workplaces, firms successfully adopt teams and team incentives (Che and Yoo, 2001; Lazear and
Shaw, 2007; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2013) in which a team’s performance depends not only on an
employee’s effort but also the effort exerted by other team members. In addition, non-executive employees
increasingly receive payments in stock options (Core and Guay, 2001; Bergman and Jenter, 2007; Hochberg
and Lindsey, 2010; Kim and Ouimet, 2014) whose valuation is influenced by external shocks in the financial
sector.
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This chapter analyzes the optimal wage contract in the setting of moral hazard and
loss aversion, in which the agent is expectation-based loss averse and the principal can use
stochastic contracts. The main result is that stochastic contracts reduce the principal’s
implementation cost in comparison with deterministic contracts that implement the same
action. When performance signals are highly informative about the agent’s effort, the
dominance of stochastic contracts over deterministic contracts holds for almost any degree
of loss aversion. Furthermore, I find that limited liability ensures the existence of the
optimal contract, and that the optimal stochastic contract pays a high wage with certainty
when a good signal is realized and with a positive probability when a bad signal is realized.
More specifically, I extend the simple principal-agent model under moral hazard, in
which both the agent’s actions and observable signals are binary, by making two assump-
tions. The first assumption is that the agent is expectation-based loss averse as defined in
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In particular, the agent forms a reference point after tak-
ing an action, and thus his chosen action affects his reference point. The agent compares
his realized wage to the stochastic reference point, and he feels a loss if the actual wage
is smaller than the reference wage. The second assumption is that the principal can add
noise to performance signals by employing stochastic contracts. In particular, the principal
can add a lottery after observing the realized signal. Stochastic contracts thus serve as a
tool for the principal to manipulate the signal distribution. A crucial feature of my model
is that the principal can fully control the structure of the stochastic contract, i.e., the odds
of the lottery.
I find that there exists a stochastic contract that strictly dominates deterministic con-
tracts. Under the stochastic contract, the principal pays out a high wage whenever she
observes a good signal, while upon observing a bad signal she adds a lottery that gives
either the high wage or a low wage that serves as a harsh penalty to the agent for the bad
signal. The advantages of this stochastic contract under loss aversion are twofold. First,
the stochastic contract with this turning-a-blind-eye structure remedies an implementa-
tion problem associated with loss aversion. In deterministic contracts, this implementation
problem is well-established, i.e., the agent may choose the stochastically dominated action
when he is sufficiently loss averse (Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk, 2010). As a result,
the principal may be unable to induce the agent to exert effort. In sharp contrast, by
employing the stochastic contract, the principal can always implement the desired action
for any degree of loss aversion.
Second, even if deterministic contracts do not face the implementation problem, the
stochastic contract helps the principal lower the cost of implementing the desired action
beyond what is achieved under the optimal deterministic contract. Note that the stochastic
contract, as compared to deterministic contracts, has two countering effects on the prin-
cipal’s cost. On the one hand, the stochastic contract might increase the principal’s cost,
because the high wage is now paid out more often and a larger wage spread is required to
incentivize the agent to work. On the other hand, the stochastic contract reduces the prob-
ability that the agent feels a loss, thus the principal might capitalize on this reduction in
the agent’s loss premium to achieve a lower cost. When the positive effect of reducing the
loss premium outweighs the negative effect of increasing the expected bonus, the stochastic
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contract dominates deterministic contracts. Whether the stochastic contract is dominant
depends on the agent’s degree of loss aversion and the informativeness of performance
signals.
Interestingly, as performance signals get more informative about the agent’s action, the
principal favors the stochastic contract under a wider range of the degree of loss aversion.
When performance signals are highly uninformative, the principal is better off with the
stochastic contract under a most restrictive condition, i.e., only when the agent feels losses
at least twice as strongly as same-sized gains. This condition gets weaker if performance
signals provide some information about the agent’s action. When performance signals con-
vey almost perfect information, the stochastic contract dominates deterministic contracts
for almost any degree of loss aversion. Intuitively, when performance signals are highly
informative, the principal can provide further wage certainty at a negligible cost. Thus,
this finding has an important implication for designing contracts for loss-averse agents:
the principal has an incentive to add noise after the bad signal to insure the agent against
wage uncertainty.
Yet I show that the second-best optimal stochastic contract might not exist. In par-
ticular, the principal’s cost strictly decreases as the probability of getting the high wage
increases. This implies that the principal prefers to push the probability of the high wage
close to one. However, the principal cannot provide wage certainty because of the in-
centive constraint, and hence the solution to the principal’s problem is not well-defined.
This existence problem differs from the above implementation problem under loss aversion
in that the stochastic contract can always implement the desired action, but if used, the
optimal stochastic contract does not exist. Given the wide range under which stochas-
tic contracts dominate deterministic contracts, the existence problem appears more severe
than previously thought.
In mitigating the non-existence problem, I find that limited liability helps restore the
existence of the optimal stochastic contract. The optimal stochastic contract pays a bonus
with certainty when the good signal is realized and with a positive probability when the
bad signal is realized; otherwise, the agent receives a lowest possible wage, at which the
limited liability constraint is binding. This finding highlights the importance of imposing
limited liability in stochastic contracts to restrict the extent the principal can punish the
agent in the event of the bad signal and to ensure that the second-best optimal contract
exists.
While for the most part of the chapter, I assume that a reference point is formed after
the decision is taken, and allow for a stochastic reference point. In the Discussion section, I
relax these assumptions and discuss alternative notions of loss aversion. In particular, the
result holds under the forward-looking disappointment aversion according to Bell (1985),
Loomes and Sugden (1986), or Gul (1991), in which the reference point is the recent
expectation but does not allow for stochastic reference points. It also remains valid to
the concept of preferred personal equilibrium by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), which assumes
that the reference point is formed before taking the decision and hence is taken as given.
The robustness of the result suggests that noise should be generally added to performance
signals in the optimal contract for loss-averse agents. When loss aversion plays a significant
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role in the agent’s preferences, the principal can insure the agent against wage uncertainty
by employing stochastic contracts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the related
literature. Section 1.3 outlines the model, and Section 1.4 specifies the principal’s problem
and derives the set of feasible contracts. Section 1.5 presents the main results and discusses
alternative notions of loss aversion. Section 1.6 concludes. All proofs of lemmas and
propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
In this section, I provide an overview of the literature on behavioral contract theory, which
is most related to this chapter. I also refer to the literature that highlights the optimality
of stochastic contracts and that provides explanations for the unresponsiveness of wages
to performance.
This chapter is most closely related and complementary to Herweg, Müller and Wein-
schenk (2010) who show that, in the setting of moral hazard and loss aversion, the optimal
deterministic contract is a bonus contract. Complementary to their finding, this chapter
provides further insight into the characteristics of the optimal contract under loss aversion:
the probability of getting a bonus is set as high as possible. Furthermore, while their paper
proposes stochastic contracts as a remedy to the implementation problem of determinis-
tic contracts, this chapter highlights the optimality of stochastic contracts for almost any
degree of loss aversion, and even when deterministic contracts are implementable.
In the literature on behavioral contract theory, this chapter also relates to Daido and
Murooka (2016) who show that the principal may employ team incentives when the agents
are loss averse. Similar to their paper, this chapter stresses the role of limited liability
in ensuring the existence of the optimal contract. However, their paper focuses on team
incentives and takes a team structure as given, whereas I examine individual stochastic
contracts and consider noise as one of the principal’s variables.
This chapter also relates to the extensive literature on reference-dependent preferences,
starting out with the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where the agent’s
utility depends on a reference point and the agents feel losses more strongly than gains.
Subsequently, as reviewed by Barberis (2013), several papers have contributed to theoret-
ical extensions—covering reference-dependent models of both static (Bell, 1985; Loomes
and Sugden, 1986; Munro and Sugden, 2003; Sugden, 2003; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006;
De Giorgi and Post, 2011) and dynamic nature (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2009; Barberis and
Huang, 2001; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001)—and applications of reference-dependent
preferences into real-life problems, such as in tournaments (Gill and Stone, 2010), saving
decisions (Jofre, Moroni and Repetto, 2015), asset pricing (Pagel, 2016), life-cycle consump-
tion (Pagel, 2017), intertemporal incentives (Macera, 2018), and portfolio choices (Pagel,
2018). This chapter contributes to the literature strand that incorporates expectation-
based reference-dependent preferences into moral hazard models, as summarized by Koszegi
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(2014), by providing the characteristics of the optimal stochastic contracts for loss-averse
agents.
My results speak to a growing literature that highlights the optimality of noise in the
contract. Haller (1985) finds that randomization benefits the principal when the agent
faces an aspiration constraint of achieving certain income levels with certain probabilities.
Strausz (2006) shows that stochastic mechanisms may be optimal in a screening context.
Lang (2020) examines the optimal contract with subjective evaluations, and shows that
stochastic contracts may increase the principal’s profits and eliminate the requirement
of a third-party payment. Ostrizek (2020) finds that the principal prefers to set wages
contingent on a noisy information structure, because the agent remains uninformed about
their match-specific ability and is cheaper to motivate. Contributing to this literature, I
show that noise can serve as a tool to insure the agent against wage uncertainty.
By highlighting that the principal prefers to lump signals together into a bonus set, my
findings also adds to the rich literature attempting to explain why wages are rigid relative
to performance. Considering multiple tasks that are substitutes, Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) shows that wages should not respond to performance because strong incentives for an
observable task worsens the agent’s performance on the other unmeasurable task. At large,
several explanation for a fixed-wage contract have proposed, including monitoring cost
(Lazear, 1986), relative performance and cooperation (Lazear, 1989), relational contracts
(e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Levin, 2003), and reciprocal preferences (Englmaier
and Leider, 2012).
1.3 The Model
I consider a principal-agent model in a moral hazard and loss aversion setting. The principal
(she) offers an one-period employment contract to the agent (he), which the agent either
accepts or rejects. If the agent rejects, he receives his reservation utility which is assumed
to be zero.2 If the agent accepts the contract, he then makes a binary action a ∈ {aH , aL},
i.e., he either “works” (a = aH) or “shirks” (a = aL). The cost of working for the agent is
c(aH) = c, for c > 0, and the cost of shirking is normalized at zero c(aL) = 0.
The action a is private information of the agent that the principal cannot observe.
Instead, the principal is assumed to observe a contractible signal for the agent’s action.
The signal s ∈ S = {1, 2} is good (s = 2) or bad (s = 1). The agent receives the good signal
with probability qH if he works and with probability qL if he shirks, where 1 > qH > qL > 0.
The signal distribution is common knowledge.
The agent exhibits expectation-based loss aversion as defined in Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007). The agent’s utility has two additively separable components: the standard
“consumption utility” and the reference-dependent “gain-loss utility”. The agent’s con-
sumption utility, denoted by u(·), is assumed to be strictly increasing, (weakly) concave,
2Assuming the reservation utility is zero is consistent with the “quitting” constraint. This assumption
is made for the sake of simplicity of analysis. The main results would continue to hold when the reservation
utility is positive.
6 1. Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Stochastic Contracts
and unbounded, i.e., u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0. The second component comes from reference-
dependent preferences: the agent compares a realized outcome to a stochastic reference
point, and how his overall utility is affected depends on whether this comparison is per-
ceived as a gain or a loss. The gain-loss function µ(·) satisfies the assumptions on the
“value function” by Tversky and Kahneman (1991). I assume that the gain-loss function
is piecewise linear,
µ(m) =
m for m ≥ 0λm for m < 0
where λ ≥ 1 represents the degree of loss aversion.
To determine the reference point, I apply the concept of choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium (CPE) in the sense of Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), which makes two important
assumptions. First, the agent forms the reference point, to which realized outcomes are
evaluated, after making the decision, and thus his decision affects his reference point.
As mentioned by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), CPE considers outcomes that are resolved
long after all decisions are made. Thus, the reference point is endogenously determined
as the agent’s rational expectation about the outcomes given his decision. Second, the
reference point is stochastic if the decision’s outcome is stochastic. To form a stochastic
reference point, it is assumed that the agent knows the set of possible outcomes and its
probability distribution conditional on his decisions. These two assumptions give rise
to a crucial feature of CPE: a stochastic outcome is evaluated to a stochastic reference
point by comparing outcome by outcome, where each comparison is weighted with the
joint probability with which a certain outcome is realized and an alternative outcome is
expected.
On the other hand, the principal is assumed to be risk and loss neutral. I assume that
the agent’s “work” generates sufficient profit to the principal that she strictly prefers to
implement the high action aH . Thus I focus on the principal’s cost minimization problem,
and inquire into the optimal contract design under moral hazard with loss aversion.
In designing the optimal contract, the principal can distort the outcome distribution by
adding noise to the performance signals. Put differently, she can fully employ stochastic
contracts to implement the desired action. A stochastic contract specifies wage payments
contingent not only on the contractible signals but also on a stochastic device that does not
depend on the agent’s action. Formally, the principal offers the agent a state-contingent
stochastic contract (Cs)s∈S, in which each Cs entails a stochastic device — uncorrelated
with the agent’s action — that specifies wage payments within the contract.
In the setting of two signals, the principal offers a stochastic contract (C1, C2). If the
principal observes the good signal s = 2, then the agent receives C2 that specifies a lottery
(p2, 1 − p2) over wage payments.3 Analogously, C1 with a lottery (p1, 1 − p1) is realized if
3The assumption that a lottery specifies two outcomes is without loss of generality. Even when the
lottery specifies more than two outcomes, the principal prefers to lump outcomes into two distinct sets.
This is in line with the finding by Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010) that the optimal contract specifies
two levels of wages.
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the bad signal s = 1 is observed. Importantly, the principal has full control over the design
of these lotteries (p1, p2) that I refer to as the “stochastic structure”.



















Notes: The left diagram depicts the distribution of wage payments conditional on the agent’s high action
aH . The right diagram depicts the distribution of wage payments conditional on the agent’s low action
aL.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the distribution over the outcomes i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} depends
on both the agent’s action and the principal’s choice of stochastic structure. Figure 1.1
represents how the distribution over the wage payments (wi)4i=1 depends on the agent’s
action a ∈ {aH , aL} under the stochastic contract. By committing to the stochastic struc-
ture (p1, p2) in the contract, the principal makes the wage distribution common knowledge
to the agent before he chooses his action. Thus, in the process of choosing an action, the
agent incorporates the structure of the stochastic contract and forms a rational expectation
about monetary outcomes.
More precisely, consider a particular case in which the agent chooses the high action
aH and that a certain outcome i is realized. The agent receives wi and incurs effort cost c.
Given that wi is realized, he compares the realized outcome wi to all alternative outcomes.
Although wi is realized, with some probability fj(aH) he expects an alternative outcome
j 6= i to be observed. If wi > wj, the agent experiences a gain of u(wi)− u(wj), whereas if
wi < wj, the agent experiences a loss of λ(u(wi) − u(wj)). If wi = wj, there is no gain or








Notice that this particular comparison occurs with the probability fi(aH) that outcome i is
realized. When there is uncertainty in the decision’s outcome, the agent’s expected utility
is obtained by averaging over all possible comparisons.
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1.4 The Principal’s Problem
Denote ui = u(wi). With this notation, the agent’s expected utility from choosing action









fi(a)fj(a)(ui − uj)− c(a)
The first term captures the agent’s expected consumption utility. For λ = 1, we are back
in the standard case without loss aversion. The second term captures the gain-loss utility.
While the agent expects a high wage ui to come up with probability fi(a), with probability
fj(a) he receives a low wage uj and experiences a loss of λ(ui − uj). On the other hand, if
the agent expects the low wage with probability fj(a), with probability fi(a) he receives the
high wage and experiences a gain of ui−uj. Since losses loom larger than gains of equal size
(λ ≥ 1), the gain-loss utility is always negative in expectation. Following Herweg, Müller
and Weinschenk (2010), I refer to this expected net loss as the agent’s “loss premium”.
For an agent with a higher degree of loss aversion, the principal has to pay a higher loss
premium in a given contract.
Let h(·) := u−1(·) be the wage that the principal offers the agent to obtain utility ui,
i.e., h(ui) = wi. Due to the assumptions on u(·), h(·) is strictly increasing and (weakly)
convex. Following Grossman and Hart (1983), I regard u = (u1, . . . , u4) as the principal’s
control variables in her cost minimization problem. The principal specifies a wage payment
wi for each outcome i in the employment contract, equivalently an utility level ui.
The key assumption is that, besides the wage payments, the principal controls the
stochastic structure p = (p1, p2). In sharp contrast to deterministic contracts, stochastic
contracts allows the principal to manipulate the outcome distribution. Her problem is thus
to minimize the expected wage payment that implements aH subject to the participation




subject to EU(aH) ≥ 0 (PC)
EU(aH) ≥ EU(aL) (IC)
In deterministic contracts, it is well-established that if the agent is sufficiently loss
averse, i.e. λ > 2, then the agent might choose the stochastically dominated action, and
the principal, facing a severe implementation problem, might be unable to induce the high
action (Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk, 2010). I now examine if there are incentive-
compatible wage payments under stochastic contracts to implement aH and show that,
in sharp contrast to deterministic contracts, stochastic contracts do not suffer from the
implementation problem.4
Lemma 1. Suppose u′′(·) ≤ 0 and λ ≥ 1. For every λ, there exists a stochastic contract
such that the action aH can be implemented.
4All proofs of lemmas and propositions are provided in the Appendix.
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Lemma 1 states that given any degree of loss aversion there are incentive-compatible
wages and a stochastic structure such that the agent accepts the stochastic contract and
chooses the high action. In particular, the principal pays out a high wage whenever she
observes a good signal, while after observing a bad signal she adds a lottery that gives
either the high wage or a low wage. This means, in the stochastic contract, the principal
turns a blind eye on the agent’s receiving a bad signal and insures the agent against
wage uncertainty. The stochastic contract circumvents the implementation problem of
deterministic contracts, because, by increasing the probability of getting the high wage,
the principal simultaneously reduces the agent’s expected net loss when he works and
increases his expected net loss when he shirks. For a sufficiently loss-averse agent, whose
primary concern is to minimize the expected net loss, the stochastic contract makes working
more attractive than shirking.
So far it is established that the constraint set of the principal’s cost minimization
problem is non-empty for the high action aH given any degree of loss aversion. I restrict
attention to the stochastic contract of the turning-a-blind-eye structure for the following
analysis.5
1.5 The Optimal Contract
In this section, I examine the existence and the characteristics of the optimal contract.
First, I focus on the case of a loss-averse but risk-neutral agent. I will show that under a
weak condition there exists a stochastic contract that strictly dominates deterministic con-
tracts. The principal can lower the cost of implementing the desired action by employing
stochastic contracts rather than deterministic contracts. Surprisingly, this holds true even
when deterministic contracts do not face the implementation problem. The dominance of
stochastic contracts, however, implies that for many cases the second-best optimal stochas-
tic contract does not exist. With agents being expectation-based loss averse, an existence
problem, which does not prevail in the standard model, arises. Second, I examine whether
limited liability mitigates the non-existence issue of stochastic contracts and characterize
the second-best optimal stochastic contract. Third, I consider the general case of a risk-
and loss-averse agent and show that the first-best can be approximated closely, but not
attained, by stochastic contracts that provide the bonus almost certainly.
1.5.1 Strict Dominance of Stochastic Contracts
Consider an agent who is risk neutral in the standard notion, u′′(·) = 0, but exhibits loss
aversion λ > 1.
5The strategy “turing a blind eye” was first discussed in Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010),
who show that indeed when facing an implementation problem, the principal can still implement the
desired action by stochastically ignoring the agent’s bad performance. In this chapter, I focus more on the
situations in which the implementation problem does not prevail and the principal can use deterministic
contracts to induce the agent to work.
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If the principal is restricted to offer deterministic contracts, with two possible signals
s ∈ {1, 2}, the deterministic contract takes the form of a bonus contract: the agent is paid
a base wage w if the bad signal is realized, and he is paid the base wage w plus a bonus
b > 0 if the good signal is realized.
Under this deterministic contract, the agent prefers the high action aH over the low
action aL if his utility from the high action exceeds his utility from the low action. This is
the case if and only if
w + qHb− (λ− 1)qH(1− qH)b− c ≥ w + qLb− (λ− 1)qL(1− qL)b
⇔ (qH − qL)b− (λ− 1) [qH(1− qH)− qL(1− qL)] b ≥ c (IC-D)
Because both the participation and incentive constraints are binding, the principal’s cost
minimization problem is equivalent to minimizing the agent’s loss premium conditional on
aH subject to the incentive constraint. I examine whether there exists a stochastic contract
that satisfies the incentive constraint and at the same time reduces the loss premium that
the principal has to pay.
Assuming that the principal can employ stochastic contracts, I consider the stochastic
contract that takes the turning-a-blind-eye structure: the principal pays a high wage with
probability 1 if she observes the good signal, while if she observes the bad signal she stochas-
tically ignores it by paying the high wage with probability p1 and paying a low wage with
probability 1− p1. It follows directly from Lemma 1 that the stochastic contract satisfies
the incentive constraint and implements the high action. I examine whether the stochastic
contract benefits the principal from a cost perspective in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, there exists a stochastic
contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal
deterministic contract.
Besides remedying the implementation problem, the stochastic contract benefits the
principal from a cost perspective: the principal pays a lower loss premium to the agent in
the stochastic contract. To see the intuition for Proposition 1, note first that the agent’s
loss premium depends on two variables: (i) the bonus size b and (ii) the probability with
which the agent feels a loss when a deviation from his reference point occurs qH(1 − qH),
which following Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010) I refer to as “loss probabiliy”. The
loss probability is an inverted U-shaped function; it reaches its maximum when getting a
bonus is completely random, i.e. qH = 1/2, and it reaches its minimum of zero as the bonus
probability moves to the extremes, i.e. qH = 0 or qH = 1. By employing the stochastic
contract that pays the low wage only if the worst outcome (i = 1) is realized and pays the
high wage for all other outcomes, the principal increases the bonus probability closer to
one and thereby reduces the associated loss probability closer to zero.
Although the stochastic contract decreases the probability that the agent feels a loss,
it increases the bonus size b required to incentivize the agent to work. As the probability
of getting a bonus increases, the outcome distribution under the high action resembles
that under the low action. Thus, to satisfy the incentive constraint, the principal needs a
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Notes: The figure shows an illustration of the principal’s cost under stochastic contracts and deterministic
contracts for qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, p1 = 0.75, p2 = 1, and c = 1. The dashed line shows the principal’s im-
plementation cost in the optimal deterministic contract. The solid line shows the the principal’s minimum
cost in the stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
higher bonus. Put together, the stochastic contract has two opposing effects on the loss
probability and the bonus size. While the insurance against wage uncertainty may come
at the cost of a larger expected bonus required to induce the agent to work, the positive
effect of the reduced loss probability outweighs the negative effect of the increased bonus
size if the agent is sufficiently loss averse.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the dominance of the stochastic contract for a simple example
with qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, and p1 = 0.75. The dashed line in Figure 1.2 shows the principal’s
implementation cost under the optimal deterministic contract, and the solid line shows the
minimum cost under the stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
Given qH = 0.8 and qL = 0.3, the condition λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL in Proposition 1 translates to
λ > 1.29. As shown in Figure 1.2, for λ ∈ [1, 1.29], the optimal deterministic contract
yields a lower cost for the principal, while for λ > 1.29, the stochastic contract strictly
dominates the optimal deterministic contract. The higher the degree of loss aversion, the
larger the relative benefit of using the stochastic contract for the principal.
Interestingly, the condition on the degree of loss aversion in Proposition 1 is much
weaker than that previously established in the literature. Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk
(2010) establish that turning a blind eye enables the principal to achieve a lower cost if
and only if λ > 2.6 Notice that in Proposition 1 the condition 1−qH1−qL + 1 is strictly smaller
6In particular, Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010) assume an incomplete contracting environment,
which implies that performance measures are inherently noisy. Thus, this limits the extent to which the
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than 2; this would imply a larger set of degrees of loss aversion than previously thought
under which stochastic contracts strictly dominate deterministic contracts.
A second interesting observation is that as the performance signals become more in-
formative about the agent’s action, the principal favors the stochastic contract under a
wider range of the degree of loss aversion. Let us consider two extreme cases. If the sig-
nals are highly uninformative, i.e. 1−qH1−qL → 1, then the most restrictive condition under
which the stochastic contract dominates deterministic contracts becomes λ > 2, which
coincides with the well-established condition in the literature. The condition on the degree
of loss aversion, however, gets weaker as the performance signals provide more information
about the agent’s action. At the other extreme, if the signals are highly informative, i.e.
1−qH
1−qL → 0, then the condition becomes λ > 1. This means if the signals provide almost
precise information about the agent’s action, then the principal benefits from using the
stochastic contract almost all the time. The logic is that when the given signals are very
informative, the principal provides further wage certainty at a negligible cost and prefers
to do so to a large extent. Put differently, in the limit the stochastic contract strictly
dominates deterministic contracts for almost any degree of loss aversion.
1.5.2 Non-Existence of The Second-Best Optimal Contract
In this part, I focus on the cases where stochastic contracts strictly dominate deterministic
contracts, and attempt to characterize the second-best optimal stochastic contract, assum-
ing for now that the solution exists. Formally, I assume that u′′(·) = 0 and λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL .
Similar to the finding by Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010), a first important
observation is that the optimal stochastic contract should take the form of a bonus contract.
When an agent is risk neutral but loss averse, it is optimal for the principal to pool as
many informative signals as possible into a bonus set and pay a high wage only if the
realized signal lies in this bonus set. The logic is that when facing the risk-neutral agent,
the principal cannot capitalize on a higher degree of wage differentiation. On the other
hand, pooling wages together helps the loss-averse agent avoid unfavourable comparisons
and yields him a higher expected utility. To satisfy the incentive constraint, the optimal
contract requires a minimum degree of wage differentiation in that the principal offers two
wage levels – a base wage and a bonus – no matter how rich the signal space is.
It remains to determine which outcomes i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} should be included in the bonus
set. Given any contract (ŵi)4i=1 that the principal offers, I can relabel the outcomes i such
that this contract is equivalent to a contract (wi)4i=1 of an (weakly) increasing wage profile
with wi−1 ≤ wi for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Thus the bonus set can be one of the three options:
(i) the bonus set includes only the highest outcome {w4}, or (ii) the bonus set includes
two highest outcomes {w4, w3}, or (iii) the bonus set includes all but the lowest outcome
{w4, w3, w2}. I examine the option (i) in the following lemma.
principal can add noise in the optimal contract as compared to the complete contracting setting in my
model.
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Lemma 2. Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ > 1. Then, any stochastic contract with the wage
structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 is weakly dominated by the optimal deterministic contract.
A stochastic contract that rewards only the highest outcome reduces the probability
of getting a bonus; a slim chance of getting a bonus in turn simultaneously increases the
agent’s expected net loss when he works and decreases his expected net loss when he shirks.
Because the agent cares sufficiently about minimizing the expected loss, this implies that
the stochastic contract of the wage structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 worsens the implementa-
tion problem under loss aversion. Moreover, the principal requires a substantially higher
bonus to motivate the agent to work. Due to the worsened implementation problem, the
negative effects of an increased bonus outweighs the positive effects of a reduced loss prob-
ability, leading to that the principal’s implementation cost actually increases with such a
stochastic contract.
Note that the option (ii) coincides with the deterministic contract. As in Proposition 1,
the optimal deterministic contract is strictly dominated by the stochastic contract with
the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4. Taken these two observations together, it is thus
optimal to include all but the worst outcome in the bonus set.
With the bonus set including all except for the worst outcome i = 1, I derive the
principal’s implementation cost for a given stochastic structure. The comparative statics
of the principal’s implementation cost with respect to the probability of getting a bonus
p1 reveals an insight about the existence of the second-best optimal stochastic contract,
which is covered in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, the second-best optimal
stochastic contract does not exist.
The solution to the principal’s problem with the above stochastic contract is not well-
defined. The reason is that the principal can always achieve a lower cost by further increas-
ing the probability of getting a bonus p1 close to one and rendering the penalty harsher
in the event of the bad signal. However, p1 cannot reach the value of one, as the contract
then becomes a fixed wage contract that does not satisfy the incentive constraint. In the






· (1− qH)c(qH − qL)
Figure 1.3 illustrates how the principal’s implementation cost changes with respect to
the probability of getting a bonus p1 for a simple example with qH = 0.8 and qL = 0.3. The
solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to the principal’s cost for λ = 1.5, λ = 2, and
λ = 2.5 respectively. All the lines exhibit a downward trend, implying that the principal’s
cost decreases as p1 increases. However, there is a discontinuity, depicted as empty circles,
at p1 = 1. If p1 = 1, the principal cannot induce the agent to work, her implementation
cost becomes prohibitively high.
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Figure 1.3: Principal’s cost as a function of the bonus probability

















Notes: The figure shows an illustration of the principal’s cost under the stochastic contract of the wage
structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 for qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, p2 = 1, and c = 1.
1.5.3 Limited Liability
The non-existence of the second-best optimal stochastic contract hinges on the principal’s
desire to insure the agent against wage uncertainty to the largest possible extent, and
thereby to further reduce her cost, if the agent is sufficiently loss averse. On the other hand,
to motivate the agent to work in the face of such insurance, the principal punishes the agent
indefinitely when the worst outcome is realized. If the punishment for the worst outcome is,
however, limited, the principal faces an upper bound of how much wage certainty she can
provide to the agent. In this part, I show that the second-best optimal stochastic contract
exists if the principal faces a limited liability constraint, and characterize the second-best
optimal contract.
Analogous to the previous analysis, it can be shown that the optimal bonus set consists
of all but the worst outcome. I thus restrict my attention to stochastic contracts of the
wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4. Let fH and fL be the probability of getting a bonus
conditional on the agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH = P [i > 1|aH ] =





w + fHb− (λ− 1)bfH(1− fH) ≥ c (PC)
b(fH − fL)− (λ− 1)b[fH(1− fH)− fL(1− fL)] ≥ c (IC)
w ≥ 0 (LL)
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Because the (IC) binds at optimum (else, the principal can reduce b by a small amount),
the optimal bonus size can be written as a function of p1:
b∗(p1) =
c
(qH − qL)(1− p1)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
The (LL) constraint is also binding at optimum. Else, by reducing w by a small amount,
the principal decreases the expected payment without changing (IC) or violating (LL).
Thus, the principal’s cost in the stochastic contract is given by Cr(p1) = fHb∗. Note that
at p1 = 0, the stochastic contract coincides with the deterministic contract such that the
principal’s minimum cost remains unchanged. The principal reduces her implementation
cost by using the stochastic contract if the following assumption holds.
Assumption 1 (A1). (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL + qH(2− qH − qL)) > 1
Assumption (A1) is a sufficient and necessary condition for the principal’s minimum
cost function to be locally decreasing at p1 = 0. Given (A1), there exists a stochastic
contract that strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract under limited liability.
Solving for the optimal p∗1 that minimizes Cr(p1), I characterize the second-best optimal
stochastic contract in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose (A1) holds, u′′(·) = 0, and w ≥ 0. Then, the second-best optimal
stochastic contract exists. The optimal stochastic contract pays b∗(p∗1) with probability one
when the good signal is realized and with probability p∗1 when the bad signal is realized. The







2− qH − qL
− qH

Figure 1.4 illustrates the second-best optimal stochastic contract under limited liability
with a simple example of qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3 and λ = 3. With this parameter specification,
the principal can implement the desired action with a deterministic contract that reaches
the lowest cost of C∗d = 1.33. The Assumption (A1), translating to λ > 2.61, is satisfied
under the specification of λ = 3. The second-best optimal stochastic contract pays b∗(p∗1) =
1.62 with probability one if the principal observes the good signal s = 2 and with probability
p∗1 = 0.08 if she observes the bad signal s = 1. Thus, the principal yields the optimal cost
of C∗r = 1.32, which is strictly lower than C∗d .
If the agent is subject to limited liability, the solution of the principal’s problem is
well-defined. Intuitively, limited liability limits the extent to which the principal can
punish the agent in the event of bad outcomes, and in turn her ability to insure the agent
against wage uncertainty. Put differently, the principal does not benefit from increasing
the bonus probability p1 close to 1 under the limited liability constraint. As the base
wage w is bounded by zero, in order to motivate the agent to work, the bonus b becomes
substantially large after a certain level of wage certainty.
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Figure 1.4: Principal’s cost under limited liability


















Notes: The figure shows an illustration of the principal’s cost under stochastic contracts and deterministic
contracts under limited liability for qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, p2 = 1, c = 1 and λ = 3. The dashed line shows
the principal’s implementation cost in the optimal deterministic contract. The solid line shows the the
principal’s minimum cost in the stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
1.5.4 Alternative Notions of Loss Aversion
The notion of loss aversion crucially depends on how the reference point is conceptualized.
In my model the reference point has two important features. First, it allows for stochastic
reference points; the agent compares a realized outcome with all possible outcomes. This
pairwise comparison implies a possibility of “mixed feeling”, i.e., the same realized outcome
can be perceived as both a gain and a loss at the same time, depending on which possible
outcomes the agent expects. Second, the reference point is formed after the decision
is made, and hence is influenced by the chosen decision. Thus, the reference point is
endogenously determined by recent expectations.
A related notion to the CPE concept is the forward-looking disappointment aversion
according to Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), or Gul (1991). Under the disappoint-
ment aversion model, the reference point is also formed after the decision is made, but the
reference point takes the form of certainty equivalent of the prospect, and hence it admits
only static reference points. The certainty equivalent of the prospect is a point estimate
and does not allow for mixed feelings; the agent feels a gain if the realized outcome is above
it, and vice versa. As it turns out, even in this case, stochastic contracts help the principal
reduce the implementation cost beyond what is achieved under deterministic contracts.
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Again, stochastic contracts add noise after the worst outcome to insure the agent that he
is more likely to receive the high wage.7
Proposition 4. Suppose the agent exhibits disappointment aversion according to Bell
(1985), u′′(·) = 0, and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and two signals. Then,
there exists a stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly
dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
The forward-looking disappointment according to Bell (1985) implies that the agent
first calculates an expected outcome, and then compares the realized outcome with his
expectation. Under a deterministic contract, if a bonus is realized, the agent feels elated as
the realized outcome is higher than the expected one. While, if a bonus is not realized, the
agent instead feels disappointed as the realized outcome is lower than the expected one. By
increasing the bonus probability in the stochastic contract, the principal simultaneously
increases the probability that the agent feels elated and reduces the probability that he
feels disappointed. Because the agent prioritizes minimizing the feeling of disappointment,
if he is sufficiently disappointment averse, the principal can capitalize on the stochastic
contract to reduce her implementation cost.
An alternative specification of the reference point is that it is given exogenously and
does not internalize the effect of the decision, namely the preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) notion. In PPE, the agent can choose his optimal action only from the actions he
knows he will follow through, whereas in CPE he can commit to the action. The analysis
of the optimal contract is very similar and gives rise to the similar result. However, it is
known that the distaste for the risk is stronger when the decision is made up front, as
in CPE, than when the decision is made later, as in PPE. The principal benefits from
stochastic contracts that insure the agent with wage certainty to a lesser extent.
Proposition 5. Suppose the agent exhibits the PPE loss aversion, u′′(·) = 0, qH+2qL ≤ 2,
and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and two signals. Then, there exists a stochastic
contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal
deterministic contract.
The robustness of the dominance of stochastic contracts suggests that noise should be
generally added to performance measures in the optimal contract for loss averse agents. Put
differently, loss aversion implies a first-order aversion to wage uncertainty, and this creates
incentives for the principal to insure the agent against this uncertainty. By employing
stochastic contracts, the principal manipulates the outcome distribution to her favor and
provides the agent a higher wage certainty. When loss aversion plays a role, the principal
capitalizes on this reduction in uncertainty and achieves a lower cost.
7De Meza and Webb (2007) examine the concept of Gul (1991), which is closely related to Bell (1985),
and finds that the optimal contracts have intermediate intervals in which wages are insensitive to perfor-
mance.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the optimal contract design under moral hazard and loss aversion,
and finds that the optimal contract adds noise in the event of bad outcomes to insure the
loss-averse agent against wage uncertainty. To reach this finding, I modify the standard
moral hazard model with two departures: the agent is expectation-based loss averse, and
the principal can add noise in the contract to manipulate the outcome distribution in her
favor. Importantly, the principal fully controls where to add noise and how to structure
noise in the contract, i.e., the structure of stochastic contracts.
There are three key takeaways from this chapter. First, the principal is strictly bet-
ter off with stochastic contracts, as compared to deterministic contracts, in implementing
the desired action if the agent is loss averse. This result relates to the literature on be-
havioral contract theory, which has pointed out that if deterministic contracts face an
implementation problem, turning a blind eye (Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk, 2010) or
team incentives (Daido and Murooka, 2016) help the principal induce the agent to work.
Contributing to this literature strand, I find that even if deterministic contracts do not
face the implementation problem, the principal can still reduce her cost by employing
stochastic contracts. In fact, if the signals are highly informative about the agent’s action,
stochastic contracts strictly dominate deterministic contracts for almost any degree of loss
aversion. Thus, this finding has an important implication for designing contracts for loss-
averse agents: the principal has an incentive to add noise after the bad signal is realized
to insure the agent against wage uncertainty.
Second, limited liability mitigates the non-existence problem of the second-best optimal
stochastic contract. Instead of the implementation problem, stochastic contracts face a
non-existence problem that the optimal contract does not exist, because the principal
has an incentive to insure the agent to the largest possible extent. Given a wide range
of loss aversion over which stochastic contracts dominates deterministic contracts, the
non-existence problem proves to be severe. To solve the non-existence problem, I find
that limited liability helps restore the existence of the second-best optimal contract. This
finding highlights the importance of limited liability in stochastic contracts to ensure that
the second-best optimal contract exists.
Given that loss aversion is an important and well-established behavioral trait, this
chapter helps explain the relevance of stochastic contracts (e.g., dismissal contracts) in
the real world. Going forward, it would be interesting to examine the interaction of loss
aversion with other behavioral or cognitive biases, such as overconfidence, that may induce
the agent to have an incorrect model of the world. The interaction of these biases and





Wage setting is at the heart of any matches between firms and employees, where two
prevalent mechanisms with which firms determine wages with workers emerge: public
wage and private negotiation. In practice, both forms of wage-setting mechanisms coexist
in many labor markets, with approximately one-third of hirings being characterized by
private negotiations.1 Despite their widespread use, it is not clear how a firm determines its
wage-setting mechanism in the choice between a public wage offer and private negotiations.
The standard paradigm assumes that a public wage offer makes the firm better off.
This theory, as put forward by Lieberman and Montgomery (1988), argues that a public
wage offer provides the firm with a “first-mover advantage” and helps the firm reduce
wages in the wage-setting process. Yet, in practice we do observe that firms engage in
private negotiations with workers. The gap between theory and practice suggests that the
standard theory provides an incomplete picture of what determines the firm’s choice of
wage-setting mechanisms. Arguably, one reason is that it has failed to incorporate one of
the most prominent workers’ characteristics: reciprocity.2
1Hall and Krueger (2010, 2012) survey a representative sample of around 1300 workers in the US and
find that wage bargaining characterizes approximately one-third of matches and wage posting represents
almost two-thirds. Examining the firm’s perspective from an extensive survey of more than 9000 establish-
ments, Brenzel, Gartner and Schnabel (2014) find a similar result—both wage bargaining and wage posting
coexist in the German labor market, with approximately one-third of workers bargaining individually for
their wages.
2Reciprocity is a well-established concept in behavioral economics and psychology (Geanakoplos,
Pearce and Stacchetti, 1989; Rabin, 1993). There is ample experimental and empirical evidence show-
ing that workers are reciprocal to the firm’s generosity (Leuven et al., 2005; Gneezy and List, 2006;
Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Kube, Maréchal and Puppe, 2012; Englmaier, Kolaska and Leider, 2016).
While reciprocity has been incorporated in many models (for example, in sequential games (Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), in demand theory (Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008),
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To fill the gap, this chapter provides a theory of wage-setting mechanisms with re-
ciprocal workers and proposes a behavioral explanation for why firms engage in private
negotiations with workers. In this chapter, I examine how a firm determines its wage-
setting mechanism—posting a public wage or negotiating wages with workers—and, more
specifically, what influences a firm’s choice between a public wage offer and private ne-
gotiations. Building on the wage bargaining literature, I extend the standard bargaining
model, where a single firm meets a unit mass of workers, by incorporating a behavioral
assumption that workers are reciprocal, i.e., the more rent workers receive from the firm at
the stage of wage bargaining, the higher effort workers give back to the firm at the latter
stage of effort provision.
The model has two stages: In the first stage of wage bargaining, the firm and workers
negotiate wages according to a given wage-setting mechanism–public wage or private nego-
tiation. In a public wage offer, the firm commits and announces to all prospective workers
a public wage, which workers can accept or reject. In a private negotiation, each worker
privately bargains wages with the firm and makes a wage offer, which the firm can accept
or reject. In the second stage of effort provision, taking the agreed-upon wage in the first
stage as fixed, workers choose their level of effort, which directly translates to the firm’s
quality.
The findings highlight that workers’ reciprocity plays an important role in shaping the
firm’s choice of wage-setting mechanisms. In sharp contrast to the standard theory which
predicts that the firm prefers a public wage offer to suppress wages, workers’ reciprocity
prompts the firm to engage in private negotiations in order to give more rents to workers.
Consequently, the equilibrium wage for workers increases, as workers become more recip-
rocal. The resulting wage increase in turn improves the probability of hiring, and thus
partially mitigates pre-existing friction in the labor market.
In essence, when negotiating wages with reciprocal workers, the firm faces a trade-off
between net surplus and quality in the choice between a public wage offer and private
negotiations. On the one hand, a public wage offer, through the “first-mover advantage”,
suppresses wages and improves the firm’s net surplus—the share of the surplus that is
left after paying wages. On the other hand, private negotiations, by allowing workers to
aggressively bargain wages, induce workers’ reciprocity and improve the firm’s quality.
The trade-off brings about a separating equilibrium in which, facing strongly reciprocal
workers, the low-surplus firm self-selects into a public wage offer and the high-surplus self-
selects into private negotiations. Intuitively, the low-surplus firm focuses on increasing its
hiring probability and its net surplus, and thus prefers a public wage offer; while the high-
surplus firm shifts its priority to induce workers’ reciprocity and improve quality, and thus
prefers private negotiations. Importantly, the separating equilibrium is unique. I show
that alternative pure equilibria—such as a pooling equilibrium at public wage, a pooling
equilibrium at private negotiation, and a separating equilibrium where the low-surplus firm
and in contract theory (Englmaier and Leider, 2012)), it has not yet been considered in a model of wage
bargaining.
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chooses private negotiations and the high-surplus firm chooses a public wage offer—do not
exist.
Lastly, I consider how the shape of the workers’ gift exchange function affects the
equilibrium wage. The intensity of workers’ reciprocity, i.e. the slope of the gift exchange
function, influences the firm’s wage strategy in a public wage offer. As the intensity of work-
ers’ reciprocity increases, the firm sets a higher public wage. Furthermore, the concavity
of the gift exchange function affects the workers’ wage strategy in private negotiations.
A concave gift exchange function implies that workers bargain even more aggressively in
private negotiations.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature.
Section 2.3 introduces the model. Section 2.4 examines a benchmark case of self-serving
workers, and Section 2.5 provides an example of fully reciprocal workers. Section 2.6
analyzes how workers’ reciprocity affects the firm’s choice of wage-setting mechanisms.
Section 2.7 discusses two important features of the workers’ gift exchange function, namely
its slope and its curvature. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes. All proofs of lemmas and
propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
With respect to the theory, my analysis builds on the literature that examines the use of
wage bargaining. Earlier works apply labor models in the directed search tradition, includ-
ing Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b), Shi
(2001, 2002), and Shimer (2005), which all predict that firms can efficiently optimize the
trade-off between higher wages and higher hiring probability by publicly posting the terms
of the employment contract up front. In contrast, bargaining wages with workers tends to
result in too high wages or too low hiring probability, which are known as “search inef-
ficiencies” associated with bargaining. More recently, Michelacci and Suarez (2006) have
put the standard prediction in question and argue with a directed search model that firms
may choose to bargain wages with workers if workers differ in their productivity that can
be subjectively assessed on the job but cannot be verified by courts. Similarly, Ellingsen
and Rosén (2003) and Camera and Delacroix (2004) use random search models to analyze
firms’ choice between bargaining and posting, and also find that unverifiable heterogeneity
in workers’ productivity provides firms an incentive to engage in wage negotiations as the
bargained wage can be tailored to the worker’s productivity.3 Contributing to this litera-
ture, this chapter provides a behavioral explanation—that workers are reciprocal—for why
firms may self-select into bargaining.
3Habibi (2020) examines when a firm prefers to be transparent or discreet about their bonus, using
a simple multidimensional signaling model. He finds that when a worker can learn about their own
productivity from another worker’s bonus, transparency benefits the firm if the value of retaining its most
productive worker is high. While in his paper a transparent bonus reflects an internal pay disclosure, a
public wage in this chapter mirrors an external pay disclosure to prospective workers.
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With respect to the application, as one can think of posting a public wage equiva-
lent to the firm making pay transparent, this chapter also adds to the literature on pay
transparency, especially in the strand that studies the effects of pay transparency on firms’
outcomes (Brenzel, Gartner and Schnabel, 2014; Kim, 2015; Mas, 2017; Baker et al., 2019;
Bennedsen et al., 2019). Examining wage posting in the US, the UK, and Slovenia, Brenčič
(2012) find that employers are less likely to post a public wage when searching for a skilled
workers. Brenzel, Gartner and Schnabel (2014) study the German labor market and sug-
gest that bargaining may result in higher wages for workers than wage posting. Cullen
and Pakzad-Hurson (2019) focus on online labor markets for low-skill, temporary jobs and
find that, under transparency, wages are lower but more equal, and employer profits are
higher. Not only that my model’s predictions are broadly consistent with the empirical
findings on the effects of transparency on firms’ outcomes, my model also contributes to
the literature by theoretically examining the determinants of pay transparency for firms,
namely workers’ reciprocity and the surplus generated from the match between workers
and the firm.4
On the other hand, given that a take-it-or-leave-it public wage can be interpreted
as firms’ commitment to pay negotiation bans, this chapter relates to the literature on
negotiation bans. Most of the literature on negotiation bans has so far focused on the effects
of the bans on workers’ outcomes, especially whether the bans help eliminate women’s
disadvantages in negotiations and reduce the gender pay gap (Recalde and Vesterlund,
2020; Gihleb, Landsman and Vesterlund, 2020). Adding to the literature, this chapter
looks at the effects of negotiation bans on firms’ outcomes and suggests that negotiation




Consider a labor market in which a single firm meets with a unit mass of workers. All
workers are equally productive and thus generate a same surplus to the firm. If matched,
workers create the surplus v, which directly benefits the firm and the value of the surplus
v is only known to the firm. Workers, on the other hand, know the distribution of the
surplus v ∼ U [0, 1]. Each worker i has a privately known outside option θi i.i.d∼ U [0, 1]. If
workers are not matched with the firm, they receive their outside options θi.
The model of this chapter builds on a simple bargaining model by incorporating a key
assumption that workers are reciprocal, i.e., the more rent they receive above their outside
options, the higher effort they are willing to exert. With reciprocal workers, the firm faces a
trade-off between net surplus and quality when determining wages. A high wage decreases
4Fahn and Zanarone (2020) analyze how firms choose between pay secrecy and transparency. Looking
from the worker’s perspective, they argue that the trade-off of transparency for workers lies between
enduring envious social comparisons and holding the firm accountable on promised pay.
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the firm’s net surplus because the firm transfers a larger share of the surplus to workers.
However, a high wage induces reciprocal workers to exert high effort and in turn increases
the quality.
The firm can determine wages through two wage-setting mechanisms: public wage or
private negotiation. In a public wage offer, the firm posts a public wage to all prospective
workers; while in private negotiations, each individual worker bargains wages with the firm.
The match between the firm and workers mimics the hiring process in practice: the
firm negotiates with workers on their wages, and workers exert effort upon accepting the
job. The model thus has two stages. In stage 1, the firm and workers bargain over wages
according to a given wage-setting mechanism. In stage 2, taking the agreed-upon wage
at stage 1 as given, workers choose a level of effort. The details of these two stages are
described in the following sections.
2.3.2 Stage 1: Wage Bargaining
The firm determines wages with workers at stage 1, according to the wage-setting mecha-
nism. The wage-setting mechanism can be either a public wage offer or private negotiations.
The choice of the wage-setting mechanism also determines the timing of wage bargaining
between the firm and workers.
In a public wage offer, the firm posts a public wage w(v) ∈ [0, 1] to all prospective
workers. Workers observe the public wage w and decides whether to accept or reject it.
Here, I assume that the firm can commit to this public wage w, i.e., the firm cannot
increase or decrease the public wage after its announcement. This assumption rules out
the possibility that the firm increases the offered wage to attract more workers, or the
possibility that the firm decreases the offered wage after screening workers with the public
wage. In other words, the public wage is a commitment device to the firm.
In private negotiations, workers do not receive any prior information on wages before
entering the wage bargaining process. Workers bargain wages through a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the firm. Each worker i makes an initial offer wi(θi) ∈ [0, 1]. If the initial offer wi
does not exceed an maximum amount the firm is willing to pay, worker i is matched with
the firm and is paid his offer wi. Otherwise, workers are permanently unmatched with the
firm and receive their outside options θi.
2.3.3 Stage 2: Effort Provision
Upon being matched with the firm, workers take the agreed-upon wage at stage 1 as given
and decide how much effort ei to exert in stage 2. For simplicity, I assume that workers’
effort ei directly translates to the work quality qi, but does not affect the surplus v between
the firm and workers. For example, in a garment factory, the surplus v represents a constant
marginal profit of a sold garment, and workers’ effort ei contributes to the garment’s quality
(i.e., whether the garment is sewed without mistakes or with minor mistakes). The firm
cares about both its net surplus and quality equally. The profit accruing to the firm is the
sum of its net surplus πi = v − wi and quality qi = ei.
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Workers are reciprocal in that the more rent, ri = wi−θi, they receive, the higher effort
ei they are willing to exert. I assume that the workers’ gift exchange function—a mapping
from the rent ri to the optimal effort e∗i—is linear and takes the form of e∗i = τri, where
τ ≥ 0 represents the degree of reciprocity.5 A linear gift exchange function assumes that
the optimal effort is proportional to the rent received at stage 1 and the marginal return
to rent in terms of effort is constant.
Assumption 1. No dominance of reciprocity, τ < 2.
Assumption 1 states that the degree of reciprocity τ is bounded above at 2, implying
that workers do not over-generously reciprocate to the firm in terms of quality. If workers
are too strongly reciprocal (τ ≥ 2), they produce a too high level of quality that the firm
finds it optimal to push the wages to the highest possible level and hire all workers in the
labor market. On the other hand, if there is no dominance of reciprocity (τ < 2), the firm
faces a trade-off between net surplus and quality when setting wages.
In the following section, I consider four levels of reciprocity: (1) a benchmark case of
the standard utility in which workers are self-serving and not reciprocal: τ = 0; (2) an
example in which workers are fully reciprocal in that they give back the same amount as
the received rent: τ = 1; (3) the main analysis focusing on strongly reciprocal workers in
that they give back more than the received rent: τ > 1; and (4) a discussion of weakly
reciprocal workers in that they give back less than the received rent: τ < 1. For each level
of reciprocity, I consider three wage-setting mechanisms: (i) the firm posts a public wage
w for all realizations of the surplus v—exogenous public wage, (ii) the firm enters a private
negotiation for all realizations of the surplus v—exogenous private negotiation, and (iii)
the firm chooses between a public wage offer and private negotiations for each realization
of the surplus v—endogenous private negotiation. In the discussion section, I also consider
the implications of a concave gift exchange function.
2.4 Benchmark – Self-Serving Workers
As a benchmark, I consider the case when workers are self-serving in the standard sense
and are not reciprocal (τ = 0). At stage 2, the firm knows that workers are self-serving
and correctly infers that workers optimally choose zero effort regardless of the rent they
receive. Thus, the firm obtains a quality of zero, qi = 0, for any level of agreed-upon wages.
The firm, as a result, solely focuses on maximizing its net surplus in the wage bargaining
stage. I analyze three wage-setting mechanisms: exogenous public wage, exogenous private
negotiation, and endogenous private negotiation.
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2.4.1 Exogenous Public Wage
In exogenous public wage offer, the firm has to employ a public wage offer as a wage-setting
mechanism. The firm posts a public wage w to all prospective workers for all realizations
of the surplus v.
In the last period of the wage bargaining stage, workers observe the public wage. Know-
ing that the firm is committed to the public wage, workers’ decision is a binary choice of
accepting or rejecting the public wage. In particular, workers accept the public wage if the
public wage is at least as good as the outside option θi ≤ w. Otherwise, workers reject the
public wage if the outside option exceeds the public wage θi > w.
At the beginning of the wage bargaining, the firm expects workers with outside options
up to the public wage θi ≤ w to accept, and chooses the public wage w to maximize its
expected profit. The firm’s objective is given by
arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)(v − w)
In the case of self-serving workers, I reproduce the standard finding in the literature
that the firm acts as a monopoly and suppresses the equilibrium wage below the surplus,
w∗ = v2 .
Lemma 1. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous public wage, and workers
are self-serving with τ = 0. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage is set below the
surplus, w∗ = v2 , and workers with θi ≤
v
2 are employed
When facing self-serving workers, the firm has an incentive to suppress the wage in order
to maximize its net surplus. In particular, the firm bargains wages aggressively, setting
the equilibrium wage below the surplus w∗ = v2 . Consequently, a hiring inefficiency exists
in the labor market in that workers with outside options less than the surplus θi ∈ (v2 , v],
who should be employed if the market is efficient, are not employed.
The equilibrium under exogenous public wage with self-serving workers is characterized
by the equilibrium wage of v2 . In equilibrium, the hiring probability P (θi ≤ w
∗) = v2 ≤ v.
Conditional on hiring, the firm yields a profit of v2 .
2.4.2 Exogenous Private Negotiation
In exogenous private negotiation, the firm has to employ private negotiations as a wage-
setting mechanism, i.e., the firm directly enters private negotiations with workers without
providing prior wage information. Workers bargain by proposing a take-it-or-leave-it offer
wi, which the firm can either accept or reject. In particular, workers choose an initial offer
wi to maximize their wages and the hiring probability. Worker i’s objective is given by
arg max
wi
P (v ≥ wi)wi + P (v < wi)θi
For any level of initial offer wi, the firm hires worker i if the benefit exceeds the cost
of hiring v ≥ wi. If being hired, worker i receives the initial offer wi. Otherwise, worker
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i receives the outside option θi. Given the objective function, worker i sets the optimal
initial offer w∗i (θi) = θi2 +
1
2 .
Lemma 2. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous private negotiation, and
workers are self-serving with τ = 0. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage is set above
worker’s outside option, w∗i (θi) = θi2 +
1
2 , and workers with θi ≤ 2v − 1 are employed
As the wage-setting mechanism changes from a public wage offer to private negotiations,
the power to set the wage shifts from the firm to workers. This power shift creates an
incentive for workers to bargain aggressively, setting the initial offer above their outside
option, w∗i (θi) = θi2 +
1
2 ≥ θi, for all possible outside options θi ∈ [0, 1].
Private negotiations with self-serving workers creates inefficiencies for both the firm and
workers. From the firm’s side, because workers set wages too high w∗i ≥ 12 for any outside
option θi ∈ [0, 1], the firm with a low surplus v < 12 cannot afford to hire workers and has
to stay out of the labor market. From the workers’ side, some workers with outside options
below the surplus θi ∈ (2v − 1, v], who should be employed if the market is efficient, are
not employed.
The equilibrium under exogenous private negotiation with self-serving workers is char-
acterized by the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 . In equilibrium, the hiring probability
P (v ≥ w∗i ) = P (θi ≤ 2v − 1) is zero if the firm has a low surplus v < 12 and equals 2v − 1
if the firm has a sufficiently high surplus v ≥ 12 . Conditional on hiring, the firm yields a
net surplus of πi = v − E(w∗i |v ≥ w∗i ) = v2 −
1
4 .
2.4.3 Endogenous Private Negotiation
What if the firm can choose between a public wage offer and private negotiations for each
realization of the surplus? For a low-surplus firm v < 12 , it cannot afford to hire workers in
private negotiations because workers set wages too high. Thus, the low-surplus firm prefers
posting a public wage to stay in the labor market. On the other hand, the high-surplus
firm, v ≥ 12 , is able to hire workers under both wage-setting mechanisms, but achieves a
higher profit with a public wage offer than with private negotiations.
Lemma 3. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is endogenous, and workers are self-
serving with τ = 0. There exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which the firm posts a
public wage for any realization of the surplus.
Facing self-serving workers, the firm always prefers posting a public wage than privately
negotiating wages with workers for any level of surplus. A public wage offer helps the low-
surplus firm stay in the labor market, and helps the high-surplus firm increase both the
hiring probability and the expected profit. The advantage of a public wage offer is also
known as the “first-mover advantage” in the negotiation literature.
In other words, the standard theory predicts a unique pooling equilibrium at public
wage for any realized surplus. This prediction, however, is in sharp contrast with what
we observe in common hiring practices in which firms often engage in private negotiations
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with workers. Arguably, one reason is that the standard theory has failed to incorporate
one of the most prominent characteristics of workers: reciprocity. In the next sections, I
consider the cases of reciprocal workers in that if workers receive positive rents from the
firm, they are willing to give back in terms of effort and quality. I will show that when
workers are reciprocal, there exists a separating equilibrium in which the high-surplus firm
opts for private negotiations.
2.5 An Example – Full Reciprocity
Before going into the general analysis in Section 2.6, I first consider an example of τ = 1,
i.e., workers give back the full received rent in terms of effort. At stage 2, the optimal
effort is given by e∗i = ri.
2.5.1 Exogenous Public Wage
Suppose the firm posts a public wage w to all prospective workers for all realizations of the
surplus v. Let us analyze the case of exogenous public wage using backward induction.
At stage 2 of effort provision, workers receive the public wage w, and equivalently a
rent ri = w − θi. Thus, workers’ effort is given by e∗i = ri = w − θi.
At the end of the wage bargaining stage, workers observe the public wage. Knowing
that the firm is committed to the public wage, workers’ decision is a binary choice of
accepting or rejecting the public wage. In particular, workers accept the public wage if the
public wage is at least as good as the outside option θi ≤ w. Otherwise, workers reject the
public wage if the outside option exceeds the public wage θi > w.
At the beginning of the wage bargaining, the firm expects workers with outside options
up to the public wage θi ≤ w to accept, and chooses the public wage w to maximize its




P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + (w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
The firm expects to hire worker i with probability P (θi ≤ w) = w under a uniform
distribution of θi. The first term in the square brackets (v − w) is the net surplus after
paying the public wage w. The second term in the square brackets (w−E(θi|θi ≤ w)) is the
expected quality conditional on hiring. Under a uniform distribution of θi, the expected
quality equals to w2 . Solving for the first-order condition of the firm’s objective, I get the
optimal public wage that maximizes the firm’s expected payoff: w∗ = v
Proposition 1. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous public wage. Sup-
pose that workers exhibit a linear gift exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back
the full rent they receive τ = 1. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage equals to the
surplus w∗ = v, and workers with θi ≤ v are employed.
In exogenous public wage, the firm posts a public wage equal to the realized surplus
w∗ = v. In contrast to the equilibrium with self-serving workers in which the firm prefers to
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suppress the public wage below the surplus, workers’ reciprocity brings back the efficiency
in the labor market in that all workers with outside options below the surplus θi ≤ v are
employed. Intuitively, the firm expects reciprocal workers to give back in terms of effort
and quality. It thus shifts the firm’s focus from maximizing its net surplus (in the standard
setting) to maximizing the hiring probability (in the full reciprocity setting). To maximize
the hiring probability of a profitable match, the firm sets the public wage equal to the
surplus.
The equilibrium under exogenous public wage and a linear gift exchange function with
τ = 1 is characterized by the equilibrium wage of v. In equilibrium, the probability of
hiring is P (θi ≤ v) = v. Conditional on hiring, the firm yields a net surplus of zero and
expected quality of v2 . Employed workers (i.e. workers with θi ≤ v) receive positive rents
ri = v − θi.
2.5.2 Exogenous Private Negotiation
Let us turn to exogenous private negotiation. In exogenous private negotiation, the firm
does not post a wage, and thus workers do not have any prior wage information before
bargaining their wages.6 Workers bargain through a take-it-or-leave-it initial offer wi. In
particular, workers choose an initial offer wi to maximize their wages and the probability
of being hired. Worker i’s objective is given by
arg max
wi
P (v ≥ θ̃i(wi))wi + P (v < θ̃i(wi))θi
where the perceived outside option θ̃i(wi) is the firm’s posterior belief about worker’s
outside option θi after observing the initial offer wi.
The probability that the firm hires worker i after receiving an initial offer wi depends
on whether the firm thinks that hiring at the initial offer is profitable. The firm’s expected
gain from hiring includes the surplus v and the expected quality wi−θ̃i(wi). Because worker
i gives back the full rent in terms of quality, the firm hires worker i whenever the surplus
exceeds the firm’s belief about the worker’s outside option, i.e., v ≥ θ̃i(wi). Thus worker i
expects to be employed whenever the surplus v exceeds the perceived outside option θ̃i(wi).
If employed, worker i receives the initial offer wi; otherwise, worker i receives the outside
option θi.
Worker i’s wage strategy wi(θi) is a mapping from the outside option θi to an initial
offer wi. In equilibrium, the firm’s belief about worker i’s strategy coincides with worker
i’s strategy. Thus, given worker i’s wage strategy wi(θi), the firm’s posterior belief about
worker’s outside option is given by θ̃i(·) := w−1i (·).
I assume that worker i employs a linear wage strategy, that is, wi(θi) = αθi + β.
Consequently, the firm’s posterior belief about the outside option is given by θ̃i(wi) = wiα −
6The assumption that workers do not have any prior knowledge about potential wages in private
negotiations is in line with the evidence that workers within an organization rarely discuss their wages and
that access to wage information is often limited (Hegewisch, Williams and Drago, 2011; Edwards, 2005;
Cullen and Perez-Truglia, 2018).
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β
α
. Given the firm’s posterior belief θ̃i, worker i sets the optimal initial offer w∗i = θi2 +
α+β
2 .
The optimal initial offer should coincide with the firm’s belief about worker i’s strategy
wi = αθi + β. Thus, the optimal wage strategy is given by w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 .
Proposition 2. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous private negotiation
and workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose that workers exhibit a linear gift
exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back the full rent they receive τ = 1. Then,
in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 , and workers with θi ≤ v are employed.
In an exogenous private negotiation, workers set an initial offer w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 . Note that
the wage offer w∗i exceeds θi for all θi ∈ [0, 1], that means workers bargain aggressively in
private negotiations, setting wages above their outside options. In equilibrium, the firm
can correctly identify worker i’s outside option. Upon receiving the initial wage w∗i , the
firm forms a posterior belief about worker i’s outside option θ̃i(w∗i ) = 2w∗i − 1 = θi. The
firm hires all workers with θi ≤ v, and is willing to overpay workers w∗i ≥ θi.
From the firm’s perspective, the equilibrium under exogenous private negotiation and




2 . In equilibrium, the probability of hiring is P (θi ≤ v) = v. Conditional on hiring
worker i, the firm yields an expected net surplus of πi = v − E(w∗i |θi ≤ v) = 3v4 −
1
2 .
Employed workers (i.e. workers with θi ≤ v) receive positive rents ri = w∗i − θi = − θi2 +
1
2 .
Thus, the firm expects quality of E(− θi2 +
1





Comparing the equilibrium of exogenous public wage and exogenous private negotiation
under a linear gift exchange function with τ = 1, the hiring probability remains unchanged
at P (θi ≤ v), as under both mechanisms the firm hires all workers with θi ≤ v. Recall
that the firm retains a net surplus of zero and achieves the expected quality of v2 in a
public wage offer. With respect to net surplus, the firm yields a higher net surplus under
private negotiations if the surplus is sufficiently high (v ≥ 23). However, with a high surplus
(v ≥ 23), the quality is lower under private negotiations. Intuitively, a high surplus ensures
that the firm can afford bargaining wages from workers and yield positive net surplus. On
the other hand, with a high surplus, the firm could have paid more to workers by posting
a public wage and achieved higher quality.
This observation highlights that, given a surplus v, the firm faces a trade-off between
net surplus and quality when choosing between a public wage offer and private negotiations.
In the next section, I examine how the surplus v influences the firm’s endogenous choice
of wage-setting mechanisms—endogenous private negotiation.
2.5.3 Endogenous Private Negotiation
In this part, I study the firm’s choice between a public wage offer and private negotiations
as a function of the surplus v. Different from exogenous public wage and exogenous private
negotiation, in which the firm has no choice over the wage-setting mechanism, endogenous
private negotiation allows the firm to specify a wage-setting mechanism for each realization
of the surplus v. After knowing the surplus v, the firm can choose between a public wage
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offer or private negotiations to bargain wages with workers. The firm’s choice of a wage-
setting mechanism contingent on the surplus is characterized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume the wage-setting mechanism is endogenous private negotiation and
workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose that workers exhibit a linear gift exchange
function e∗i = τri and workers give back the full rent they receive τ = 1. For each v ∈ [0, 1],
there exists a separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm v ∈ [0, v] self-selects into
a public wage offer and the high-surplus firm v ∈ [v, 1] self-selects into private negotiations.
Consider the firm’s strategy when the surplus is low v ∈ [0, v]. In the equilibrium, the
firm optimally posts a public wage w∗ = v and employs all workers with θi ≤ v. If the
firm stays on the equilibrium path, the firm hires workers with probability P (θi ≤ v) = v,
and yields a net surplus of zero and an expected quality of v2 . Thus, the firm’s equilibrium
payoff is given by v22 .
If the firm deviates to private negotiations, workers believe that the firm has a high
surplus v ∈ [v, 1]. When bargaining wages, workers would then demand at least v and
optimally set the initial offer w∗i = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}.
7 As compared to exogenous private
negotiation, workers with a low outside option (i.e., θi ≤ 2v− 1) bargain wages even more
aggressively, setting a higher initial offer w∗i = v ≥ θi2 +
1
2 . While the firm prefers to hire
all workers with θi ≤ v, it cannot effectively identify the outside options of workers who
demand w∗i = v.
Case 1. Suppose that 2v− 1 > v such that the firm prefers to hire only those workers
who demand w∗i = v. The expected profit of hiring at w∗i = v is given by
P (θi ≤ 2v − 1)
[
(v − v) + (v − E(θi|θi ≤ 2v − 1))
]
This expected deviation payoff increases in v, so it is sufficient to check whether the firm
of v = v has an incentive to deviate. At v = v, the firm does not deviate if and only if the
equilibrium payoff is at least as good as the expected payoff from deviating.
v2
2 ≥ v −
1
2
⇔(v − 1)2 ≥ 0 (Always true)
Example 1. To understand this scenario better, let us consider an illustrative example.













4 . Assume that v =
1
4 such that the firm only hires workers
at w∗i = 34 . The firm’s expected payoff from deviating to private negotiation is given by
P (θi ≤ 12)
[
v − E(θi|θi ≤ 12)
]
= 0. If the firm stays on the equilibrium path, the firm’s
expected equilibrium payoff from a public wage offer is v22 =
1
32 > 0
Intuitively, when v is sufficiently large, a fraction of workers set the initial offer w∗i = v,
and the firm cannot precisely infer the workers’ outside options. For the low-surplus firm,
7Note that workers with sufficiently low outside options θi ≤ 2v−1 would demand w∗i = v, and workers
with sufficiently high outside options θi > 2v − 1 would bargain w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 .
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hiring at w∗i = v entails a possibility that worker i’s outside option exceeds the surplus. In
this case, the quality produced by worker i cannot compensate the over-payment to worker
i. Thus, the firm is better off with a public wage offer, because a public wage offer helps
the firm screen out workers and effectively hire those workers with θi ≤ v.
Case 2. Suppose v ≥ v ≥ 2v − 1 such that the firm hires all workers with θi ≤ v,
including those who demand w∗i = v. In this case, after observing the initial offer w∗i , the
firm can effectively identify the workers’ outside options. Thus, the firm hires all workers
with θi ≤ v and yields the same expected profit if it deviates to private negotiations. In
other words, the firm is indifferent between a public wage offer and private negotiations.
From the observations of case 1 and 2, the low-surplus firm does not have an incentive
to deviate to private negotiations. Given a low surplus, the firm focuses on optimizing the
hiring probability. This is best done with a public wage offer, as a public wage offer helps
the firm effectively identify workers with θi ≤ v.
Consider now the firm’s strategy when the surplus is high v ∈ [v, 1]. I examine if the
high-surplus firm has an incentive to deviate to a public wage offer. In the equilibrium,
upon observing private negotiations, workers believe that the firm has a high surplus and
set wages w∗i = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}. The expected benefit from hiring workers with a low
outside option θi ∈ [0, 2v − 1] at w∗i = v is given by
P (θi ≤ 2v − 1)
[
v − E(θi|θi ≤ 2v − 1)
]
(2.1)
The expected benefit from hiring workers with a high outside option θi ∈ (2v − 1, v] at
w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 is given by
P (2v − 1 ≤ θi ≤ v)
[
v − E(θi|2v − 1 ≤ θi ≤ v)
]
(2.2)
The firm’s equilibrium payoff from hiring all workers with θi ≤ v is the sum of the expected
benefits (2.1) and (2.2). In the equilibrium, the firm receives an expected profit of v22 . If the
firm deviates to a public wage offer, it optimally posts a public wage equal to the surplus
w = v, and achieves an expected deviation payoff of v22 . Thus, in private negotiations the
firm yields a payoff at least as good as in a public wage offer.
The indifference of the firm between private negotiations and a public wage offer cru-
cially hinges on the assumptions that the workers’ gift exchange function e∗i = ri is linear
and that workers are fully reciprocal τ = 1. This implies that for every dollar the firm
pays out as wages, the firm expects workers to give back a full rent no matter how high
wages are. In the next section, I relax the assumption that workers are fully reciprocal
and examine how the intensity of reciprocity influences the firm’s choice between a public
wage offer and private negotiations. In particular, I consider the case of strong reciprocity
where workers strongly reciprocate by giving back more than the received rent (τ > 1).
In Section 2.7, I discuss the case of weak reciprocity where workers weakly reciprocate by
giving back less than the received rent (τ < 1).
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2.6 Analysis – Reciprocal Workers
In this main part of the analysis, I consider a general setting in which worker’s reciprocity
is represented by the parameter τ ∈ [1, 2). The argument for the case of τ = 1 coincides
with the above example of fully reciprocal workers. Hence, in some instances, I will focus
my attention on strong reciprocity (τ > 1).
In what follows, I sequentially examine the cases of exogenous public wage, exogenous
private negotiation, and endogenous private negotiation. I will show that when workers are
strongly reciprocal, there exists a separating equilibrium when the firm can choose between
a public wage offer and private negotiations. Different from the example of fully reciprocal
workers, the separating equilibrium with strongly reciprocal workers is unique.
2.6.1 Exogenous Public Wage
In exogenous public wage, the firm does not have a choice between a public wage offer and
private negotiations, but can only post a public wage w to all prospective workers.
Following closely the previous arguments, the firm chooses a public wage w to maximize
the expected profit as a sum of its net surplus and quality. Announcing the public wage




P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
The firm receives back the quality proportional to the rent τ(w−E(θi|θi ≤ w)). Solving
for the first-order condition of the firm’s objective, the optimal public wage is given by
w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}.
Proposition 4. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous public wage. Sup-
pose that workers exhibit a linear gift exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back
more than the rent they receive τ > 1. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage,
w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}, exceeds the surplus, and workers with θi ≤
v
2−τ are employed.
Note that for τ > 1 the equilibrium wage w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1} ∈ (v, 1]. When workers are
strongly reciprocal in that they are willing to produce positive quality, and to a greater
extent than the received rent, the firm sets a public wage above the surplus. The intuition
is straight-forward. Recall that the firm sets the public wage equal to the surplus when
workers are fully reciprocal. Now, as workers become strongly reciprocal (τ > 1), the firm
receives more quality for any given rent, and thus the firm is willing to set the public wage
above the surplus to attract workers. Put differently, because of workers’ strong reciprocity,
the firm puts more weight to maximizing its quality relative to its net surplus. As a result,
the firm posts a public wage above the surplus to induce reciprocity from workers.
The equilibrium under exogenous public wage and a linear gift exchange function with
τ > 1 is characterized by the equilibrium public wage w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}, which exceeds the





Conditional on hiring, the firm’s net surplus is negative, i.e. πi = v − w∗ = 1−τ2−τ v ≤ 0,
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2(2−τ) ≥ 0. For any given surplus v,
as workers’ reciprocity τ increases, the hiring probability increases, the firm’s net surplus
decreases, and the firm’s quality increases. As workers become more reciprocal, the firm is
willing to post a higher public wage. The higher wage increases the hiring probability and
the firm’s quality, but decreases the firm’s net surplus.
2.6.2 Exogenous Private Negotiation
In exogenous private negotiation, workers initiate by stating their wage offers wi. The
firm privately bargains wages with each worker and hires worker i if the benefit of hiring
exceeds the cost of hiring at the initial offer wi. The benefits of hiring include the surplus
v and the quality τ(wi − θ̃i(wi)), where θ̃i(wi) is the firm’s belief about worker i’s outside
option θi upon observing the initial offer wi.
I assume that worker i employs a linear wage strategy wi(θi) = αθi + β. It follows that
the firm’s belief about worker i’s outside option is θ̃i(wi) = wiα −
β
α
. Worker i chooses an
initial offer wi to maximize the chance of being hired and the wage.
arg max
wi
P ((v + τ(wi − θ̃i)) ≥ wi)wi + P ((v + τ(wi − θ̃i)) < wi)θi
Solving for worker i’s first-order condition, I characterize the optimal initial offer w∗i in the
following Proposition
Proposition 5. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous private negotiation
and workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose that workers exhibit a linear gift
exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back more than the rent they receive τ > 1.
Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1






Similar to a fully reciprocal worker τ = 1, a strongly reciprocal worker τ > 1 sets the
initial offer w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 . In other words, workers’ reciprocity τ does not affect their wage
strategy. Intuitively, on the one hand, as the firm receives back more quality from a strongly
reciprocal worker, the worker might increase the wage. On the other hand, a higher wage
signals to the firm that the worker has a higher outside option, and hurts the chance of
being hired for the worker. The negative effect of a reduced hiring probability cancels out
the positive effect of an increased wage, implying that the wage strategy remains identical
regardless of the degree of reciprocity.
The fraction of employed workers, however, depends workers’ reciprocity τ . If τ equals
one, the firm faces fully reciprocal workers and hires all workers with θi ≤ v. If τ is between
one and two, the firm hires workers with θi ≤ 2vτ+1 +
τ−1




τ+1 ≥ v for
all τ ∈ (1, 2). As the degree of reciprocity τ increases, the fraction of employed workers
expands under exogenous private negotiation.
From the firm’s perspective, the equilibrium under exogenous private negotiation and a
linear gift exchange function with τ > 1 is characterized by the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 . In equilibrium, the firm of any surplus v ∈ [0, 1] can participate in private negotiations
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and the probability of hiring is P (θi ≤ 2vτ+1 +
τ−1
τ+1) ≥ v. Conditional on hiring, the firm











4(τ+1) . For any given surplus v, as the
intensity of reciprocity τ increases, the probability of hiring and the firm’s quality increase,
but the firm’s net surplus decreases. The resulting increases in the hiring probability and
in the firm’s quality outweigh the resulting decrease in the firm’s net surplus and, as a
consequence, the firm’s payoff increases with more reciprocal workers.
Given a level of reciprocity τ , when comparing between exogenous public wage and
exogenous private negotiation, for a firm with a sufficiently high surplus v, private ne-
gotiation yields a higher net surplus. However, with a high surplus, private negotiations
result in lower quality. In the next section, I examine the trade-off between net surplus
and quality when the firm endogenously chooses between a public wage offer and private
negotiations.
2.6.3 Endogenous Private Negotiation
I now consider the endogenous case in which the firm can choose between private nego-
tiations and a public wage offer after observing the surplus v. Put differently, the firm
specifies a wage-setting mechanism, i.e. private negotiations or a public wage offer, for
each realization of the surplus. I will show that there exists a separating equilibrium in
which the low-surplus v ∈ [0, v] opts for a public wage offer and the high-surplus firm
v ∈ [v, 1] opts for private negotiations. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the case of fully
reciprocal workers, the separating equilibrium is unique. The main result is covered in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 6. Assume the wage-setting mechanism is endogenous private negotiation
and workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose workers exhibit a linear gift exchange
function e∗i = τri and workers give back more than the rent they receive τ > 1. Then
there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm v ∈ [0, v] self-
selects into a public wage offer and the high-surplus firm v ∈ [v, 1] self-selects into private
negotiations. The cutoff threshold v is given by
v =
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
To understand Proposition 6, I will provide the intuition in two steps: why such a
separating equilibrium exists, and why it is unique. The complete proof of the proposition
can be found in the appendix.
Regarding the existence of the separating equilibrium, consider first the low-surplus
firm v ∈ [0, v] that chooses a public wage offer. Analogous to the above analysis, in
equilibrium, the firm optimally posts a public wage w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}. The firm offering
w∗ = v2−τ receives an equilibrium payoff of
v2
2(2−τ) , which is characterized by the hiring
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probability of v2−τ and, conditional on hiring, the expected sum of net surplus and quality





If the firm deviates to private negotiations, workers believe that the firm has a high
surplus v ∈ [v, 1] and demand at least wi = v. In particular, worker i’s wage strategy is
given by wi = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}, that is, a fraction of workers having a low outside option
θi ≤ 2v − 1 demand wi = v, and another fraction of workers having a high outside option
θi ≥ 2v − 1 demand wi = θi2 +
1
2 ≥ v. Given the workers’ wage strategy, the low-surplus
firm has no incentive to deviate from a public wage offer to private negotiations if and
only if the equilibrium payoff from the public wage offer exceeds the deviation payoff from
private negotiations. This is the case if the cutoff threshold v is sufficiently large, i.e.,
v ≥
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1 (2.3)
In this case, if the firm deviates to private negotiations, workers would bargain too aggres-
sively, demanding at least v. Higher wages paid to workers imply that the low-surplus firm
v ∈ [0, v] incurs a substantial negative net surplus, which cannot be compensated by the
countering improvement in quality. Thus, the low-surplus firm prefers a public wage offer
over private negotiations.
Turning attention to the firm with a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1], I show that the firm prefers
private negotiations over a public wage offer if v is sufficiently small. In equilibrium, as the
firm chooses private negotiations, workers believe that the firm has a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1]
and optimally set their initial offer w∗i = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}. If the firm deviates to posting
a public wage w, workers with θi ≤ w would accept the offer. Yielding a net surplus of
πi = v − w and quality of qi = τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w)) = τ w2 , the firm sets the public wage
w = min{ v2−τ , 1} and achieves a deviation payoff of
v2
2(2−τ) . The high-surplus firm v ∈ [v, 1]
prefers staying in the equilibrium than deviating if and only if the equilibrium payoff from
private negotiations exceeds the deviation payoff from a public wage offer. This is the case
if the cutoff threshold v is sufficiently small, i.e.,
v ≤
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1 (2.4)
Intuitively, the firm with a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1] enjoys double benefits under private
negotiations. First, with a sufficiently high surplus v and a sufficiently small v, the firm
is able to afford workers’ wage offers and yields a positive net surplus. Second, private
negotiations allow workers to voice their wage offers, exceeding workers’ outside options,
and thus the firm yields positive quality. These advantages make the high-surplus firm
prefer private negotiations over a public wage offer.




τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
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Regarding the uniqueness of the separating equilibrium, I examine three alternative
pure equilibria: (i) a pooling equilibrium at public wage, (ii) a pooling equilibrium at
private negotiation, and (iii) a separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm opts
for private negotiations and the high-surplus firm opts for a public wage offer. In what
follows, I will provide counterexamples to illustrate why such equilibria do not exist.
First, with respect to a pooling equilibrium at public wage, as in the previous analysis,
in equilibrium the firm of any v posts a public wage w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}, and yields an
expected equilibrium payoff of v22(2−τ) . If the firm deviates to private negotiations, workers
do not receive any wage information before the negotiation, and set their initial offers
wi = θi2 +
1





on hiring, yields an expected sum of net surplus and quality of πi + qi = 2v+τ−14 . The firm
thus expects a deviation payoff of (2v+τ−1)24(τ+1) . For the firm with v = 0, the deviation payoff
from private negotiations (τ−1)24(τ+1) is higher than the equilibrium payoff 0 from the public
wage offer. In other words, the firm with v = 0 has an incentive to deviate to private
negotiation. Hence, a pooling equilibrium at public wage does not exist.
The pooling equilibrium at public wage differs from the separating equilibrium in Propo-
sition 6 in two aspects. First, workers’ wage strategy in private negotiations is less aggres-
sive in the pooling (wi = θi2 +
1





with workers demanding at least v in the separating equilibrium. Second, upon observing
workers’ initial offers wi, the firm in the pooling equilibrium can effectively identify work-
ers’ outside options, whereas the firm in the separating equilibrium cannot distinguish
among workers demanding v, which might lead to over-hiring for the low-surplus firm.
These two aspects result in that the low-surplus firm has an incentive to deviate to private
negotiations in the pooling at public wage equilibrium, but not in the separating one.
Second, with respect to a pooling equilibrium at private negotiation, in equilibrium
workers enter negotiations without receiving any wage information, and set their initial
offers wi = θi2 +
1




τ+1 , the firm obtains an equilibrium
payoff of (2v+τ−1)24(τ+1) . If the firm deviates to a public wage offer, it posts a public wage
w = min{ v2−τ , 1}. The firm with v = 1 sets w
∗ = 1 and yields an expected deviation payoff
of τ2 . Thus, at v = 1, the firm has an incentive to deviate to a public wage offer, because
the equilibrium payoff from private negotiations falls short of the deviation payoff from a
public wage offer. Thus, a pooling equilibrium at private negotiation does not exist.
The reason why the high-surplus firm prefers to deviate to posting a public wage in
the pooling equilibrium at private negotiation, but not in the separating equilibrium in
Proposition 6, is that the high-surplus firm can—and prefers to—pay high wages to workers
in order to induce workers’ reciprocity and improve quality. High wages can be achieved in
the separating equilibrium due to workers’ belief that the surplus is high v ∈ [v, 1], while
in the pooling equilibrium at private negotiation, high wages can be reached with the firm
deviating to a public wage offer and announcing a high public wage.
Last, I examine the existence of a separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm
v ∈ [0, ṽ] opts for private negotiations and the high-surplus firm v ∈ [ṽ, 1] opts for a public
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wage offer. Consider the low-surplus firm v ∈ [0, ṽ] that chooses private negotiations. In
equilibrium, workers believe that the surplus is low v ∈ [0, ṽ] and set their initial offers
wi = θi2 +
ṽ
2 . This implies that workers with θi > ṽ are discouraged to apply because
they are better off with their outside options θi > wi. Conditional on hiring workers with
θi ≤ 2vτ+1 +
(τ−1)ṽ
τ+1 , the firm yields an expected sum of net surplus and quality
2v+(τ−1)ṽ
4 ,
leading to an equilibrium payoff of (2v+(τ−1)ṽ)24(τ+1) . If the firm deviates to a public wage offer,
it posts a public wage w = min{ v2−τ , 1} and achieves a deviation payoff of
v2
2(2−τ) . The
firm with v = ṽ then has an incentive to deviate from private negotiations to a public
wage offer. Thus, the separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm chooses private
negotiations and the high-surplus firm chooses a public wage offer does not exist.
Taken together, these observations imply that the separating equilibrium in Proposition
6 is unique. Negotiating wages with reciprocal workers, the firm faces a trade-off between
net surplus and quality when choosing between a public wage offer and private negotiations.
On the one hand, the low-surplus firm has a slim chance of matching with workers, and thus
prefers a public wage offer in order to maximize the hiring probability and its net surplus,
however at the expense of forgoing quality. On the other hand, for the high-surplus firm,
because the hiring probability is high, its priority shifts from maximizing its net surplus
to inducing workers’ reciprocity and improving quality. To achieve this objective, private
negotiation serves as a better mechanism to tailor rents to workers by allowing them to
voice their initial offers in proportion to their outside options.
2.7 Discussion
In the section, I will discuss how two crucial features of workers’ reciprocity affect the equi-
librium: the intensity of reciprocity—as captured by the parameter τ—and the curvature
of the gift exchange function—whether it is linear or concave.
2.7.1 Weak Reciprocity
So far, I have covered the case of strong reciprocity τ ≥ 1. In this part, I examine the case
of weak reciprocity, i.e., upon receiving a positive rent from the firm, workers return the
favor in terms of quality, but the returned quality does not exceed the received rent. Put
differently, workers’ gift exchange function is given by e∗i = τri, where τ < 1.
Similar to the case of strong reciprocity, the exogenous public wage equilibrium in the
case of weak reciprocity (τ < 1) is characterized by the equilibrium public wage w∗ = v2−τ
and the fraction of employed workers θi ≤ v2−τ . However, subject to weaker intensity of
reciprocity 0 < τ < 1, the equilibrium wage w∗ = v2−τ falls below the surplus v. More
specifically, when workers are weakly reciprocal in that they are willing to produce positive
quality but to a lesser extent of the received rent, the firm sets a public wage w above that
for self-serving workers v2 but below that for fully reciprocal workers v. In short, the
intensity of reciprocity affects the firm’s wage strategy.
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The exogenous private negotiation equilibrium, on the other hand, remains robust to
the intensity of reciprocity. The equilibrium under exogenous private negotiation and weak
reciprocity τ < 1 is characterized by the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 and the fraction
of employed workers θi ≤ 2vτ+1 −
1−τ
τ+1 . While the intensity of reciprocity does not affect
workers’ wage strategy, it does however influence the fraction of workers being employed.
As workers’ reciprocity τ decreases, the firm employs a smaller fraction of workers because
it receives less quality from workers. Furthermore, in the case of weak reciprocity, the firm
with v < 1−τ2 cannot participate in private negotiations because workers bargain wages too
aggressively.
Yet, different from the case of strong reciprocity, a separating equilibrium in which the
firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, v] chooses a public wage offer and a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1]
chooses private negotiations does not exist under weak reciprocity. The firm at the cutoff
threshold v = v always prefers a public wage offer over private negotiations. Intuitively,
when workers are weakly reciprocal, the firm focuses on maximizing its net surplus, rather
than improving its quality, and thus prefers a public wage offer. In essence, a public
wage offer serves as an efficient mechanism to suppress wages and to increase the hiring
probability. At the extreme, when workers are self-serving τ = 0, there exists a unique
pooling equilibrium at public wage, which replicates the finding in the standard literature.
2.7.2 Concave Gift Exchange Function
In this section, I relax the assumption that the gift exchange function is linear and discuss
the implication of a concave gift exchange function on the exogenous public wage and
exogenous private negotiation equilibria. In particular, I assume that the gift exchange
function is concave, i.e., the effort exerted by workers is concave in the rents they receive
from the firm and takes the form of e∗i =
√
ri. The concavity of a gift exchange function
implies that an increase in rent induces a higher optimal effort, but the marginal return
to rent in terms of effort is diminishing. Simply put, as the firm initially gives rent to
workers, they strongly reciprocate in terms of effort. However, as the firm increases rent
further, workers increase their effort to a lesser extent.8
The optimal effort level e∗i =
√
ri implies that workers are strongly reciprocal, i.e. for
any level of rent ri ∈ [0, 1] workers receive, they are willing to give back in terms of quality
more than the received rent. As a result, analogous to the analysis of strong reciprocity,
the equilibrium under exogenous public wage and concave gift exchange is characterized
by the equilibrium wage that exceeds the surplus w∗ ≥ v. That said, the curvature of the
gift exchange function does not qualitatively affect the firm’s wage strategy.
On the other hand, the concavity of the gift exchange function influences the workers’
wage strategy in the exogenous private negotiation equilibrium. Given the concave gift
exchange function e∗i =
√
ri, workers bargain more aggressively than in the case of a linear
gift exchange function e∗i = τri. More specifically, workers set their wage offers w∗i > θi2 +
1
2
8The concavity assumption of worker’s gift exchange function is in line with List and Momeni (2020)’s
finding that upfront payments induce a gift-exchange effect that is concave in the share of total wage paid
upfront.
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in private negotiations. Intuitively, for workers, the trade-off lies between the wage offer and
the hiring probability. By demanding higher wages, workers might receive higher wages.
However, higher wages signal higher outside options, which reduce the chance of being
hired for the workers. In the case of a linear gift exchange, these two forces cancel each
other out, leaving the workers’ strategy unchanged. In the case of a concave gift exchange,
the positive effect of receiving higher wages outweigh the negative effect of lowering the
hiring probability, making workers bargain more aggressively.
All in all, the intensity of reciprocity matters for the firm: workers’ reciprocity affects
the firm’s wage strategy in a public wage offer, but does not change the workers’ wage
strategy in private negotiations. On the other side, the curvature of the gift exchange
function matters for the workers: the concavity of the gift exchange function influences the
workers’ wage strategy in private negotiations, but does not qualitatively affect the firm’s
wage strategy in a public wage offer.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examine how the firm determines its wage-setting mechanism, i.e. posting
a public wage or negotiating wages with workers. In particular, I show that the surplus
generated from the match influences the firm’s choice between a public wage offer and
private negotiations. Contributing to the literature on wage bargaining, I incorporate a
prominent behavior trait of workers—reciprocity—into the standard bargaining model.
I find that, when bargaining wages with reciprocal workers, the firm faces a trade-
off between net surplus and quality in the choice between a public wage offer and private
negotiations. On the one hand, a public wage offer creates the “first-mover” advantage, and
thereby suppresses wages and improves the firm’s net surplus. On the other hand, private
negotiations, allowing workers to aggressively bargain wages, induce workers’ reciprocity
and improve the firm’s quality.
The trade-off brings about a separating equilibrium in which, facing strongly reciprocal
workers, the low-surplus firm self-selects into a public wage offer and the high-surplus firm
self-selects into private negotiations. Intuitively, the low-surplus firm, with its focus on
increasing the hiring probability and maximizing its net surplus, prefers a public wage offer;
while the high-surplus firm shifts its priority to induce workers’ reciprocity and improve
quality, and thus prefers private negotiations. Importantly, the separating equilibrium is
unique. I show that alternative pure equilibria—such as a pooling equilibrium at public
wage, a pooling equilibrium at private negotiation, and a separating equilibrium where the
low-surplus firm chooses private negotiation and the high-surplus firm chooses a public
wage offer—do not exist.
Lastly, the shape of the gift exchange function plays an important role in determining
the equilibrium wage. The intensity of workers’ reciprocity, i.e. the slope of the gift
exchange function, influences the firm’s wage strategy in a public wage offer. Furthermore,
the concavity of the gift exchange function affects the workers’ wage strategy in private
negotiations.
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Chapter 3
Work Environment, Mental Health,
and The Pandemic∗
How COVID-19 affected loan officers’ work in India
3.1 Introduction
Covid-19 has impacted and continues to affect life across the globe in various domains,
ranging from work (e.g., Brodeur et al., 2020) to leisure (e.g., Lee and Tipoe, 2020) and
mental health (e.g., Fetzer et al., 2020). This chapter focuses on issues related to working
during the pandemic, in an industry that has been severely affected by the crisis and where
work from home is hard to implement due to the nature of the tasks and technological re-
strictions: microfinance. We document how the work of loan officers changes during the
pandemic as compared to before, how employees are impacted in terms of work organi-
zation and mental well-being, and whether leadership can play a mitigating role. To do
so, we collect panel survey data from over 500 employees of a large Indian microfinance
organization from December 2019 to December 2020 and use administrative records of
performance indicators to characterize the work environment. We find i) even though the
working environment has become more challenging, the tasks required from loan officers
have not changed; ii) perceived stress worsened at the early stages of the pandemic, but
showed signs of improvement at the later stages; and iii) leadership seems to be positively
related to performance, and to loan officers’ subjective well-being during the pandemic.
With over 140 million borrowers world-wide, the microfinance sector provides access
to financial services to low-income clients who lack (easy) access to traditional banks.
However, with the collapse of household incomes during the pandemic in especially this
population, as documented e.g. by Kesar et al. (2020), repayment capacity of clients
is low (Ogden and Bull, 2020), which threatens the collapse of the entire sector (Malik
et al., 2020). In addition to issues related to re-financing, lockdowns and restrictions
to gatherings pose severe limitations on the usual operating procedures of microfinance
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Kristina Czura, Florian Englmaier, and Lisa Spantig.
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institutions (MFIs) (Pandey and Ojha, 2020). Operations traditionally rely on frequent
personal interactions (Breza, 2014; Giné and Karlan, 2014) and social pressure to ensure
traditionally high repayment rates (Czura, John and Spantig, 2020). Loan officers, who
constitute the largest share of staff within MFIs, function as the direct link between the
organization and its customers, and thus assume a crucial role in this sector.
In India, the first Covid-19 case was reported on January 30, 2020 (Andrews et al.,
2020) and a very restrictive nation-wide lockdown was in place from March 24 to April 20,
with restrictions being slowly eased afterwards depending on the local situation. On March
26, a 1.7 trillion INR relief package was announced by the Ministry of Finance. One day
later, the Reserve Bank of India announced a debt moratorium for an initial period of three
months (until May 31), which was later extended until the end of August 2020. Despite
all governmental efforts, poor workers and the urban poor showed daily income drops of
60% (Lee et al., 2020) to nearly 90% (Afridi, Dhillon and Roy, 2020) during the lockdown,
related to high rates of job loss. Microfinance clients in India are thus likely to face similar
problems as clients in other countries that have directly been linked to drastically reduced
repayment capacity (Malik et al., 2020; Ogden and Bull, 2020).
Reflecting the severe drop in incomes in samples that are comparable to microfinance
borrowers, we document a drastic drop in repayment collection rates from 92% in March
to 3% in April 2020 using administrative records. The lockdown and the debt moratorium
have led to a challenging work environment, not only with collection rates drastically drop-
ping, but also portfolio-at-risk rates increasing and client numbers decreasing. Even with
lockdown restrictions being eased, the administrative data shows a worsening of business
conditions with a continuous decrease of client numbers and loan portfolios up to July.1
These patterns might be related to the debt moratorium being in place until August 31.
While the difficulty of performing the work has clearly increased during the pandemic, the
main tasks of loan officers have not changed. Comparing time use for work tasks in De-
cember 2019 and in December 2020, around 44% of loan officers’ time is spent on activities
related to repayment collections. Another 40% of the time is dedicated to handling loan
applications and disbursing new loans, and 16% is spent on marketing and acquiring of
new clients. Consistent with similar tasks and time allocation, we do not see a change in
self-reported work time. However, we find a decrease in effort and some indications that
loan officers engage less in planning activities. This might be related to how loan officers
perceive their work: the ease of working deteriorated in the second half of the year, which
is also reflected in declining performance indicators in summer 2020.
The period in June and July when restrictions were eased further, operations in terms of
personal interactions were possible to resume at least partially, but is still heavily affected
by the moratorium, loan officers report increasing levels of stress (measured over six weeks
in June and July), but no decline in subjective well-being. While levels of subjective well-
being also remain stable towards the end of the year, perceived stress levels are lower in
December than during summer. Consistent with this slight improvement, we document
lower levels of job-related anxiety towards the end of the year.
1The administrative data is currently only available until the end of July 2020.
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It is widely believed that work organization and implied work stress highly depend
on leadership and management skills. How does leadership relate to performance and
resilience during the crisis? In microfinance, institutions typically operate in branches.
In our setting, branch managers are directly responsible for all activities of a branch,
and branches comprise 3-5 loan officers. The management and leadership skills of branch
managers, an intermediate management level in our organization, are most relevant for loan
officer’s work organization. We focus on leadership qualities of branch managers and their
relationship with loan officers’ performance and mental health. Pre-covid, loan officers
with better leaders tend to have a lower share of their portfolio in arrear. This relationship
persists during the pandemic, but there is no additional benefit of leadership during the
pandemic in terms of performance. Similarly, leadership relates to more planning and
higher effort provision before the onset of the pandemic, but has no additional benefit
for these relationships during the pandemic. In terms of well-being and perceived stress,
which we measure during the pandemic in June/July 2020 and December 2020, we find
that leadership is related to better subjective well-being in both points in time, but only
find weak evidence that leadership is associated with lower perceived stress levels.
This chapter contributes to several strands of literature. First, we focus on employees in
a developing country and document how they and their work are affected by the pandemic
over the course of a year. Most of the literature on working during the pandemic either
focuses on employees in developed countries (see e.g. Baker et al. (2020); Bartik et al.
(2020); Barrero, Bloom and Davis (2020); Von Gaudecker et al. (2020) and Brodeur et al.
(2020) for a review) or on workers and self-employed business owners in developing countries
(e.g. Lee et al. (2020) and Dai, Hu and Zhang (2020)). For example, comparing early
labor market impacts in Germany, the UK and the US, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020b) find
significant heterogeneity across those countries. This highlights the limited generizability
of findings and the need to study different contexts. While most of the above articles
examine labor market outcomes with a focus on the ability to work at all, they do not
provide a detailed description of how work has changed, and the struggles employees face.
Two exceptions are Etheridge, Wang and Tang (2020) and Lee and Tipoe (2020) who use
representative survey data from the UK to document how the lockdown and work from
home affect different segments of the population in terms of time use and productivity.
Comparable evidence from developing countries is lacking and we see our study as a first
step to better understand the continuity of work for employees who did not lose their job.
The most comprehensive study of labor market impacts at the onset of the pandemic in
developing countries across the globe is likely Khamis et al. (2021). They conduct phone
surveys in 39 countries from April to July 2020 and report job loss for a third of the
respondents. They also find that 20% of the wage workers who continue to work report
partial or no payments, which corresponds to reports of partial or no payments for April
or May in our sample. In contrast to the studies above, we are able to observe respondents
before the start of the pandemic and at various points in time thereafter. This allows us
to investigate how patterns change once lockdowns are eased.
Second, we provide detailed evidence on how loan officers, the crucial link between
MFIs and borrowers, are handling the pandemic. The impact of Covid on microfinance
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has predominantly been described with respect to the industry and institutions as a whole
(Ogden and Bull, 2020; Pandey and Ojha, 2020; Mujeri et al., 2020; Malik et al., 2020;
Zheng and Zhang, 2021) and the issues that clients face (Malik et al., 2020; Ogden and Bull,
2020). Both of these aspects are important as they determine the financial stability of the
sector. Smooth operations depends on staff’s dedication in following up with clients and
attracting new borrowers. It can hence be severely affected by frustration, demotivation
and ultimately the lack of staff, which is why understanding loan officers’ concerns is
important. To the best of our knowledge, Malik et al. (2020) are the only ones who also
interview 200 loan officers in Pakistan in April 2020. While most of the survey questions
to loan officers are related to client welfare, the authors also document high levels of stress
of loan officers related to the drop in repayment rates and potential job loss, consistent
with our findings.
Third, this chapter provides a nuanced description in which aspects leadership might
help during a crisis. In general, leaders have been shown to foster trust and cooperation
(Tyler, 2013), and promote a share sense of identity and responsibility (Haslam and Pla-
tow, 2001; Reicher, Haslam and Hopkins, 2005; Fransen et al., 2015), which might explain
why loan officers with appear to perform better under better leadership. Based on ev-
idence from the 2018/19 Ebola outbreak, Van Bavel et al. (2020) argue that leadership
can play a crucial role in times of the pandemic. Leaders can coordinate individuals and
encourage them to engage in socially responsible behaviours such as, honouring mandated
social distancing (Blair, Morse and Tsai, 2017; Tsai, Morse and Blair, 2020), or adopt-
ing preventive measures (Vinck et al., 2019). Relatedly, Dirani et al. (2020) conduct a
literature review and argue that leadership competencies in times of crisis should adapt
and further extend to providing guidance in response to fast-changing situations, integrat-
ing technology within the organization, and ensuring employees’ emotional stability and
well-being. Evidence from the current crisis is still scarce. In the context of integrating
technology, Bartsch et al. (2020) survey 206 service employees in Germany who, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, unexpectedly had to transform to a virtual work environment. They
find that leadership matters for crisis-induce digital transformation at workplace and helps
employees perform in a virtual work environment. Being able to compare effects of leader-
ship on performance before and during the pandemic, we find that leadership is generally
associated with better performance, but not differentially so during the crisis. Moreover,
leadership is related to higher subjective well-being during a very stressful period, but not
to perceived stress per se.
Lastly, we document constant levels of subjective well-being and changing patterns in
perceived stress levels with panel data from six weeks in June and July and a one-time
measurement in December 2020. A large bulk of the literature investigating the relationship
of mental health and the pandemic focuses on early outcomes, in particular effects of
lockdowns (e.g. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a); Fetzer et al. (2020) for the US, Sibley et al.
(2020) for New Zealand, and Durizzo et al. (2021) for Ghana and South Africa). Consistent
with experiences from previous pandemics (SARS, Ebola, H1N1) reviewed in Brooks et al.
(2020), most studies report negative psychological effects, including (post-traumatic) stress
symptoms and anxiety (see e.g. Rajkumar (2020) for a review of early evidence during
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Covid). We complement this literature with evidence from a time period in which the
lockdown is already lifted, but other pandemic-related policy measures (in our case the
debt moratorium) can still impact the (work) life. We provide suggestive evidence that
towards the end of the first year of the pandemic, stress levels have decreased in comparison
to summer and that from June onward, levels of subjective well-being remained constant.2
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the
setting and our data sources. In Section 3.3 we first provide descriptive statistics of the
work and tasks of loan officers pre-Covid, before we document changes to the work during
Covid. We then discuss the role of leadership before and after Covid and briefly present
robustness checks for our results. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Background and Data
3.2.1 Organizational Setting
We partner with one large Indian microfinance institution (MFI) that operates mostly in
Northern India. In 2019, this MFI served 1.3 million clients who held a total of 801,594
loans worth about 16.5 billion INR (approx. 225 million USD). Responsible for client
acquisition and ensuring repayments are loan officers (hereafter LOs), who constitute the
largest share of the 2850 employees of the organization. Three to six LOs are located at
one branch. The geographical dispersion of branches ensures that especially rural clients
can be served. LOs in one branch are supervised by a branch manager, who reports to
a hub manager. A hub consists of four to five branches and the hub manager reports to
a regional manager. The organization thus is very hierarchical and branches usually only
interact at the manager level.
Joint liability clients are grouped and organized in borrower centers (with a median of
88 clients per center), based on geographical proximity. On average, one LO is responsible
for 24 borrower centers, each meets weekly at a designated time and location. LOs lead
those meetings with the main purpose of ensuring repayment of outstanding loans. In
addition to ensuring repayment, the official job description for a LO entails many other
tasks, such as selecting potential villages for expanding operations, targeting new customers
and forming groups and centers, verifying and recommending loan proposals, as well as
monitoring the loan utilization. The tasks require both field and office work. The regular
work week extends from Monday morning until Saturday afternoon, with Saturdays being
the only days that do not usually require field visits.
Since all LOs in a branch have their ‘own’ clients and centers, the tasks can be thought
of as individual tasks. Exchanging ideas about work, for example regarding organizational
issues, remains at the discretion of each LO and, according to qualitative interviews, varies
by branch. Given the crucial role of LOs in ensuring lending operations and to prevent
collusion with clients due to familiarity, LOs are assigned to a new branch every 2-3 years.
2We use the same measure of subjective well-being as Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a) who find a significant
decrease in well-being during lockdowns in the US.
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Moreover, they will never be assigned to a branch that is within a 50km radius of their
hometown. Assignment to branches is decided by the central administration.
3.2.2 Covid-19, economic impacts, and early policy responses in
India
The first Covid-19 case in India was reported on January 30, 2020 (Andrews et al., 2020). A
nation-wide lockdown was announced on March 24 that was partially lifted a month later,
starting from April 20 with several relaxation measures in non-hotspot areas. Other areas
remained under a strict lockdown until the end of May. Notably, the Indian lockdown was
much stricter than lockdowns in other countries.3 Severe restrictions applied to leaving the
home. In addition, all but essential transport, services, and factories were suspended. On
April 20, India had 914 new confirmed cases and a cumulative of 18,540 cases. The peak
was reached on September 16 with 97,894 daily new cases (see Figure C.1 and Max Roser
and Hasell (2020)).
On March 24, the Finance Minister announced an economic relief package, but the early
impacts of the lockdown were drastic, especially for the working poor. Lee et al. (2020)
conduct phone surveys with a representative sample of poor and non-migrant workers
(1400 respondents) in Delhi between March and May and report a drop in income and days
worked of 57% and 73%, respectively. Using a large-scale survey of nearly 5000 respondents
across 12 states of India between April and May, Kesar et al. (2020) find that two-thirds of
respondents lost their work. The few informal workers who were still employed during the
lockdown experienced a larger than 50% drop in their incomes. Similarly, Afridi, Dhillon
and Roy (2020) conduct a phone survey of 413 respondents in India during April 2020,
and report the impact of Covid on the urban poor’s economic livelihood, physical and
emotional well-being. The vast majority (90%) of respondents were unable to continue
working and those who were employed before the lockdown saw their daily income fall by
87%. Afridi, Dhillon and Roy (2020) also document an increase in anxiety associated with
these economic impacts.
On March 27, the Reserve Bank of India announced a debt moratorium for an initial
three months (until May 31), that was later extended until the end of August 2020. This
moratorium on term loans allowed all banks, financial institutions and non-banking finance
companies to grant a three-months repayment break for installment payments of loans
outstanding as of March 1, 2020. Such a repayment break would imply that interest
on the outstanding loan amount continues to accrue, but the non-payment of installments
would not be classified as “default” nor would it result in an asset classification downgrade.
Offering and implementing those moratoria in practice was challenging especially for MFIs,
as terms and conditions were hard to explain to clients during the initial lockdown with the
corresponding travel restrictions. Nonetheless, it is estimated that under this moratorium,
3The government stringency index (Hale and Webster, 2020) was at its maximum for the lockdown
period (100), as compared to a maximum of 65 in Germany or 72 in the UK during the first wave.
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70-90% of the loans issued by small finance banks and MFIs were rescheduled (see Covid-
19 Briefing (2020) for a more detailed analysis of the moratorium in India).
3.2.3 Data
Data comes from two main sources: administrative data from the firm about employee
performance and online survey data of employees. The most recent online survey data was
collected in January 2021.
Administrative Data
The data currently cover the period March 2019 to July 2020.4 On the month-LO level,
these data indicate i) how many clients are being handled, ii) how many new clients start a
loan (net of those who fully settle their loans), iii) the percentage of complete repayments as
a fraction of outstanding repayment, iv) the portfolio at risk (PAR) as the percentage of the
gross loan portfolio that is overdue by more than 30 days, and v) the total loan portfolio.
In addition, the data contain information about basic demographic characteristics of LOs.
Survey Data
Several quantitative surveys have been administered online at different points in time
shortly before and during the pandemic. All variables are described in detail in Ap-
pendix C.2.
• Baseline, December 2019 This survey covers the work of LOs and its environment,
such as the tasks and time allocation, work organization, subjective measurement of
effort and knowledge of the incentive structure. In addition, it elicits reciprocal
preferences, locus of control and a measure of leadership.
• Additional Survey, May 2020 This additional survey entails questions about
cognitive abilities, financial literacy and the understanding of the incentive structure.
• Weekly Surveys, June–July 2020 Over a period of six weeks, we collected short,
high-frequency weekly data on workload, well-being and perceived stress.
• Follow-Up Survey, October 2020 This follow-up survey elicits (work-related)
issues during and after the nation-wide lockdown.
• Endline, December 2020/January 2021 This survey contains the same as the
one from December 2019 regarding work. It also includes questions on subjective
well-being, stress (as during the summer) and current work-related issues (as during
the October survey).
4Data for August 2020 to January 2021 is requested, but pending.
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Data Collection
Survey links (in Hindi, programmed in SurveyCTO) were sent via whatsapp to LOs and
they were given a week to fill in the respective survey. Since no monetary compensation
was allowed by the partner organization, all respondents who completed at least 80% of the
surveys received a certificate of participation. Before the start of the first survey round, a
video explaining the details and procedures of the study was sent to all LOS in the sample.
All participants provided written consent before the start of the first survey.
Sample
We focus on the two states Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, in which most of our part-
ner’s branches are located. All branches are located in Northern India, in (the surroundings
of) the following cities: Allahabad, Gwalior, Jabalpur, Jaipur, Lucknow, Moradabad, Sa-
haranpur and Varanasi (see Figure C.3). We restrict population branches to ones that have
at least three LOs and that offer the standard group loan.5 From branches that fulfill these
criteria, we randomly selected 150 and invite all 655 LOs of these branches to participate
in the study. Table C.1 presents summary statistics of branch and LO characteristics and
Table C.2 presents an overview of response rates in all surveys. On average, LOs are 26
years old, most of them have a college degree (84%) and half of them are married. Nearly
all LOs are men (91%). At their current branch, they have been for a little less than 2
years on average and they have worked for the organization for an average of 2.7 years. In
the first survey, we have 596 responses of LOs and thus a response rate of 91%.6
3.3 Results
We start by presenting descriptive statistics of LOs’ work before the onset of the pandemic
in Section 3.3.1 and then move to a more detailed description of how LOs and their work
were affected by Covid-19 in Section 3.3.2. In Section 3.3.3, the main analysis focuses on
heterogeneous effects by leadership before and during the pandemic. We briefly address
robustness of our results in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Work pre-Covid
LOs are the organization’s link to the clients, such that their work consists of many different
tasks that can broadly be classified into three categories. The first one is to organize loan
disbursement. This includes verifying and checking loan application documents, collecting
additional information on borrowers and their creditworthiness, and informing clients about
different products. All surveyed LOs stated having engaged in at least one of those activities
5Other types of branches focus exclusively on individual-liability clients or serve as a branch of business
correspondence for a large commercial bank. Since operations and incentives work differently in those
branches, we do not include them in our sample.
6We present a detailed discussion of attrition and reasons for it in Section 3.3.4.
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during the last working day, while the most common task within this category is the
verification of loan applications. The second task is to ensure high repayment rates. This
includes preparing and conducting the weekly meetings, reminding clients about upcoming
and outstanding repayments, and providing financial advice broadly speaking. When asked
about activities during the last working day, 99% state that they have completed at least
one of the tasks that contribute to ensuring repayment (see Panel A of Table 3.1). Most
commonly, LOs spend time on preparing meetings and reminding clients of repayments.
Lastly, in addition to ensuring smooth business operations with existing clients, LOs are
tasked to acquire new clients. This includes identifying potential new clients and new
villages to expand operations to. Ninety-six percent completed a related task during the
last working day.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics—Work pre-Covid
Panel A. Task and Time Use (December 2019)
LO% Time spent %
Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Disburse Loans 100 40 10 36 42 44
Collect Repayments 99 44 11 40 43 49
Acquist Clients 96 16 7.1 13 14 17
N (LOs) 583
Panel B. Performance indicators (October 2019 - February 2020)
Mean S.D. p25 p50 p75
Total Caseload 545 244 421 562 703
Monthly Acquisition 15 24 0 10 25
Collection Percent 92 23 97 99 100
Portfolio-at-Risk (PAR) 11 12 1.8 7.7 17
Loan Portfolio 11,021,047 5,093,824 7,919,367 11,386,569 14,353,652
Observations 2876
N (LOs) 592
Notes: Panel A: Summary statistics of how LOs allocate their time among three main tasks and the components of each main task
at baseline collected in December 2019. Out of our sample, 583 LOs answered the task and time use questionnaire. The variable
LO% shows the fraction of LOs performing at least one component of the task (in percentage). The variable Time spent % captures
the percentage of the total working time that LOs spend performing the task.
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of key performance indicators, namely total caseload, monthly acquisition, collection percentage,
portfolio-at-risk (PAR), and loan portfolio, for LOs in our sample. The variable Total Caseload represents the total number of clients
that LOs handle. The variable Monthly Acquisition shows the number of clients being acquired each month, net of settled clients.
The variable PAR is the percentage of gross loan portfolio that is overdue by more than 30 days. The variable Loan Portfolio is the
accumulated outstanding loan (in Indian Rupees) that has yet to be repaid.
While all three categories of tasks are performed on a daily basis, client acquisition
requires field work and is more likely to be conducted Monday–Friday during the official
meetings. This can explain the slightly lower percentage of LOs engaging in this category
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of tasks.7 The relative importance of the tasks is reflected in the time LOs spend on each of
the categories: collection (44% of the time) and disbursement (40%) are clearly at the heart
of the operations, while expanding the client base is a secondary task. This is also reflected
in the potential bonus payments: if collection rates do not clear a certain threshold, no
bonus is paid for any task, whereas the acquisition of clients entails a comparatively small
piece-rate bonus. This bonus scheme might also explain why time use patterns appear to
be relatively homogeneous across LOs (as indicated by the percentiles).
On average, LOs handle 545 clients and acquire 15 new clients per month (see Panel B of
Table 3.1). However, this number masks substantial heterogeneity, with LOs handling the
total of clients ranging from 421 to 703, which corresponds to the 25th and 75th percentile,
respectively. The number of clients is correlated with seniority, both at the organization
(Pearson’s r = 0.046 p < 0.001) and at the branch (Pearson’s r = 0.070 p < 0.001).
As usual in the microfinance sector (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010), the mean collection
percentage is above 90%, with a median of 99%. The average PAR is 11% and the portfolio
of an average LO is worth 11 million INR (about 125,000 EUR at the time of writing).
3.3.2 Work during Covid
How do the above described patterns change with the pandemic? In addition to the views
of LOs collected via the surveys, we also aimed at understanding the perspective of the
organization. We thus conducted a qualitative interview with the managing director on
May 12, 2020. In line with the findings of Malik et al. (2020) that clients struggle to make
ends meet, the director expressed concerns about the livelihoods of clients and the resulting
drop in repayments. In addition to clients often not being able to work from home, many
rural households face the burden of return migration from workers who usually live in the
cities and send money back to their families. While clients inquire about additional loans
for more liquidity, the organization struggles to meet its own refinancing requirements.
In addition, the director pointed out that LOs struggle to keep in touch with their clients
and that the work done at home was difficult to monitor. That is why the organization
started to require LO-client interactions to be conducted via a specific app that would
produce statistics to monitor LOs’ effort, e.g. in terms of how many clients have been
contacted in a given day. According to official guidelines, salaries for work at home would
range between 80% and 100% depending on effort, while not working at home during the
lockdown would still result in a 80% salary. In practice however, the organization decided
to delay salary payments in April for those who would not come to the office. After the first
lockdown restrictions were lifted on April 20, only 15% of employees came to the office.
In the interview, the director acknowledges that most LOs were scared to come to the
office, but also reported that paying salaries only for those who worked from the branch
substantially increased attendance rates. To the organization, this return to the offices was
797% of LOs who are surveyed such that the reference day for the time use elicitation is a weekday
report engaging in client acquisition, whereas 93% who are surveyed with Saturday being the reference
day indicate engaging in this activity.
3.3 Results 51
important because some operations such as loan disbursement can only be done from the
branches, not from home.
We use survey data from December 2020 and administrative data (currently only avail-
able until July 2020) to study changes in performance and work organization. We first
describe how performance indicators develop after the onset of the pandemic in Table 3.2.
For each indicator shown in Panel B of Table 3.1, we present results from OLS regressions
with March 2020 as the reference month. The average caseload steadily decreases over
time, such that the difference to March becomes significant in later months (Column 1).
When controlling for individual fixed effects in Column 2, this pattern becomes more pro-
nounced. Where does this drop in client numbers come from? Columns 3 and 4 show
a decline in the net acquisition of clients.8 Given the debt moratorium enacted by the
Indian government on March 27, the impact on finance-related performance indicators is
both more immediate and more pronounced: As shown in Columns 5 and 6, collection
rates dropped from above 90% in March by 89 percentage points to around 3% in April
and remained at this low level until July. This is reflected in an increase in PAR over time
(Columns 7 and 8).9 Related to the drop in client numbers, the average loan portfolio
shrinks by around 13% from March to July (Columns 9 and 10).
While a more informative comparison will need to include further administrative data
for later months, we now turn to a comparison of tasks and time allocation in December
2019 (as described in Panel A of Table 3.1) and December 2020. Table 3.3 presents a
comparison for i) all responses (Columns 1-5) and ii) individuals who completed both
surveys (Columns 6-8).10 Despite the change in work environment, at least for the first
half of 2020, that is suggested by Table 3.2, there are no statistically significant changes
in tasks that are being performed and the relative share of time allocated to each category
of tasks. This holds true in aggregate numbers and when restricting the sample to those
who answer both surveys.
The above discussion relies on measurable performance indicators or tasks that directly
map into them. In addition, we are interested in work organization, perceived effort and
subjective issues that LOs face while performing their tasks during the pandemic. Espe-
cially during the nation-wide lockdown that was imposed on March 25 and gradually lifted
starting from April 20, various problems arose. Due to the short notice of the lockdown,
around 24% of LOs could not travel home and had to stay at or close to the branch. Having
to stay close to work, however, does not predict whether LOs worked: 88% stated they
continued to work during April and May (91% of those who traveled home). Examining
more closely from where BROs worked during April and May, we find that 29% worked
only from home; 32% only worked at the branch but not in the field; 21% worked in the
branch and in the field, i.e. interacting with clients face-to-face; 10% worked from home,
in the branch, and in the field; and 8% work from home and in the branch, but not in
8Note that this number can be negative if settled clients exceed new clients.
9The relief measures announced by the Reserve Bank of India on 27 March 2020 also entailed that the
moratorium period can be excluded from the computation of non-performing loans.
10The differences in respondents is due to job rotations, resignations, promotions and higher non-
response rates in December 2020.
































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Task and Time Use (December 2019 vs. December 2020)
Fraction of LOs
performing the task (%) Time spent % Time spent %

















Disburse Loans 100 98.6 40.4 39.6 -0.83 39.6 39.0 -0.60
[10.0] [10.6] (0.65) [9.37] [11.1] (0.87)
Collect Repayments 99.0 98.6 43.9 44.1 0.21 44.1 44.2 0.060
[10.8] [11.9] (0.71) [11.0] [11.9] (0.98)
Acquist Clients 96.2 96.1 15.7 16.3 0.62 16.3 16.9 0.54
[7.12] [9.14] (0.51) [7.91] [10.2] (0.78)
Observations 583 434 583 434 1,017 276 276 552
Notes: This table compares how LOs allocate their time among three main tasks: collect repayments, disburse loans, and acquist clients at baseline and endline. The
variable Time spent % captures the percentage of the total working time that LOs spend performing the task. Column (1)-(5) include all responses to the task and
time use questionnaire in the baseline and endline surveys, and Column (6)-(8) restricts to those LOs answering the task and time use questionnaire both at the baseline
and the endline surveys. Standard deviation are reported for Column (3),(4),(6), and (7) in square parentheses. Standard errors are reported for Column (5) and (8) in
parentheses. Asterisks in the Difference column refer to p-values from two-tailed t-tests of equality between baseline and endline ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the field. In contrast to what the interview with the managing director would suggest,
we do not find a statistically significant relationship between working at the branch and
receiving salary payments. For those who indicated working during April and May, only
42% indicated having received their salaries for both months and 30% reported they have
not been paid for either. While we do not have administrative data on salary payments
to cross-check LOs’ self-reports, we interpret the discrepancies with the views expressed in
the qualitative interview as indications that especially these two months were chaotic and
stressful in several dimensions.
Table 3.4 presents summary statistics and differences in various features of working
styles between December 2019 and December 2020. All four variables are z-scores and
explained in detail in the table notes. Baseline values for the full sample are standardized
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The raw data for December 2019
(not shown) indicates that 89% of LOs engage in at least one planning activity such as using
reminders or checklists. Consistent with the task priorities shown in Panel A of Table 3.1,
93% of LOs exert effort in both marketing loan products and enforcing repayments. As
far as subjective work time is concerned, 94% of LOs feel that they often have to work
overtime or skip lunches to get the task done. Column 3 presents differences between
values measured in December 2019 and December 2020 for all LOs that completed either
the baseline and/or the endline survey. The only dimension with a statistically significant
drop is effort. As this comparison might be confounded by attrition or selection into the
sample, we restrict the analysis to the 277 LOs who completed both surveys in Columns 4
to 6 (see Section 3.3.4 for a more detailed discussion of attrition). Due to the drop in
observations, the estimates of the difference in Column 6 become more noisy. We find
weak evidence that both planning and effort decreased by about 0.15 standard deviations.
The above shows that especially the early stages of the pandemic were difficult due to
movement restrictions, the moratorium and corresponding missing repayments and that
some aspects of work such as planning or effort might have changed permanently or are
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Table 3.4: Working Styles (December 2019 vs. December 2020)













Planning 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.15*
[1.00] [0.97] (0.063) [0.95] [0.96] (0.081)
Effort -0.00 -0.17 -0.17** 0.02 -0.16 -0.17*
[1.00] [1.21] (0.070) [0.95] [1.18] (0.092)
Obj. Work Time -0.00 0.09 0.09 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11
[1.00] [1.67] (0.082) [0.96] [1.08] (0.087)
Subj. Work Time -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
[1.00] [1.12] (0.066) [0.98] [1.07] (0.087)
Observations 594 494 1,088 277 277 554
Notes: This table shows how LOs’ working styles have changed at the endline, as compared to the baseline. The Planning is a z-
score of the planning index that captures how well LOs plan their work (e.g., using reminders and checklists, and following through
with their plans). The Effort is a z-score of the effort index that captures how much effort LO exerts on main work dimensions
(enforcing repayments, marketing, and assessing clients). The variable Objective Work Time is a z-score of self-reported working
time. The variable Subjective Work Time is a z-score of the subjective work time index that captures how much time LOs
subjectively perceive they are working (e.g., often working overtime or skipping lunches). The z-scores for the endline in Column
(2) and (5) are created using the mean and standard deviation of the baseline indices. Column (1)-(3) include all responses to the
working style questionnaire in the baseline and endline surveys, and Column (4)-(6) restricts to those LOs answering the working
style questionnaire both at the baseline and the endline surveys. Standard deviation are reported for Column (1),(2),(4), and (5)
in square parentheses. Standard errors are reported for Column (3) and (4) in parentheses. Asterisks in the Difference column
refer to p-values from two-tailed t-tests of equality between baseline and endline. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
affected for at least the medium run and not only the lockdown period. We now turn
to changes in LOs’ perceptions of the ease of working, the support they receive from the
organization and job-related anxiety in earlier vs later stages of the pandemic (Table 3.5).
The earlier survey was conducted in October 2020 and asked LOs to recall their experi-
ences during and shortly after lockdown. The raw data from the earlier survey (shown
standardized in the table) indicates that during the lockdown, 73% of LOs reported that
they had a hard time concentrating on their tasks or that work became more stressful.
Despite these setbacks during the lockdown, 56% report feeling supported by both their
managers and their colleagues during the period of March to October. Nonetheless, 69% of
LOs felt demotivated or feared that the organization might close its business when asked
to consider the period of March to October. We assess how these views have changed
in December 2020. First, we compare the ease of working during lockdown (March–May
2020) with the ease of working afterwards (June–December 2020). We find a large drop in
the perceived ease of working of around 0.75 standard deviations (Column 3) that is even
larger when we restrict the sample to those who complete both surveys (Column 6). How
well do LOs feel supported by their organization in these difficult times? We compare the
perceived fairness and support by the organization for March–October 2020 vs November–
December 2020. While the overall data suggest an increase in perceived support for the
last two months of 2020, this conclusion is not supported in the restricted sample. Job
anxiety and demotivation are measured for the same time spans as perceived support. We
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find significantly lower levels of job-related anxiety in November and December 2020 as
compared to March–October 2020. This might be explained with higher levels of certainty
that the organization will not go bankrupt due to the pandemic, which was not clear in
the early months during and after the lockdown.
Table 3.5: Work Perceptions (earlier vs later months, 2020)













Work Ease -0.00 -0.76 -0.76*** 0.01 -0.86 -0.87***
Earlier=Mar-May, Later=Jun-Dec [1.00] [1.41] (0.10) [1.04] [1.41] (0.13)
Fairness & Support -0.00 0.28 0.28*** 0.08 0.20 0.12
Earlier=Mar-Oct, Later=Nov-Dec [1.00] [0.95] (0.07) [1.00] [0.93] (0.10)
Job Anxiety -0.00 -0.74 -0.74*** -0.03 -0.69 -0.65***
Earlier=Mar-Oct, Later=Nov-Dec [1.00] [1.33] (0.09) [1.05] [1.19] (0.12)
Observations 327 419 746 187 187 374
Notes: This table shows how LOs’ perceptions at work have changed in our December 2020 survey, as compared to the October
2020 survey. The variable Work Ease is a z-score of the work ease index captures the perceived ease of working in our October
survey during the lockdown, i.e. for March-May 2020, and in our December survey after the lockdown, i.e. for June-December
2020. The variable Fair & Support is a z-score of the fair and support index captures the perceived fairness and support in our
October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December 2020. The
variable Job Anxiety is a z-score of the job anxiety index captures the perceived job anxiety and demotivation in our October
survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December 2020. All outcome
variables are positively coded, i.e., a higher score indicates a higher perception. The z-scores for December 2020 in Column
(2) and (5) are created using the mean and standard deviation of the October indices. Column (1)-(3) include all responses to
the perception questionnaire in the October and December surveys, and Column (4)-(6) restricts to those LOs answering the
perception questionnaire in both the October and December surveys. Standard deviation are reported for Column (1),(2),(4), and
(5) in square parentheses. Standard errors are reported for Column (3) and (4) in parentheses. Asterisks in the Difference column
refer to p-values from two-tailed t-tests of equality between October and December. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Overall, 2020 appears to have been a very stressful year for LOs with high levels of
uncertainty especially in the first half. Given the abundant evidence that the pandemic
has had and continues to have substantial impact on mental health, we also examine mental
health in terms of subjective well-being and perceived stress. Data for this come from two
sources, six weekly surveys in June and July 2020 and a one-time measurement in December
2020. Recall that based on what we know from the administrative data, June and July
appear to be a difficult time: caseloads continue to decrease, collection percentages remain
very low and PAR keeps increasing (see Table 3.2). How does this affect mental health
of LOs? Panel a) of Figure 3.1 shows that subjective well-being did not change during
these six weeks. However, Panel b) indicates an increase in perceived stress over time. As
Table C.3 shows, these patterns also hold when examining changes at the individual level.
How do levels of well-being and stress in summer compare to those in December 2020?
Table 3.6 compares the average well-being and stress scores in June and July to the ones
measured in December 2020. Similar to the patterns observed in June/July, subjective
well-being appears to remain stable over time. In contrast, perceived stress decreases in
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Figure 3.1: Development of Mental Health in June and July 2020
(a) Subjective Well-Being (b) Perceived Stress
Notes: The figures show the development of mental health in terms of subjective well-being and perceived
stress for 6 consecutive weeks, from the third week of June to the fourth week of July 2020. Subjective
well-being is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire WHO-5 Well-Being Index, which has 5 items
and a range from 0 to 25. Perceived stress is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Perceived Stress
Scale 4 (PSS-4), which includes 4 items and has a range from 0 to 16. In Panel A, the black line shows a
linear fit of raw subjective well-being score over 6 survey rounds, using robust standard error and inverse
probability weighting. The grey shade represents the 95% confidence interval. In Panel B, the black line
shows a linear fit of raw perceived stress score over 6 survey rounds, using robust standard error and
inverse probability weighting. The grey shade represents the 95% confidence interval.
December as compared to summer. This finding is robust to restricting the sample to LOs
who responded to both surveys.
To summarize, the lockdown and the moratorium have led to a challenging work envi-
ronment with collection rates drastically dropping, PAR rates increasing and client numbers
decreasing. As far as the administrative data allows us to analyze, the summer period was
an even more challenging environment than the lockdown months March and April. How-
ever, our rich survey data also shows that many LOs struggle and report even worse ease
of work towards the end of the year. The type of work required from LOs has not changed
when looking at aggregate categories of tasks, but we find some indication of somewhat
lower effort and planning activities in December 2020 as compared to the previous year.
Mental health in terms of perceived stress appears to be impacted by the challenging work
environment: during the time of deteriorating performance indicators in June and July, we
find a significant increase in stress levels. Toward the end of the year, perceived stress has
declined compared to summer and LOs report lower levels of job-related anxiety.
3.3.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Leadership
We now turn to the role of leadership in work performance before and during the pan-
demic. For each LO, we elicit a perceived leadership index that captures the assessment
of their branch manager, using the Global Tranformational Leadership (GTL) developed
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Table 3.6: Mental Heath (June 2020 vs. December 2020)













Subjective Well-Being 12.60 13.09 0.49 12.76 13.51 0.75
[5.08] [8.04] (0.41) [4.92] [7.67] (0.51)
Perceived Stress 6.85 5.70 -1.15*** 6.78 5.94 -0.84***
[1.68] [3.19] (0.16) [1.61] [2.98] (0.19)
Observations 534 509 1,043 320 320 640
Notes: This table compares LOs’ mental health in terms of subjective well-being and perceived stress in June 2020 versus in December
2020. Subjective well-being is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire WHO-5 Well-Being Index, which has 5 items and a range
from 0 to 25. Perceived stress is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Perceived Stress Scale 4 (PSS-4), which includes 4 items
and has a range from 0 to 16. Columns June shows the average well-being and perceived stress scores over 6 survey rounds in June and
July 2020. Columns December shows the scores measured in our December 2020 survey. Column (1)-(3) include all responses to the
mental health questionnaire in the June/July and December surveys, and Column (4)-(6) restricts to those LOs answering the mental
health questionnaire in both the June/July and December surveys. Standard deviation are reported for Column (1),(2),(4), and (5) in
square parentheses. Standard errors are reported for Column (3) and (4) in parentheses. Asterisks in the Difference column refer to
p-values from two-tailed t-tests of equality between June and December. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
by Carless, Wearing and Mann (2000). Leadership is measured in December 2019 by 8
survey items and combined into one leadership score per LO. In each item, LOs are asked
to evaluate how often their branch manager engages in leadership activities such as giving
encouragement and recognition to LOs, or communicating a clear vision (see also Ap-
pendix C.2). For our analyses, we calculate the average leadership score at the branch
level across all LOs. Depending on the type of data we analyze, we estimate two different
main specifications.
Administrative Data We will analyze the monthly administrative data using OLS es-
timatation of the following differences-in-differences specification:
yitb = α0 + β1leadershipb + β2postt + β3leadershipb ∗ postt + εitb (3.1)
where yitb is the outcome of interest, i.e. yitb = {total caseload, monthly acquisition,
collection percentage, PAR, and loan portfolio}, leadershipb is the branch manager’s average
leadership rating of all LOs within the branch, postt a time indicator taking value 1 for
observations after the start of the pandemic (March 2020 and later), and 0 for observations
before, i.e. February 2020 and earlier.11 The variables are defined for individual i, time t
and branch b, respectively. Thus, in this model, β1 identifies the relationship of leadership
and individual performance measures before the pandemic and β3 captures any differential
effect of leadership during the pandemic, i.e. a statistically significant estimate would
indicate that leadership during the pandemic has a stronger relationship with the variable
of interest than leadership before the pandemic. We use robust standard errors εitb.
11In the main specification, we restrict the before period to include October 2019 and later months
only, as moving back in time makes the leadership measure less precise due to rotations. We provide a
discussion of alternative reference periods in Section 3.3.4.
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Survey Data The survey data is generally available for two points in time, so we will
estimate an ANCOVA specification to increase power (McKenzie, 2012) when estimating
the effect of leadership during the pandemic (β1):
Yib1 = α0 + β1leadershipb + β2Yib0 + εib1 (3.2)
where Y1 is the outcome of interest for individual i in branch b during the pandemic, Y0
the corresponding baseline value of the outcome. We use robust standard errors εib1. To
assess the relationship of leadership and outcome variables of interest, we simply regress
leadership on the respective variable.
Results We start with the correlation of leadership and performance indicators as mea-
sured by the administrative data. Figure C.2 presents evidence that the parallel-trend as-
sumption holds for all performance indicators: the different performance measures moved
in similar patterns for those with above and those with below median leadership.12 Ta-
ble 3.7 presents results for the period covering five months before and five months after the
start of the pandemic.13 In the months before the start of the pandemic, better leadership
scores for the branch manager are related to LOs both handling and acquiring fewer clients
(Columns 1 and 2). We also see a weak association with lower PAR (Column 4). One pos-
sible explanation for this pattern might be that relatively fewer clients allow a better focus
on each client. We do not find evidence that leadership is related differently to perfor-
mance indicators after February 2020. However, when considering the overall relationship
of leadership during the pandemic, we only find a relationship between better leadership
and lower PAR. Including month fixed effects rather than the post dummy reinforces these
effects (see Panel A of Table C.4).14
In terms of working styles presented in Table 3.8, we find a positive relationship between
planning, effort and subjective working time in December 2019 (odd columns).15 Consistent
with similar relationships of leadership and performance before and during the pandemic,
we do not find a stronger association of leadership and working styles in December 2020
(even columns).
Regarding perceptions of work, leadership does not have a systematic relationship,
neither for earlier periods of the pandemic (odd columns of Table 3.9), nor for later ones
(even columns). Restricting the sample to those who answer both surveys does not change
this conclusion (see Table C.6).
12For the purpose of illustration, we binarize the leadership variable for this graph. In all analyses, we
use the average leadership rating within a branch unless indicated otherwise.
13Note that this specification classifies March 2020 as post-pandemic, whereas Table 3.2 uses March
2020 as the reference month. We discuss the impact of different classifications and reference periods in
Section 3.3.4.
14Adding baseline characteristics of LOs as control variables to the regression strengthens the relation-
ship between good leadership and lower PAR, both for the before and during the pandemic (see Panel B
of Table C.4 and Panel C for a specification including controls and month fixed effects). The remaining
effects become insignificant.
15The results for baseline are robust to restricting the sample to those who also appear in the endline
(Table C.5).
3.3 Results 59
Table 3.7: Performance and Leadership (Oct’19-Feb’20 vs. Mar’20-Jul’20)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Caseload Monthly Acquisition Collection Percent PAR Loan Portfolio
Leadership -2.212∗∗ -0.251∗∗ -0.163 -0.0834∗ -4411.4
(1.091) (0.102) (0.101) (0.0481) (22580.1)
Leadership*Post 0.461 0.175 0.104 -0.0410 8765.7
(1.574) (0.115) (0.194) (0.0705) (32253.8)
Post 38.96 -23.18∗∗∗ -73.66∗∗∗ 6.399∗∗∗ 585711.9
(46.16) (3.427) (5.748) (2.129) (946434.9)
Observations 5481 5481 5481 5481 5481
N (LOs) 589 589 589 589 589
R2 0.0125 0.184 0.573 0.0463 0.00698
p-value leadership (total) 0.123 0.144 0.721 0.0157 0.850
Notes: The table covers the period from October 2019 to July 2020, where pre-lockdown refers to 5 months before the lockdown (from October 2019 to February
2020) and post-lockdown refers to 5 months after the lockdown (from March 2020 to July 2020). The indicator Post is 1 for March 2020 to July 2020. Leadership
is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The
independent variable Leadership captures the manager’s average leadership rating from all LOs within the branch. The indicator Total Caseload represents the
total number of clients that LOs handle. The variable Monthly Acquisition shows the number of clients being acquired each month, net of settled clients. The
variable PAR is the percentage of gross loan portfolio that is overdue by more than 30 days. The variable Loan Portfolio is the accumulated outstanding loan
(in Indian Rupees) that has yet to be repaid. The scalar p-value leadership (total) reports the p-value for the total effect of leadership, i.e., the sum of the
coefficients of Leadership and Leadership*Post. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Lastly, we investigate the relationship of leadership and mental health in Table 3.10.
While subjective well-being did not change significantly over time (see Figure 3.1 and
Table 3.6), we find a robust association between higher leadership and better well-being in
our six-wave survey conducted in June and July 2020 (Column 1). Similarly, we observe
a weak, positive relationship between leadership and the fraction of times LOs reported
an increase in well-being from one survey to the next during the summer (Column 2), but
no association with the fraction of times a well-being decrease was reported (Column 3).
We see a similarly-sized, albeit lower-powered correlation in December 2020 (Column 4).
Recall that in contrast to well-being, perceived stress changed significantly over time, with
an increase from June to July (see Figure 3.1) and a decrease from summer averages
to December (Table 3.6). However, we do not see a strong or consistent association of
leadership and perceived stress (Columns 5-8).
In sum, we find a relationship between leadership and performance pre-pandemic and
this relationship does not appear to be differentially affected by the pandemic. Moreover,
we find that leadership seems to be positively related to subjective well-being during the
pandemic, but do not find a relationship with perceived stress.
3.3.4 Robustness
Several aspects of our analysis merit further discussion. First, as Table C.2 shows, our
main sample of initially 655 LOs shrinks over time. Part of this is driven by rotation of
LOs in and out of our sample branches, LOs leaving the organization or being promoted to
branch manager. These fluctuations imply that we only retain 65% of the original sample
up to the point of the endline preparations and that we collect responses from LOs who
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Table 3.8: Working Styles and Leadership
Planning Effort Objective Work Time Subjective Work Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline
Leadership 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0148 0.0532∗∗∗ -0.0115 -0.0101 0.0196 0.0480∗∗∗ -0.00118
(0.00946) (0.0153) (0.0111) (0.0147) (0.00942) (0.0159) (0.0109) (0.0151)
Observations 581 275 581 268 588 299 590 285
R2 0.0117 0.0491 0.0531 0.0710 0.00194 0.0153 0.0428 0.0726
Baseline Index X X X X
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing various working styles indices on leadership. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire
Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership captures
the manager’s average leadership rating from all LOs within the branch. The Planning is a z-score of the planning index that captures how well LOs
plan their work (e.g., using reminders and checklists, and following through with their plans). The Effort is a z-score of the effort index that captures
how much effort LO exerts on main work dimensions (enforcing repayments, marketing, and assessing clients). The variable Objective Work Time is a
z-score of self-reported working time. The variable Subjective Work Time is a z-score of the subjective work time index that captures how much time
LOs subjectively perceive they are working (e.g., often working overtime or skipping lunches). Odd columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) show the results for
the baseline value of the outcomes. Even columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) show the results for the endline value of the outcomes, controlling for the baseline
value of the outcomes. The z-scores at the endline are created using the mean and standard deviation of the endline indices. Robust standard errors are
used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.9: Perceptions and Leadership (earlier and later months, 2020)
Work Ease Fair & Support Job Anxiety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mar–May Jun–Dec Mar–Oct Nov–Dec Mar–Oct Nov–Dec
Leadership 0.00520 -0.0164 0.0166 0.0321∗ 0.0281∗∗ 0.00191
(0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0179) (0.0134) (0.0167)
Observations 246 267 278 268 278 267
R2 0.000467 0.00395 0.00523 0.0151 0.0138 0.0000534
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing various work perception indices on leadership at the earlier and
later stages of the pandemic. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Global Transformational
Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership
captures the manager’s average leadership rating from all LOs within the branch. The variable Work Ease is a z-score
of the work ease index captures the perceived ease of working in our October survey during the lockdown, i.e. for
March-May 2020, and in our December survey after the lockdown, i.e. for June-December 2020. The variable Fair &
Support is a z-score of the fair and support index captures the perceived fairness and support in our October survey
since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December 2020. The
variable Job Anxiety is a z-score of the job anxiety index captures the perceived job anxiety and demotivation in our
October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December
2020. All outcome variables are positively coded, i.e., a higher score indicates a higher perception. The z-scores for
the later months (in even columns 2, 4, and 6) are created using the mean and standard deviation of the indices
from our December survey. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Robust standard errors are used in all
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joined the sample after the baseline. The other part of attrition is driven by LOs who
remain in the sample, but do not take the survey.
While Tables 3.3 and 3.6 suggest that there are no major differences between overall
and restricted samples, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that some conclusions change when the
sample is restricted to those who answer both of the surveys that are being compared.
We therefore analyze attrition more formally. For each of the follow-up surveys that we
conduct after the baseline in December 2019, we use baseline or administrative data to
predict attrition from baseline to the respective survey. Table C.7 present results from
probit regressions. For attrition in June 2020 and October 2020, we find little evidence that
baseline characteristics are predictive of leaving the sample (Columns 1 and 4). However,
not responding to the December 2020 survey appears to be related to lower financial
literacy and higher intelligence as measured by Raven’s matrices. A more systematic (and
problematic) pattern emerges when we repeat the same analysis for the administrative
data. In all specifications, we find that those who leave the sample have worse average
performance in the ten months before the start of the study, especially with regard to
the collection percentage (Columns 2, 5 and 8). These effects are more pronounced when
controlling for the performance in the month before the baseline (Columns 3, 6, and 9).
This implies that performance-related analyses are conservative in that they are likely
to underestimate the effect of the pandemic because we retain better performing LOs.
Importantly, we do not find leadership to be predictive of attrition.
Second, to avoid single leadership ratings being very influential in our analysis, we ex-
plore an alternative definition of leadership that relies on comparing the leadership rating of
a given branch manager to the average rating in our sample. In particular, we compare the
leadership rating of the manager to the average manager rating across all other branches,
and define objective leadership to be one if the manager is rated higher than average. This
very rough measure of leadership is arguably more robust to individual ratings than the
branch-level average. Table C.8 replicates Table 3.7. The results that LOs with better
leaders acquire fewer new clients per month is robust to this more coarse definition of lead-
ership. For the remaining estimates, we lack statistical power to detect any effects. Results
for working styles become much stronger for the baseline and with the alternative defini-
tion, we find an additional positive relationship between leadership and objective work
time (Table C.9). Similarly, results for perceptions are confirmed and strengthened, with
more support that leadership is positively correlated with perceiving the work environment
during the pandemic as supportive (Table C.10). Results for mental health are also robust
to the alternative definition of leadership and show that leadership is positively correlated
with well-being, especially in the stressful summer period (Table C.11). However, both
measures used so far contain LOs’ individual perception of their leader, which might be
influenced by performance, leading to reverse causation. We thus also create a branch-level
measure that excludes the own rating. Given that all other BROs in the branch have the
same manager, this rating should be informative of actual leadership a given LO faces.
Indeed, both measures are significantly correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.235 p < 0.001). It is
thus not surprising that most of the results are robust to using this different definition of
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leadersip: Table C.12 shows that effects for performance are robust. Similarly, effects for
effort and subjective work time at baseline are robust (Table C.13), whereas effects of per-
ceptions are weakened (Table C.14) and conclusions for mental health remain unchanged
(Table C.15). We conclude that our results regarding leadership are robust to alternative
definitions of the leadership measure.
Third, we vary the definition of the start of the pandemic and the reference period to
which the performance during the pandemic is compared to. Comparing Tables 3.2 and 3.7
suggests that the classification of March as either before or after the pandemic might matter
and it is plausible that seasonal patterns exist in performance data. We thus replicate
Table 3.7 in different versions, i) using March to July 2019 as the reference period to keep
the months that are being compared constant (Table C.16), ii) using all available data from
December 2018 to February 2020 as the reference period (Table C.17), iii) using the same
reference period as in the main table, but classifying March as “before” (Table C.18), and
iv) replicating the main table, but including control variables from the baseline (Table C.4).
Across all specifications we find a robust relationship between better leadership and lower
PAR both before and after the onset of the pandemic (β1 is consistently negative and β3 is
indistinguishable from zero). For other performance indicators, the evidence is mixed and
depends on the specification. The additional administrative data that we have requested
will help us understand those patterns in more detail. Overall, we do not find consistent
evidence that leadership has a different effect during the pandemic as compared to before.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide insights into how the work and work environment of crucial
microfinance employees have changed with the pandemic, that led to a crisis of the entire
sector. We collect panel survey data of more than 500 loan officers of an Indian microfinance
organization at various points in time between December 2019 and December 2020 and
complement these data with monthly administrative records of performance indicators.
While required tasks and the relative time allocation to them have not changed, they
become more difficult to complete. The administrative data show that this is not a mere
lockdown effect, but likely a combination of the debt moratorium and the substantial
negative impact of the crisis on the livelihood of clients. While the moratorium has expired
end of August 2020, the economic crisis is far from being over and it is currently not clear
to what extent the rescheduled debt can be recovered and how microfinance organizations
will be able to absorb this shock. Consistent with this, ease of work has decreased in
December as compared to earlier during the year. Also in line with this evidence is the
fact that attrition over the year is very high. If we interpreted attrition as an outcome
variable rather than a robustness check, the low level of sample retention (65% of the
baseline respondents are still in the endline sample; this is irrespective of the response
rate) would be illustrative of an additional issue that microfinance organizations might
face: retention rates.
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While the increased digitization of the lending process might lower staffing require-
ments, it is still unclear to what extent the microfinance model will be sustainable with
reduced personal interactions. For example, Kaffenberger, Totolo and Soursourian (2018)
report substantially lower repayment rates for digital credit in Kenya and Tanzania than
for traditional microcredit loans and findings from Czura, John and Spantig (2020); Giné
and Karlan (2014) suggest that the strong repayment norm is sustained by regular meet-
ings. loan officers as the direct link to the client are thus likely to continue to be of crucial
importance for MFIs’ operations and might merit more attention. With tight budgets that
limit the scope for bonus payments, soft-factors such as well-being can play an important
role. We find that only 56% of loan officers feel supported by their manager and colleagues,
while 73% report a more stressful work environment. Given that the health impact of the
current pandemic will also be related to mental health, this should also be reflected in
personnel policies, not only in MFIs, but more generally (Hamouche, 2020). These policies
can include, but are not limited to transparent communication and social support, e.g.
through one-on-one counseling, mentoring or (virtual) mindfulness workshops and apps.
One additional way to achieve better mental health of employees might be by investing
in leadership skills of managers. For example, Dirani et al. (2020) suggest that leadership
skills such as adaptability, stress management, and social awareness might be desirable dur-
ing the post-Covid period to help employees overcome personal and emotional problems.
We find that leadership might help to a certain degree in that it appears to be associated
with better subjective well-being. However, we find no benefit of leadership in terms of
stress reduction. More research is needed to understand which components of leadership
matter, which actions of managers can help improve which aspects of mental health and
how those behaviors can effectively be trained.
Appendix A
Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and
Stochastic Contracts
A.1 Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Suppose u′′(·) ≤ 0 and λ ≥ 1. For every λ, there exists a stochastic contract
such that the action aH can be implemented.
Without loss of generality, assume 1 > p1 ≥ 1/2. Consider a contract of the form
ui =
u+ b for i > 1u for i = 1
where b > 0.
Let fH1 and fL1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the agent’s high
and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and fL1 = P [i >
1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL). Under this contractual form, (IC) is given by
b(fH1 − fL1 )− (λ− 1)b[fH1 (1− fH1 )− fL1 (1− fL1 )] = c (IC)
which can be rewritten as
b{(fH1 − fL1 )[1− (λ− 1)(1− fH1 − fL1 )]} = c (IC’)
Under this stochastic contract, fH1 = qH + p1(1 − qH) and fL1 = qL + p1(1 − qL). It is
straight-forward to see that fH1 > fL1 as qH > qL and p1 < 1.
Consider
1− fH1 − fL1 = 1− (qH + p1(1− qH))− (qL + p1(1− qL))
= 1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL)
Notice for p1 ≥ 1/2, this above term is strictly negative. This implies the term in curly
brackets in (IC’) is strictly positive for 1 > p1 ≥ 1/2. Hence, with c > 0, b can always be
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chosen such that (IC) is met.
The binding participation constraint can be written as follows
u+ bfH1 − (λ− 1)bfH1 (1− fH1 ) = c
(PC) is satisfied whenever u is chosen as above.
A.2 Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, there exists a stochastic
contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal
deterministic contract.
Without loss of generality, assume 1 > p1 ≥ 1/2. Consider a stochastic contract of the
form
wi =
w + b for i > 1w for i = 1
where b > 0. The non-emptiness of the constraint set follows from Lemma 1.
Let fH1 and fL1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the agent’s high
and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and fL1 = P [i >
1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
Consider any p1 ∈ [12 , 1). The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH1 b
subject to
w + fH1 b− (λ− 1)bfH1 (1− fH1 ) = c (PC)
b(fH1 − fL1 )− (λ− 1)b[fH1 (1− fH1 )− fL1 (1− fL1 )] = c (IC)
From (IC), the optimal bonus size is given by
b = c(fH1 − fL1 )[1− (λ− 1)(1− fH1 − fL1 )]
Recall that fH1 = qH + p1(1− qH) and fL1 = qL + p1(1− qL). Under the stochastic contract
of this form, the principal’s cost, Cr = c+ (λ− 1)fH1 (1− fH1 )b, is given by
Cr = c+
(λ− 1)[qH + p1(1− qH)](1− qH)(1− p1)c
(qH − qL)(1− p1)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
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Suppose that the optimal deterministic contract exists.1 Then the principal’s cost under
the optimal deterministic contract (i.e., p1 = 0) is given by
Cd = c+
(λ− 1)qH(1− qH)c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
The stochastic contract reduces the principal’s cost if and only if Cd ≥ Cr.
⇔ qH1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)
≥ qH + p1(1− qH)1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))
Since the solution exists for both deterministic and stochastic contracts, both denominators
are positive. Cross multiply the inequalities.
Notice the term qH [1 − (λ − 1)(1 − qH − qL)] is present on both sides. The inequality is
reduced to
⇔ qH(λ− 1)p1(2− qH − qL) ≥ p1(1− qH)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
⇔ qH(λ− 1)(2− qH − qL) ≥ (1− qH)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
Removing the term qH(λ− 1)(1− qH − qL) on both sides, I have
⇔ qH(λ− 1) ≥ 1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)− qH
⇔ 0 ≥ 1− qH − (λ− 1)(1− qL)
⇔ λ− 1 ≥ 1− qH1− qL
Since λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL , Cr < Cd . This completes the proof.
A.3 Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ ≥ 1. Then, any stochastic contract with the wage
structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 is weakly dominated by the optimal deterministic contract.
Consider a stochastic contract of the form
wi =
w + b for i = 4w for i < 4
where b > 0. Let fH4 and fL4 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the
agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH4 = P [i = 4|aH ] = p2qH and fL4 = P [i =
1If the principal’s constraint set is empty under deterministic contracts, then it is assumed that the
principal’s cost becomes prohibitively high. It follows directly that stochastic contracts, which enable the
principal to implement the desired action, strictly dominate deterministic contracts.
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4|aL] = p2qL.
The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH4 b
subject to
w + fH4 b− (λ− 1)bfH4 (1− fH4 ) = c (PC)
b(fH4 − fL4 )− (λ− 1)b[fH4 (1− fH4 )− fL4 (1− fL4 )] = c (IC)
Suppose that the above constraint set is non-empty, the optimal bonus size is given by
b = c(fH4 − fL4 )[1− (λ− 1)(1− fH4 − fL4 )]
Recall that fH4 = p2qH and fL4 = p2qL. Under the stochastic contract of this form, the
principal’s cost, C = c+ (λ− 1)fH4 (1− fH4 )b, is given by
C = c+ (λ− 1)p2qH(1− p2qH)c
p2(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− p2qH − p2qL)]
Note that if the constraint set for the above stochastic contract is non-empty, then the
constraint set for the deterministic contract is also non-empty. Thus, the principal’s cost
under the optimal deterministic contract (i.e., p2 = 1) is given by
Cd = c+
(λ− 1)qH(1− qH)c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
It is straight-forward to see that C ≥ Cd for any 1 ≥ p2 > 0.
A.4 Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ−1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, the second-best optimal stochas-
tic contract does not exist.
Suppose, by contradiction, the solution for the principal’s problem exists.
I decompose the principal’s problem into two subproblems. First, for a given stochastic
structure (p1, p2), I derive the optimal wage payments that implement aH . Second, I choose
the stochastic structure to achieve the lowest cost.
Step 1: Given any contract (ŵi)4i=1 the principal offers, I can relabel the states such
that this contract is equivalent to a contract (wi)4i=1 of an (weakly) increasing wage profile
with wi−1 ≤ wi for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Let bi = wi−wi−1 ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Let fHi and
fLi be the probability that state i is realized conditional on aH and aL respectively.
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biβi = c (IC)





















The principal’s problem is a linear programming problem. It is well known that if a linear
programming has a solution, this (unique) solution is an extreme point of the constraint
set. All extreme points of the constraint set are characterised by the following property:
bi > 0 for exactly one state i ∈ {2, 3, 4} and bt = 0 for all t 6= i, t ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
It remains to determine for which state i ∈ {2, 3, 4} the bonus is set strictly positive.
From Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 if λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL , the second-best optimal stochastic
contract has the optimal wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
Step 2: I now consider the optimal stochastic structure p1 to achieve the lowest cost.
Recall that under the stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4, the
principal’s cost is given by
Cr = c+
(λ− 1)[qH + p1(1− qH)][1− qH ]c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
Differentiation of Cr with respect to p1 yields
∂Cr
∂p1
= c(λ− 1)(1− qH)[2− qH − qL − λ(1− qL)](qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]2
Obviously, ∂Cr/∂p1 < 0 for all p1 as λ > 2−qH−qL1−qL . The principal can always achieve a lower
cost by increasing p1 close to 1, i.e., the probability of bonus is almost 1. However, p1 can
not reach 1 due to the incentive constraint. Hence, the second-best optimal stochastic
contract does not exist.
A.5 Proposition 3
Proposition 3. Suppose (A1) holds, u′′(·) = 0, and w ≥ 0. Then, the second-best optimal
stochastic contract exists. The optimal stochastic contract pays b∗(p∗1) with probability one
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when the good signal is realized and with probability p∗1 when the bad signal is realized. The







2− qH − qL
− qH

Consider a stochastic contract of the form
wi =
w + b for i > 1w for i = 1
where b > 0. Let fH1 and fL1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the
agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and
fL1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH1 b
subject to
w + fH1 b− (λ− 1)bfH1 (1− fH1 ) ≥ c (PC)
b(fH1 − fL1 )− (λ− 1)b[fH1 (1− fH1 )− fL1 (1− fL1 )] ≥ c (IC)
w ≥ 0 (LL)
Notice first that the (LL) constraint is binding. Suppose, by contradiction, w > 0 is
the optimal wage scheme. Reducing w by a small amount ε, the principal decreases the
expected payment without changing (IC) or violating (LL) constraint. Thus, w∗ = 0.
Notice also that the (IC) constraint is binding. Suppose, by contradiction, (IC) is slack.
Reducing b by a small amount ε, the principal decreases the expected payment without
changing (LL) or violating (IC) constraint.
Assume that the optimal deterministic contract exists, then the constraint set for the
above stochastic contract is non-empty.2 Thus, at optimum, the bonus is given by
b∗ = c(fH1 − fL1 )[1− (λ− 1)(1− fH1 − fL1 )]
Under the stochastic contract of this form, the principal’s cost, Cr = w∗ + fH1 b∗ = fH1 b∗,
is given by
Cr =
(qH + p1(1− qH))c
(qH − qL)(1− p1)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
2If the deterministic contract has no solution, the dominance of the stochastic contract is trivial. The
reason is that the principal can always implement aH under the stochastic contract by setting p1 ∈ [1/2, 1)
(Lemma 1). On the other hand, if the optimal deterministic contract exists, i.e., (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL) < 1,
it follows that (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL)) < 1. Thus, the constraint set under the stochastic
contract is non-empty for all p1.
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Analogously, the principal’s cost under the optimal deterministic contract with limited
liability is given by
Cd =
qHc
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
Note that if p1 = 0, then Cr = Cd












< 0⇔ (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL + qH(2− qH − qL)) > 1 (A1)
Provided that (A1) holds, there exists a stochastic contract of the wage structure w1 <
w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract.3 Solving for the







2− qH − qL
− qH

The second-best optimal stochastic contract is characterized by w∗ = 0, b∗(p∗1), and p∗1.
This completes the proof.
A.6 Proposition 4
Proposition 4. Suppose the agent exhibits disappointment aversion according to Bell (1985),
u′′(·) = 0, and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and two signals. Then, there exists a
stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the
optimal deterministic contract.
The proof of Proposition ?? closely follows the proof of Proposition 1. I first show
that the principal’s problem remains the same regardless of whether the agent exhibits
disappointment aversion (Bell, 1985) or loss aversion (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007).
3Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2, it can be shown that under limited liability, adding noise
to the good outcome is weakly dominated by the optimal deterministic contract. The cost of a
stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 under limited liability is given by
C = qHc(qH −qL)(1−(λ−1)(1−p2qH −p2qL) , which is weakly larger than Cd – the cost under the optimal determin-
istic contract – for all p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the second-best optimal stochastic contract has the wage structure
of w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
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Consider a stochastic contract of the form
wi =
w + b for i > 1w for i = 1
where b > 0. Let fH1 and fL1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the
agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and
fL1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
Under the disappointment aversion, the agent compares a realized outcome to the cer-
tainty equivalence of the prospect, which is given by CEr(aH) = w+fH1 b. With probability
fH1 a bonus is realized, the agent feels elated by receiving (1−fH1 )b more than the certainty
equivalence. With probability (1−fH1 ) a bonus is not realized, the agent feels disappointed
by receiving fH1 b less than the certainty equivalence. The agent’s utility from choosing aH
is given by
w + fH1 b+ fH1 (1− fH1 )b− λ(1− fH1 )fH1 b = w + fH1 b− (λ− 1)fH1 (1− fH1 )b
The (IC) constraint is given by
b(fH1 − fL1 )− (λ− 1)b[fH1 (1− fH1 )− fL1 (1− fL1 )] = c
Notice that the above (PC) and (IC) constraints coincide with the principal’s constraints
under CPE loss aversion.
Assume w.l.o.g. 1 > p1 ≥ 1/2, the non-emptiness of the constraint set follows from
Lemma 1, and the dominance of the stochastic contract analogously follows from Proposi-
tion 1.
A.7 Proposition 5
Proposition 5. Suppose the agent exhibits the PPE loss aversion, u′′(·) = 0, qH + 2qL ≤ 2
and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and two signals. Then, there exists a stochastic
contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal
deterministic contract.
Consider a stochastic contract of the form
wi =
w + b for i > 1w for i = 1
where b > 0. Let fH1 and fL1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the
agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and
fL1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
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Under PPE loss aversion, the agent identifies (i) the set of personal equilibrium (PE)
that includes all actions the agent can follow through, and (ii) the preferred action among
the set of personal equilibrium (PPE).
a ∈ PE ⇔ EU(a|a) ≥ EU(a′|a) ∀a′ 6= a
a ∈ PPE ⇔ EU(a|a) ≥ EU(a′|a′) ∀a′ ∈ PE
For aH ∈ PE, EU(aH |aH) ≥ EU(aL|aH), the latter refers to the expected utility when
the agent expects to choose aH but actually chooses aL, is given by
w + fH1 b− (λ− 1)fH1 (1− fH1 )b− c ≥ w + fL1 b+ fL1 (1− fH1 )b− λ(1− fL1 )fH1 b+ c
This is equivalent to
b ≥ 2c(fH1 − fL1 )[2 + fH1 (λ− 1)]
:= b (aH-PE)
Analogously, for aL ∈ PE
b ≤ (λ+ 1)c(fH1 − fL1 )[2 + fL1 (λ− 1)]
:= b (aL-PE)
Note that b > b for all λ ≥ 1.
The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH1 b
subject to
w + fH1 b− (λ− 1)bfH1 (1− fH1 ) = c (PC)
b ≥ c(fH1 − fL1 )[1− (λ− 1)(1− fH1 − fL1 )]
:= b̃ (aH-PPE)
b ≥ b (aH-PE)
Assume that the optimal deterministic contract exists, it follows that the principal’s con-
straint set for the stochastic contract is non-empty. There exists p1 ∈ [0, 1) such that b̃ ≥ b.
Consider a relaxed problem without (aH-PE) constraint. The relaxed problem coincides
with the principal’s problem of CPE loss aversion and, from Proposition 1, the cost is given
by
Cr = c+
(λ− 1)[qH + p1(1− qH)][1− qH ]c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
Following the above analysis analogously, if qH + 2qL ≤ 2, then the principal’s cost
under the optimal deterministic contract is given by
Cd = c+
(λ− 1)qH(1− qH)c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
Since λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL , Cr < Cd. This completes the proof.





Lemma 1. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous public wage, and workers
are self-serving with τ = 0. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage is set below the
surplus, w∗ = v2 , and workers with θi ≤
v
2 are employed.
Because workers are self-serving, ei = 0 in Stage 2 for any level of public wage w. Thus,
the firm receives zero quality qi = 0 in Stage 2.
In Stage 1, after observing a take-it-or-leave-it offer w, workers accept w if θi ≤ w, and
reject otherwise. Thus, the probability of hiring is given by P (θi ≤ w).











First-order condition with respect to w gives us
v − 2w∗ = 0
⇔w∗ = v2
Workers with θi ≤ w∗, or equivalently θi ≤ v2 , are employed.
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B.2 Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous private negotiation, and
workers are self-serving with τ = 0. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage is set above
worker’s outside option, w∗i (θi) = θi2 +
1
2 , and workers with θi ≤ 2v − 1 are employed.
Because workers are self-serving, ei = 0 in Stage 2 for any level of initial offers wi.
Thus, the firm receives zero quality qi = 0 in Stage 2.
In Stage 1, workers believe that the firm hires at a given initial offer wi if the benefit
exceeds the cost, i.e. if v ≥ wi. Workers choose the initial offer wi to maximize their wages
and the hiring probability. Worker i’s objective is given by
arg max
wi
P (v ≥ wi)wi + P (v < wi)θi
= arg max
wi
(1− wi)wi + wiθi
= arg max
wi
wi − w2i + wiθi
First-order condition with respect to wi gives us






Worker i with an outside option θi is employed if
v ≥ w∗i
⇔v ≥ θi2 +
1
2
⇔2v − 1 ≥ θi
B.3 Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is endogenous, and workers are self-
serving with τ = 0. There exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which the firm posts a
public wage for any realization of the surplus.
Case 1. For the firm with v < 12 :




2 ∀θi ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, for v < 12 , v < w
∗
i ∀θi ∈ [0, 1]. The firm cannot hire workers in private negotiation
and has an expected payoff of 0.
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If the firm chooses public wage, it posts a public wage w∗ = v2 . The firm hires workers
with probability P (θi ≤ w∗) = v2 and, conditional on hiring, earns a profit πi = v−w
∗ = v2 .
Thus, the firm yields an expected payoff of v24 ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ [0, 1].
⇒ The firm with v < 12 always prefers public wage. (1)
Case 2. For the firm with v ≥ 12 :
If the firm chooses private negotiation, workers demand w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 and the firm hires
workers with probability P (w∗i ≤ v) = P (θi ≤ 2v − 1) = 2v − 1. Conditional on hiring,
the firm achieves a profit of πi = v − E(w∗i |θi ≤ 2v − 1) = 2v−14 . Thus, the firm yields an
expected payoff of (2v−1)24 in private negotiation.
If the firm chooses public wage, it yields an expected payoff of v24 .





⇔v2 ≥ (2v − 1)2
⇔v ≥ 2v − 1
⇔1 ≥ v (Always true)
⇒ the firm with v ≥ 12 always prefers public wage. (2)
From (1) and (2), there exists a unique pooling equilibrium at public wage.
B.4 Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous public wage. Suppose
that workers exhibit a linear gift exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back the full
rent they receive τ = 1. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage equals to the surplus
w∗ = v, and workers with θi ≤ v are employed.
Because workers are fully reciprocal, given a public wage w and an outside option θi,
workers exert effort equal to rent ei = ri = w − θi in Stage 2
In Stage 1, after observing a take-it-or-leave-it offer w, workers accept w if θi ≤ w, and
reject otherwise. Thus, the probability of hiring is given by P (θi ≤ w).
At the beginning of the wage bargaining, the firm chooses a public wage w to maximize
the expected payoff, which is a sum of profit and quality
arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + (w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w
w(v − E(θi|θi ≤ w))
= arg max
w
w(v − w2 )
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First-order condition with respect to w gives us
v − w∗ = 0
⇔w∗ = v
Workers with θi ≤ w∗, or equivalently θi ≤ v, are employed.
B.5 Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous private negotiation
and workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose that workers exhibit a linear gift
exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back the full rent they receive τ = 1. Then,
in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 , and workers with θi ≤ v are employed.
Because workers are fully reciprocal, the firm expects quality qi = wi − θ̃i(wi), where
θ̃i(wi) = E(θi|wi) denotes the firm’s posterior belief about worker i’s outside option θi after
observing the initial offer wi.
In Stage 1, the firm hires at an initial offer wi if the benefit of hiring exceeds the cost
of hiring, i.e.
⇔v + wi − θ̃i(wi) ≥ wi
⇔v ≥ θ̃i(wi)
Thus, workers believe the probability of hiring to be P (v ≥ θ̃i). Workers bargain though
a take-it-or-leave-it offer wi. In particular, workers chooses an initial offer wi to maximize
their wages and the hiring probability. Worker i’s objective is given by
arg max
wi
P (v ≥ θ̃i(wi))wi + P (v < θ̃i(wi))θi
I assume that worker i employs a linear wage strategy, that is, wi(θi) = αθi + β. In
equilibrium, the firm’s belief about worker i’s strategy coincides with worker i’s strategy.
Consequently, the firm’s posterior belief about the outside option is given by θ̃i(wi) =
w−1i (θi) = wiα −
β
α
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Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and
β = α+β2 . Thus, α = β =
1
2 . ⇒ Worker i’s wage strategy is given by w
∗
i = θi2 +
1
2 .
In equilibrium, θ̃i(wi) = θi. Hence, workers with θi ≤ v are employed.
B.6 Proposition 3
Proposition 3. Assume the wage-setting mechanism is endogenous private negotiation and
workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose that workers exhibit a linear gift exchange
function e∗i = τri and workers give back the full rent they receive τ = 1. For each v ∈ [0, 1],
there exists a separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm v ∈ [0, v] self-selects into
a public wage offer and the high-surplus firm v ∈ [v, 1] self-selects into private negotiations.
Consider first the firm of a low match surplus v ∈ [0, v]. In equilibrium, the firm of a




P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + (w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w
w(v − w2 )
First-order condition with respect to w gives us: w∗ = v
Given the public wage w∗ = v, the probability of hiring is P (θi ≤ v) = v. Conditional
on hiring, the firm obtains a profit of v − w and quality of w − E(θi|θi ≤ w). Thus, the
firm’s equilibrium payoff in public wage is given by
v(v − w + w − E(θi|θi ≤ v))
=v(v − v2) =
v2
2
If the firm deviates to private negotiation, workers believe, upon observing private
negotiation, that the firm has a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1] and demand at least v. Assume that
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for wi ≥ v, workers employ a linear wage strategy wi(θi) = αθi + β. Thus, upon observing
the initial offer wi, the firm believes the outside option is θ̃i = wiα −
β
α
and hires if v ≥ θ̃i.
Believing that v ∈ [v, 1], workers choose their initial offer wi to maximize their wages
and the hiring probability.
arg max
wi≥v





































































Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and
β = α+β2 . Thus, α = β =
1
2 .




v if θi < 2v − 1θi
2 +
1
2 if θi ≥ 2v − 1
Case 1. Suppose that 2v− 1 > v such that the firm prefers to hire only those workers
who demand w∗i = v. The expected payoff of hiring at w∗i = v is given by
P (θi ≤ 2v − 1)
[
(v − v) + (v − E(θi|θi ≤ 2v − 1))
]
=(2v − 1)(v − v + 12)
It is sufficient to check whether the firm of v = v has an incentive to deviate. At v = v,
the firm does not deviate if and only if the equilibrium payoff is at least as good as the
expected payoff from deviating.
v2
2 ≥ v −
1
2
⇔(v − 1)2 ≥ 0 (Always true)
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Case 2. Suppose v ≥ v ≥ 2v − 1 such that the firm hires all workers with θi ≤ v,
including those who demand w∗i = v. The firm yields an expected deviation payoff of
P (θi ≤ 2v − 1)(v − E(θi|θi ≤ 2v − 1))
+ P (2v − 1 ≤ θi ≤ v)(v − E(θi|2v − 1 ≤ θi ≤ v))



















⇒ The firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, v] is indifferent between public wage and private
negotiation. In case of indifference, the firm prefers to stay in the equilibrium and chooses
public wage.
Consider now the firm of a high match surplus v ∈ [v, 1]. In equilibrium, the firm opts
for private negotiation. Workers, upon updating their belief that v ∈ [v, 1], set their wage
strategy w∗i = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}. Thus, the firm’s equilibrium payoff in private negotiation is
given by
P (θi ≤ 2v − 1)(v − E(θi|θi ≤ 2v − 1))
+ P (2v − 1 ≤ θi ≤ v)(v − E(θi|2v − 1 ≤ θi ≤ v))







If the firm deviates to public wage, it optimally posts a public wage w∗ = v and yields an
expected deviation payoff of v22
⇒ The firm of a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1] is indifferent between private negotiation and
public wage. In case of indifference, the firm prefers to stay in the equilibrium and chooses
private negotiation.
B.7 Proposition 4
Proposition 4. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous public wage. Sup-
pose that workers exhibit a linear gift exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back
more than the rent they receive τ > 1. Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage,
w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}, exceeds the surplus, and workers with θi ≤
v
2−τ are employed.
Because workers are strongly reciprocal (τ ≥ 1), given a public wage w and an outside
option θi, workers exert more effort than the received rent ei = τri = τ(w − θi) in Stage 2
In Stage 1, after observing a public wage w, workers accept w if θi ≤ w, and reject
otherwise. Thus, the probability of hiring is given by P (θi ≤ w).
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At the beginning of the wage bargaining, the firm chooses a public wage w to maximize
the expected payoff, which is a sum of profit and quality
arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w≤1
w(v − w + τ w2 )
= arg max
w≤1
wv − w2 + τ2w
2
First-order condition with respect to w gives us1
v − 2w∗ + τw∗ = 0




2−τ if v ≤ 2− τ
1 if v ≥ 2− τ
Note that w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1} ≥ v for all τ ≥ 1. Workers with θi ≤ w
∗, or equivalently
θi ≤ v2−τ , are employed.
Note on comparative statistics with respect to τ :
The equilibrium under exogenous public wage and linear gift exchange with τ ≥ 1 is
characterized by





= v(2− τ)2 ≥ 0
⇒ As τ increases, the hiring probability increases.











=v1− τ − (2− τ)(2− τ)2
= −v(2− τ)2 ≤ 0
⇒ As τ increases, the firm’s profit decreases.
1Note that if w ≥ 1, the firm’s payoff is given by v−w+ τ2 , which decreases in w. Thus the firm wants
to cap the public wage w at 1.
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(2− τ)2 ≥ 0
⇒ As τ increases, the firm’s quality increases.
B.8 Proposition 5
Proposition 5. Assume that the wage-setting mechanism is exogenous private negotiation
and workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose that workers exhibit a linear gift
exchange function e∗i = τri and workers give back more than the rent they receive τ > 1.
Then, in equilibrium, the equilibrium wage w∗i = θi2 +
1






Because workers are strongly reciprocal, the firm expects quality qi = τ(wi − θ̃i(wi)),
where θ̃i(wi) = E(θi|wi) denotes the firm’s posterior belief about worker i’s outside option
θi after observing the initial offer wi.
In Stage 1, the firm hires at an initial offer wi if the benefit of hiring exceeds the cost
of hiring, i.e.
⇔v + τ(wi − θ̃i(wi)) ≥ wi
⇔v ≥ (1− τ)wi + τ θ̃i(wi)
I assume that worker i employs a linear wage strategy, that is, wi(θi) = αθi + β. In
equilibrium, the firm’s belief about worker i’s strategy coincides with worker i’s strategy.
Consequently, the firm’s posterior belief about the outside option is given by θ̃i(wi) =




Substituting the firm’s posterior belief θ̃i(wi) into the hiring probability, we have
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Thus, workers believe the probability of hiring is P (v ≥ α+τ−τα
α
wi − τβα ) at a given wi.
Workers bargain though a take-it-or-leave-it offer wi. In particular, workers chooses an









)wi + P (v <



































First-order condition with respect to wi gives us





+ α + τ − τα
α
θi = 0
⇔α + τ − τα
α
2w∗i = 1 +
τβ
α
+ α + τ − τα
α
θi










2(α + τ − τα) +
1
2θi
Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and
β = α+τβ2(α+τ−τα) . Thus, α = β =
1
2 .
⇒ Worker i’s wage strategy is given by w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 .
In equilibrium, the firm correctly infer workers’ outside option θ̃i(wi) = θi. Hence,
worker i, with the initial offer w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 , gets employed if and only if
v − wi + τ(wi − θi) ≥ 0
⇔v + (τ − 1)(θi2 +
1
2)− τθi ≥ 0




τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 ≥ θi
Note on comparative statistics with respect to τ :
The equilibrium under exogenous private negotiation and linear gift exchange with
τ ≥ 1 is characterized by
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= −2v(τ + 1)2 +
−(τ − 1)
(τ + 1)2 +
1
τ + 1
=−2v − τ + 1 + τ + 1(τ + 1)2
=2(1− v)(τ + 1)2 ≥ 0
⇒ As τ increases, the hiring probability increases.
2. The firm’s profit:
πi =v − E(w∗i |θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1)




τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1)




τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1)
=v − 12 −
v
2(τ + 1) −
τ − 1
4(τ + 1)
= 2τ + 12(τ + 1)v −
3τ + 1
4(τ + 1) =





[(3τ + 1)− 2(2τ + 1)v





[(1− 2v)− τ(4v − 3)





(1− 2v) + (4v − 3)
(τ + 1)2 =
−(1− v)
2(τ + 1)2 ≤ 0
⇒ As τ increases, the firm’s profit decreases.


















2v + τ − 1
2(τ + 1) )
=τ(τ + 3− 2v)4(τ + 1)




[−τ(τ + 3− 2v)
(τ + 1)2 +








2(τ + 1)2 ≥ 0
⇒ As τ increases, the firm’s quality increases.
B.9 Proposition 6
Proposition 6. Assume the wage-setting mechanism is endogenous private negotiation and
workers employ a linear wage strategy. Suppose workers exhibit a linear gift exchange
function e∗i = τri and workers give back more than the rent they receive τ > 1. Then
there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the low-surplus firm v ∈ [0, v] self-
selects into a public wage offer and the high-surplus firm v ∈ [v, 1] self-selects into private
negotiations. The cutoff threshold v is given by
v =
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
Part 1: Existence of the separating equilibrium
Consider first the firm of a low match surplus v ∈ [0, v]. In equilibrium, the firm of a




P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w≤1
w(v − w + τ w2 )
= arg max
w≤1
wv − w2 + τ2w
2
First-order condition with respect to w gives us
v − 2w∗ + τw∗ = 0
⇔w∗ = min{ v2− τ , 1}
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If v ≤ 2 − τ , then the public wage is w∗ = v2−τ , and the probability of hiring is
P (θi ≤ v2−τ ) =
v
2−τ . Conditional on hiring, the firm obtains a profit of v − w =
1−τ
2−τ v and
quality of τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w)) = τ v2(2−τ) . Thus, the firm’s equilibrium payoff in public













If v ≥ 2 − τ , then the public wage is w∗ = 1, and the probability of hiring is P (θi ≤
1) = 1. Conditional on hiring, the firm obtains a profit of v − 1 and quality of τ2 . Thus,
the firm’s equilibrium payoff in public wage is given by v − 1 + τ2 .
Note that the equilibrium payoff under w∗ = v2−τ is smaller than the equilibrium payoff
under w∗ = 1.2 It is thus sufficient to consider a deviation incentive for the firm with
w∗ = v2−τ .
If the firm deviates to private negotiation, workers believe, upon observing private
negotiation, that the firm has a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1] and demand at least v. Assume that
for wi ≥ v, workers employ a linear wage strategy wi(θi) = αθi + β. Thus, upon observing




v − wi + τ(wi − θ̃i) ≥ 0











Believing that v ∈ [v, 1], workers choose their initial offer wi to maximize their wages
and the hiring probability.
arg max
wi≥v
















1− v wi +
α+τ−τα
α





















2 . For v ≥ 2 − τ ,
then the public wage is w∗ = 1 and the firm’s payoff is v − 1 + τ2 ≥
2−τ
2 . If the firm with w
∗ = v2−τ does
not have an incentive to deviate, it follows that the firm with w∗ = 1 also does not want to deviate.
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First-order condition with respect to wi gives us





+ α + τ − τα
α
θi = 0










2(α + τ − τα) +
1
2θi
Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and
β = α+τβ2(α+τ−τα) . Thus, α = β =
1
2 .




v if θi < 2v − 1θi
2 +
1
2 if θi ≥ 2v − 1
Recall that under private negotiation, the firm prefers to hire workers with θi ≤ 2vτ+1 +
τ−1
τ+1
Case 1. Suppose that 2v− 1 > 2v
τ+1 +
τ−1
τ+1 such that the firm prefers to hire only those
workers who demand w∗i = v. The expected payoff of hiring at w∗i = v is given by
P (θi ≤ 2v − 1)
[
(v − v) + τ(v − E(θi|θi ≤ 2v − 1))
]
=(2v − 1)(v − v + τ2)
Because the deviation payoff increases in v, it is sufficient to check whether the firm of
v = v has an incentive to deviate. At v = v, the firm does not deviate if and only if the
equilibrium payoff is at least as good as the expected payoff from deviating.
v2
2(2− τ) ≥ vτ −
τ
2
⇔v2 − 2v(2− τ)τ + (2− τ)τ ≥ 0
⇔(v − (2− τ)τ)2 + (2− τ)τ(1− (2− τ)τ) ≥ 0
⇔(v − (2− τ)τ)2 + (2− τ)τ(τ − 1)2 ≥ 0 (Always true)
Case 2. Suppose 2v
τ+1 +
τ−1




τ+1 , including those who demand w
∗
i = v. As before, the expected payoff of hiring
at w∗i = v is given by (2v − 1)(v − v + τ2 ).
In addition, hiring at w∗i = θi2 +
1
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τ+1 ]). Thus, the expected payoff of
hiring at w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 is given by
[ 2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1








τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 − 2v + 1]
v + τ − v(τ + 1)
2
The firm yields an expected deviation payoff of
(2v − 1)(v − v + τ2) + [
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 − 2v + 1]
v + τ − v(τ + 1)
2
Because the deviation payoff is increasing in v, it is sufficient to check if the firm with
v = v has an incentive to deviate. At v = v, the expected deviation is given by
(2v − 1)τ2 + [
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 − 2v + 1]
v + τ − v(τ + 1)
2
=(2v − 1)τ2 +









=(2v − 1)τ2 +
τ 2(1− v)2
τ + 1
The firm prefers to stay in the equilibrium if the equilibrium payoff exceeds the deviation
payoff, i.e.,
v2





⇔v2(τ + 1) ≥ (2v − 1)τ(τ + 1)(2− τ) + 2τ 2(1− v)2(2− τ)
⇔v2(τ + 1) ≥ v2(−2τ 3 + 4τ 2) + 2v(τ 3 − 3τ 2 + 2τ)− (τ 3 − 3τ 2 + 2τ)
⇔v2(2τ 3 − 4τ 2 + τ + 1) ≥ 2v(τ 3 − 3τ 2 + 2τ)− (τ 3 − 3τ 2 + 2τ)
⇔v2(τ − 1)(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1) ≥ 2vτ(τ − 2)(τ − 1)− τ(τ − 2)(τ − 1)
⇔v2(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1) ≥ 2vτ(τ − 2)− τ(τ − 2)
⇔(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)(v − τ(τ − 2)2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)
2 ≥ τ(τ − 2)(1 + τ)(1− τ)2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
a. If 2τ 2 + 2τ − 1 < 0, then by multiplying both sides with 2τ 2 + 2τ − 1 the condition
is equivalent to
⇔|v(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)− τ(τ − 2)| ≤ τ(τ − 2)(1 + τ)(1− τ)
⇔v ≥
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
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b. If 2τ 2 + 2τ − 1 ≥ 0, then by multiplying both sides with 2τ 2 + 2τ − 1 the condition
is equivalent to
⇔|v(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)− τ(τ − 2)| ≥ τ(τ − 2)(1 + τ)(1− τ)
⇔v ≥
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
⇒ The condition such that the firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, v] prefers public wage is
v ≥
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1 (?)
Consider now the firm of a high match surplus v ∈ [v, 1]. In equilibrium, the firm opts
for private negotiation. Workers, upon updating their belief that v ∈ [v, 1], set their wage
strategy w∗i = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}. Thus, the firm’s equilibrium payoff in private negotiation is
given by
(2v − 1)(v − v + τ2) + [
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 − 2v + 1]
v + τ − v(τ + 1)
2
If the firm deviates to public wage, it optimally posts a public wage w∗ = v2−τ and yields
an expected deviation payoff of v22(2−τ)
At the cutoff v = v, the firm prefers to stay in the equilibrium if the equilibrium payoff
exceeds the deviation payoff, i.e.,
v2





Analogous to the above analysis, the condition such that the firm of a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1]
prefers private negotiation is
v ≤
√
τ(2− τ)(τ − 1)(τ + 1)− τ(2− τ)
2τ 2 − 2τ − 1 (??)
From (?) and (??), if v =
√
τ(2−τ)(τ−1)(τ+1)−τ(2−τ)
2τ2−2τ−1 , then there exists a separating equi-
librium in which the firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, v] self-selects into public wage and a high
surplus v ∈ [v, 1] self-selects into private negotiation.
Part 2: Uniqueness of the separating equilibrium
Case 1. A pooling equilibrium at public wage
In equilibrium, the firm of any realized v posts a public wage w to maximize its expected
payoff
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arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w
w(v − w + τ w2 )
First-order condition with respect to w gives us: w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}. If w
∗ = v2−τ , the firm’s











If the firm deviates to private negotiation, workers believe that v ∈ [0, 1] and demand
wi to maximize their expected wage. Assume that workers employ a linear wage strategy
wi(θi) = αθi + β. Thus, upon observing the initial offer wi, the firm believes the outside




v − wi + τ(wi − θ̃i) ≥ 0





Workers choose their initial offer wi to maximize their wages and the hiring probability.
arg max
wi≥v





)wi + P (v <





















First-order condition with respect to wi gives us










2(α + τ − τα) +
1
2θi
Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and
β = α+τβ2(α+τ−τα) . Thus, α = β =
1
2 . Worker i’s wage strategy is given by w
∗
i = θi2 +
1
2 .
Given worker i’s wage strategy, the firm hires worker i if and only if
v − wi + τ(wi − θi) ≥ 0⇔
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 ≥ θi
Thus, the firm’s expected deviation payoff is given by
P (θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1










τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1)
=2v + τ − 1






2(τ + 1)E(θi|θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1))
=2v + τ − 1
τ + 1 (
2v + τ − 1
2 −
2v + τ − 1
4 ) =
(2v + τ − 1)2
4(τ + 1)
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Consider an incentive to deviate for the firm with v = 0. At v = 0, the firm prefers to
deviate if
(τ − 1)2
4(τ + 1) ≥ 0 (True)
Thus, a pooling equilibrium at public wage does not exist as the firm of v = 0 prefers to
deviate to private negotiation.
Case 2. A pooling equilibrium at private negotiation
In equilibrium, the firm of any realized surplus v opts for private negotiation, and
workers believe that v ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that workers employ a linear wage strategy wi(θi) =
αθi + β. Thus, upon observing the initial offer wi, the firm believes the outside option is




v − wi + τ(wi − θ̃i) ≥ 0





Workers choose their initial offer wi to maximize their wages and the hiring probability.
arg max
wi≥v





)wi + P (v <





















First-order condition with respect to wi gives us










2(α + τ − τα) +
1
2θi
Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and
β = α+τβ2(α+τ−τα) . Thus, α = β =
1
2 . Worker i’s wage strategy is given by w
∗
i = θi2 +
1
2 .
Given worker i’s wage strategy, the firm hires worker i if and only if
v − wi + τ(wi − θi) ≥ 0⇔
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1 ≥ θi
Thus, the firm’s expected equilibrium payoff is given by
P (θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1










τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1)
=2v + τ − 1






2(τ + 1)E(θi|θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
τ − 1
τ + 1))
=2v + τ − 1
τ + 1 (
2v + τ − 1
2 −
2v + τ − 1
4 ) =
(2v + τ − 1)2
4(τ + 1)
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P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w
w(v − w + τ w2 )
First-order condition with respect to w gives us: w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1}.
Consider an incentive to deviate for the firm with v = 1. At v = 1, the firm sets w∗ = 1
and yields a deviation payoff of v − 1 + τ2 . Thus, the firm prefers to deviate if
τ
2 ≥
(2 + τ − 1)2
4(τ + 1)
⇔2τ ≥ τ + 1
⇔τ ≥ 1 (True)
Thus, a pooling equilibrium at private negotiation does not exist as the firm of v = 1
prefers to deviate to public wage.
Case 3. A separating equilibrium – the firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, ṽ] opts for private
negotiation and a high surplus v ∈ [ṽ, 1] opts for public wage
Consider the firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, ṽ]. In equilibrium, the firm opts for private
negotiation. Workers, upon observing private negotiation, believe that v ∈ [0, ṽ]. Assume
that workers employ a linear wage strategy wi(θi) = αθi + β. Thus, upon observing the




v − wi + τ(wi − θ̃i) ≥ 0





Believing that v ∈ [0, ṽ], workers choose their initial offer wi to maximize their wages
and the hiring probability.
arg max
wi
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First-order condition with respect to wi gives us





+ α + τ − τα
α
θi = 0










2(α + τ − τα) +
1
2θi
Furthermore, w∗i = αθi+β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = 12 and β =
ṽ
2 .




Given workers’ strategy w∗i = θi2 +
ṽ
2 , the firm hires if
(v − w∗i ) + τ(w∗i − θi) ≥ 0⇔
2v
τ + 1 +
(τ − 1)ṽ
τ + 1 ≥ θi
Thus, the firm’s expected equilibrium payoff is given by
P (θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
(τ − 1)ṽ










τ + 1 +
(τ − 1)ṽ
τ + 1 )
=2v + (τ − 1)ṽ






2(τ + 1)E(θi|θi ≤
2v
τ + 1 +
(τ − 1)ṽ
τ + 1 ))
=2v + (τ − 1)ṽ
τ + 1 (
2v + (τ − 1)ṽ
2 −
2v + (τ − 1)ṽ
4 ) =
(2v + (τ − 1)ṽ)2
4(τ + 1)
If the firm deviates to public wage, it optimally posts w∗ = min{ v2−τ , 1} and yields a
deviation payoff of at least v22(2−τ) . Consider an incentive to deviate for the firm at v = ṽ,
the firm wants to deviate if
ṽ2
2(2− τ) ≥







⇔2 ≥ (τ + 1)(2− τ)
⇔0 ≥ −τ(τ − 1) (True)
Thus, a separating equilibrium in which the firm of a low surplus opts for private negotiation
and a high surplus opts for public wage does not exists, as the firm at the cutoff has an
incentive to deviate to public wage.
3Note that w∗i ≥ θi ⇔ ṽ ≥ θi. Workers with θi > ṽ are discouraged to apply as they are better off
with their outside options.
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B.10 Mathematical Note for Discussion
B.10.1 Weak Reciprocity
. Consider weak reciprocity τ < 1.
Note 1: Exogenous Public Wage
At the beginning of the wage bargaining, the firm chooses a public wage w to maximize
the expected payoff, which is a sum of profit and quality
arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w≤1
w(v − w + τ w2 )
= arg max
w≤1
wv − w2 + τ2w
2
First-order condition with respect to w gives us
v − 2w∗ + τw∗ = 0
⇔w∗ = v2− τ
Note that w∗ = v2−τ ∈ [
v
2 , v] for all τ < 1. Workers with θi ≤ w
∗, or equivalently θi ≤ v2−τ ,
are employed.
Note 2: Exogenous Private Negotiation
Assume that worker i employs a linear wage strategy, that is, wi(θi) = αθi + β. In
equilibrium, the firm’s belief about worker i’s strategy coincides with worker i’s strategy.
Consequently, the firm’s posterior belief about the outside option is given by θ̃i(wi) =
w−1i (θi) = wiα −
β
α
. The firm hires if
v − wi + τ(wi − θ̃i) ≥ 0





Workers bargain though a take-it-or-leave-it offer wi. In particular, workers chooses an
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First-order condition with respect to wi gives us










2(α + τ − τα) +
1
2θi
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Furthermore, w∗i = αθi + β. Solving both equations simultaneously, I get α = β = 12 .
Thus, worker i’s wage strategy is given by w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 .
In equilibrium, the firm correctly infer workers’ outside option θ̃i(wi) = θi. Hence,
worker i, with the initial offer w∗i = θi2 +
1
2 , gets employed if and only if
v − wi + τ(wi − θi) ≥ 0
⇔ 2v
τ + 1 −
1− τ
τ + 1 ≥ θi
Comparative statics of the fraction of employed workers with respect to τ :









= −2v(τ + 1)2 +
−(τ − 1)
(τ + 1)2 +
1
τ + 1
=−2v − τ + 1 + τ + 1(τ + 1)2
=2(1− v)(τ + 1)2 ≥ 0
⇒ As τ decreases, the hiring probability decreases.




τ+1 < 0. Thus, the probability of hiring is zero for
the firm with v < 1−τ2 .
Note 3: Separating equilibrium – the firm of a low surplus v ∈ [0, v] chooses public
wage and a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1] chooses private negotiation.
Consider the firm of a high surplus v ∈ [v, 1]. In equilibrium, upon observing private
negotiation, workers believe that v ∈ [v, 1] and demand w∗i = max{v, θi2 +
1
2}. Thus, the
firm yields an expected equilibrium payoff of
(2v − 1)(v − v + τ2) + [
2v
τ + 1 −
1− τ
τ + 1 − 2v + 1]
v + τ − v(τ + 1)
2
If the firm deviates to public wage, the firm chooses a public wage w that maximizes
the firm’s expected payoff.
arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)[(v − w) + τ(w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))]
= arg max
w
wv − w2 + τ2w
2
First-order condition with respect to w gives us
v − 2w∗ + τw∗ = 0⇔ w∗ = v2− τ
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Conditional on hiring, the firm obtains a profit of v − w = 1−τ2−τ v and quality of τ(w −











Consider an incentive to deviate for the firm with v = v. At v = v, the expected
equilibrium payoff is given by
(2v − 1)τ2 + [
2v
τ + 1 −
1− τ
τ + 1 − 2v + 1]
v + τ − v(τ + 1)
2
=(2v − 1)τ2 +
τ 2(1− v)2
τ + 1
The firm prefers to stay in equilibrium if the equilibrium payoff exceeds the deviation
payoff, i.e.,
(2v − 1)τ2 +
τ 2(1− v)2
τ + 1 ≥
v2
2(2− τ)
⇔(2v − 1)τ(τ + 1)(2− τ) + 2τ 2(1− v)2(2− τ) ≥ v2(τ + 1)
⇔2v(τ 3 − 3τ 2 + 2τ)− (τ 3 − 3τ 2 + 2τ) ≥ v2(2τ 3 − 4τ 2 + τ + 1)
⇔(2v − 1)τ(τ − 2)(τ − 1) ≥ v2(τ − 1)(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)
Because τ < 1, then τ − 1 < 0. Dividing both sides with (τ − 1) we have
v2(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1) + (2v − 1)τ(2− τ) ≥ 0
⇔(2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)(v + τ(2− τ)2τ 2 − 2τ − 1)
2 ≥ τ(2− τ)(τ + 1)(τ − 1)2τ 2 − 2τ − 1
Note that for τ < 1, then 2τ 2 − 2τ − 1 = −2τ(1 − τ) − 1 < 0. Thus, the LHS of the
condition is negative, while the RHS is positive. This implies that the firm at v = v prefers
to deviate to public wage.
Thus, a separating equilibrium in which the firm of a low surplus chooses public wage
and a high surplus chooses private negotiation does not exist.
B.10.2 Concave Gift Exchange Function
. To examine the implications of the concavity of the gift exchange function on the equi-
librium, I assume that the gift exchange function takes the form of e∗i =
√
ri
Note 1: Exogenous Public Wage
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The firm posts a public wage w to maximize its payoff
arg max
w
P (θi ≤ w)(v − w +
√
w − E(θi|θi ≤ w))
arg max
w





First order condition with respect to w gives us



























Note 2: Exogenous Private Negotiation
In private negotiation, workers set an initial offer wi. Denote the gift exchange from
workers as ei(wi). The firm hires worker i if v − wi + ei(wi) ≥ 0
Worker i sets wi to maximize the expected payoff
P (v ≥ wi − ei(wi))wi + P (v < wi − ei(wi))θi
⇔(1− wi + ei(wi))wi + (wi − ei(wi))θi
⇔wi − w2i + ei(wi)wi + wiθi − ei(wi)θi
First order condition with respect to wi gives us
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Table C.1: Branch and LO Characteristics (Baseline, December 2019)
Mean
Branch Characteristics






College Degree (%) 83.89
Seniority at company (in months) 32.48
Seniority at branch (in months) 21.74
N (LOs) 596
Notes: Summary statistics on Branch and LO characteristic
at baseline, which was collected in December 2019. Our sample
covers 150 branches and 596 LOs in total. The variable Seniority
at company captures the number of months LOs work in the
company as of December 2019, and the variable Seniority at
branch captures the number of months LOs work in the current
branch as of December 2019.
Table C.2: Overview of Response Rates
Total Responses Sample Responses Response Rate %
Baseline (Dec 2019) 596 596 91
Additional Survey (May 2020) 545 478 73
Weekly Surveys (Jun-Jul 2020) 534 476 73
Follow-Up Survey (Oct 2020) 327 290 44
Endline (Dec 2020) 509 318 49
Notes: The table shows an overview of responses rates for all surveys. Total Responses show the total number of responses,
including newly joined LOs in our sample branches, for each survey. Sample Responses show the number of responses from our
main sample. Response Rate captures the fraction of our main sample (655 LOs in total) that responded to each survey.
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Table C.3: Development of Mental Heath (June-July 2020)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWB SWB Stress Stress
Survey round 0.0359 0.000223 0.0713∗∗ 0.0337
(0.0872) (0.0660) (0.0336) (0.0305)
Constant 12.53∗∗∗ 12.66∗∗∗ 6.502∗∗∗ 6.634∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.273) (0.145) (0.124)
Observations 1763 1763 1763 1763
N (LOs) 459 459 459 459
R2 0.000102 0.687 0.00275 0.480
Individual FE X X
Notes: This table shows the development of mental health in terms of subjective
well-being and perceived stress over 6 survey rounds in June and July 2020. The
variable SWB is the subjective well-being index elicited through a self-reported
questionnaire WHO-5 Well-Being Index, which has 5 items and a range from 0 to
25 The variable Stress is the perceived stress index elicited through a self-reported
questionnaire Perceived Stress Scale 4 (PSS-4), which has 4 items and a range from
0 to 16. All columns (1)-(4) are weighted with the inverse probability of answering
the survey rounds. Column (2) and (4) control for individual fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: Performance and Leadership (Oct’19-Feb’20 vs. Mar’20-Jul’20)
Month FE and Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Caseload Monthly Acquisition Collection Percent PAR Loan Portfolio
Panel A. Controlling for month fixed effects
Leadership -2.178∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.163 -0.0836∗ -3606.6
(1.081) (0.0931) (0.101) (0.0480) (22253.7)
Leadership*Post 0.444 0.172∗ 0.0996 -0.0450 8784.5
(1.566) (0.102) (0.108) (0.0674) (31899.4)
Observations 5481 5481 5481 5481 5481
N (LOs) 589 589 589 589 589
R2 0.0232 0.349 0.854 0.113 0.0279
p-value leadership (total) 0.126 0.0987 0.0847 0.00650 0.821
Panel B. Controlling for baseline characteristics
Leadership 0.180 -0.0727 0.0713 -0.260∗∗∗ 55899.1∗
(1.564) (0.143) (0.123) (0.0711) (32730.4)
Leadership*Post -0.771 0.0754 -0.0587 -0.0403 -8460.2
(2.141) (0.163) (0.257) (0.0976) (44593.2)
Post 62.41 -21.42∗∗∗ -71.67∗∗∗ 5.738∗ 820959.5
(61.91) (4.731) (7.580) (2.934) (1294427.8)
Observations 3011 3011 3011 3011 3011
N (LOs) 589 589 589 589 589
R2 0.0317 0.210 0.623 0.0606 0.0358
p-value leadership (total) 0.686 0.974 0.957 0.0000322 0.119
Panel C. Controlling for month fixed effects and baseline characteristics
Leadership 0.164 -0.0789 0.0661 -0.258∗∗∗ 55359.6∗
(1.537) (0.129) (0.118) (0.0709) (31948.6)
Leadership*Post -0.718 0.0930 -0.0297 -0.0494 -6519.8
(2.116) (0.143) (0.122) (0.0932) (43690.7)
Observations 3011 3011 3011 3011 3011
N (LOs) 589 589 589 589 589
R2 0.0540 0.400 0.929 0.122 0.0751
p-value leadership (total) 0.703 0.831 0.327 0.00000331 0.103
Notes: The table covers the period from October 2019 to July 2020, where pre-lockdown refers to 5 months before the lockdown (from October 2019 to February
2020) and post-lockdown refers to 5 months after the lockdown (from March 2020 to July 2020). Panel A controls for month fixed effects, Panel B controls for various
baseline characteristics, and Panel C controls for both month fixed effects and baseline characteristics. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire
Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership captures the manager’s
average leadership rating from all LOs within the branch. The indicator Post is 1 for March 2020 to July 2020. The indicator Total Caseload represents the total
number of clients that LOs handle. The variable Monthly Acquisition shows the number of clients being acquired each month, net of settled clients. The variable
PAR is the percentage of gross loan portfolio that is overdue by more than 30 days. The variable Loan Portfolio is the accumulated outstanding loan (in Indian
Rupees) that has yet to be repaid. Baseline characteristics include working styles indices (planning, effort, and work time), preference indices (locus of control,
reciprocity), and ability indices (financial literacy, raven, and cognitive reflection test). The scalar p-value leadership (total) reports the p-value for the total effect of
leadership, i.e., the sum of the coefficients of Leadership and Leadership*Post. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.5: Working Styles and Leadership at Baseline (restricted sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Planning Effort Obj. Work Time Subj. Work Time
Leadership 0.0286∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ -0.0103 0.0449∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0149)
Observations 301 302 305 304
R2 0.0130 0.0551 0.00167 0.0327
Notes: The table restricts attention to LOs who answered both the baseline and endline surveys. It
shows the results of regressing the baseline values of working styles indices on leadership. Leadership is
elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists
of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership captures the manager’s
average leadership rating from all LOs within the branch. The Planning is a z-score of the planning index
that captures how well LOs plan their work (e.g., using reminders and checklists, and following through
with their plans). The Effort is a z-score of the effort index that captures how much effort LO exerts on
main work dimensions (enforcing repayments, marketing, and assessing clients). The variable Objective
Work Time is a z-score of self-reported working time. The variable Subjective Work Time is a z-score of
the subjective work time index that captures how much time LOs subjectively perceive they are working
(e.g., often working overtime or skipping lunches). Robust standard errors are used in all regressions.
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.6: Perceptions and Leadership (restricted sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Work Ease Fair & Support Job Anxiety
Leadership 0.00661 0.0308∗ 0.0246
(0.0208) (0.0184) (0.0174)
Observations 184 204 204
R2 0.000673 0.0173 0.00906
Notes: The table restricts attention to LOs who answered both our October and
December surveys. It shows the results of regressing various work perception indices
elicited in our October survey on leadership. Leadership is elicited through a self-
reported questionnaire Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists
of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership
captures the manager’s average leadership rating from all LOs within the branch.
The variable Work Ease is a z-score of the work ease index captures the perceived
ease of working in our October survey during the lockdown, i.e. for March-May
2020, and in our December survey after the lockdown, i.e. for June-December 2020.
The variable Fair & Support is a z-score of the fair and support index captures the
perceived fairness and support in our October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for
March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December 2020.
The variable Job Anxiety is a z-score of the job anxiety index captures the perceived
job anxiety and demotivation in our October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for
March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December 2020.
All outcome variables are positively coded, i.e., a higher score indicates a higher
perception. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Attrition Analysis
Attrition in June 2020 Attrition in October 2020 Attrition in December 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
main
Leadership -0.015 0.023 -0.0087
(0.077) (0.021) (0.019)
Planning 0.42 -0.17 -0.069
(0.61) (0.14) (0.13)
Effort -0.63 0.018 0.00035
(0.82) (0.22) (0.19)
Obj. Work Time -0.30 0.17∗ 0.042
(0.30) (0.090) (0.081)
Subj. Work Time 1.11∗ -0.0019 -0.13
(0.64) (0.12) (0.10)
Locus of Control 0.30 -0.15 -0.094
(1.12) (0.30) (0.28)
Negative Reciprocity -0.29 -0.12 -0.014
(0.27) (0.074) (0.067)
Positive Reciprocity 0.14 -0.027 -0.0085
(0.40) (0.086) (0.079)
Financial Literacy 0.035 -0.66∗ -0.86∗∗
(1.35) (0.39) (0.36)
Raven Score -2.37 0.44 0.76∗∗
(1.63) (0.34) (0.32)
CRT score -1.19 0.24 0.45
(2.25) (0.47) (0.43)
Total Caseload -0.00011 0.00058 0.0011 0.0013 0.0017∗ 0.00090
(0.0012) (0.00096) (0.00097) (0.00081) (0.00094) (0.00079)
Monthly Acquisition 0.0067 0.00082 0.0075 0.0016 0.0026 0.0038
(0.0068) (0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0026) (0.0059) (0.0025)
Collection Percent -0.0071∗ -0.0053∗ -0.0068∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0074∗∗ -0.0073∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0028)
PAR -0.0081 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.0055 -0.0090∗ -0.010∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0049)
Loan Portfolio -4.5e-10 -0.000000060 -0.000000040 -0.000000072∗ -0.000000063 -0.000000050
(0.000000056) (0.000000045) (0.000000047) (0.000000038) (0.000000046) (0.000000037)
Constant -1.21 -0.28 0.034 0.064 0.032 0.45∗∗ 0.51 0.43∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(5.02) (0.21) (0.20) (1.25) (0.20) (0.21) (1.12) (0.21) (0.22)
Observations 305 562 590 305 562 590 305 562 590
November 2019 X X X
Notes: The table analyzes whether baseline characteristics predict LO’s attrition in different surveys, using Probit regressions. The outcome Attrition in June 2020 indicates whether LOs left and did not
participate in our June 2020 survey onwards. The outcome Attrition in October 2020 indicates whether LOs left and did not participate in our October survey onwards. The outcome Attrition in December
2020 indicates whether LOs left and did not participate in the endline survey in December 2020.
Column (1), (4), and (7) use the survey data and examine whether baseline characteristics such as leadership, planning, effort, and work time predict LO’s attrition. Column (2), (5), and (8) use the admin
data and examine whether the average performance from December 2018 to October 2019 predicts LO’s attrition. Column (3), (6), and (9) use the admin data and examine whether the performance in
November 2019 predicts LO’s attrition. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































106 C. Work Environment, Mental Health, and The Pandemic
Table C.9: Working Styles and Objective Leadership
Planning Effort Objective Work Time Subjective Work Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline
Objective Leadership 0.199∗∗ 0.136 0.377∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.0760 0.286∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.0997
(0.0834) (0.119) (0.0842) (0.117) (0.0824) (0.115) (0.0841) (0.114)
Observations 581 275 581 268 588 299 590 285
R2 0.00983 0.0502 0.0354 0.0717 0.00147 0.0296 0.0209 0.0750
Baseline Index X X X X
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing various working styles indices on leadership. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire
Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Objective Leadership takes a
value of 1 if my manager’s leadership rating from all LOs within my branch is higher than the average leadership rating of all managers across all branches.
The Planning is a z-score of the planning index that captures how well LOs plan their work (e.g., using reminders and checklists, and following through with
their plans). The Effort is a z-score of the effort index that captures how much effort LO exerts on main work dimensions (enforcing repayments, marketing,
and assessing clients). The variable Objective Work Time is a z-score of self-reported working time. The variable Subjective Work Time is a z-score of the
subjective work time index that captures how much time LOs subjectively perceive they are working (e.g., often working overtime or skipping lunches). Odd
columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) show the results for the baseline value of the outcomes. Even columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) show the results for the endline
value of the outcomes, controlling for the baseline value of the outcomes. The z-scores at the endline are created using the mean and standard deviation of
the endline indices. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.10: Perceptions and Objective Leadership (earlier and later months, 2020)
Work Ease Fair & Support Job Anxiety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mar–May Jun–Dec Mar–Oct Nov–Dec Mar–Oct Nov–Dec
Objective Leadership 0.0118 -0.181 0.224∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.0201
(0.130) (0.120) (0.116) (0.124) (0.121) (0.124)
Observations 246 267 278 268 278 267
R2 0.0000339 0.00819 0.0133 0.0152 0.0166 0.000100
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing various work perception indices on leadership at the earlier and later stages of
the pandemic. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which
consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Objective Leadership takes a value of 1 if my
manager’s leadership rating from all LOs within my branch is higher than the average leadership rating of all managers across
all branches. The variable Work Ease is a z-score of the work ease index captures the perceived ease of working in our October
survey during the lockdown, i.e. for March-May 2020, and in our December survey after the lockdown, i.e. for June-December
2020. The variable Fair & Support is a z-score of the fair and support index captures the perceived fairness and support in
our October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December
2020. The variable Job Anxiety is a z-score of the job anxiety index captures the perceived job anxiety and demotivation in our
October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-December 2020. All
outcome variables are positively coded, i.e., a higher score indicates a higher perception. The z-scores for the later months (in
even columns 2, 4, and 6) are created using the mean and standard deviation of the indices from our December survey. Robust
standard errors are used in all regressions. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.1 Additional Tables and Figures 109
Table C.13: Working Styles and Leadership (exclude own rating)
Planning Effort Objective Work Time Subjective Work Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline Baseline Endline
Leadership 0.0107 0.00522 0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0138 -0.00890 0.0271∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗ -0.00634
(0.00838) (0.0133) (0.00909) (0.0123) (0.00823) (0.0111) (0.00922) (0.0123)
Observations 579 274 579 267 586 297 588 284
R2 0.00264 0.0466 0.0213 0.0727 0.00187 0.0290 0.0188 0.0734
Baseline Index X X X X
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing various working styles indices on leadership. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire
Global Transformational Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership captures the
manager’s average leadership rating from all other LOs (excluding own rating) within the branch. The Planning is a z-score of the planning index that
captures how well LOs plan their work (e.g., using reminders and checklists, and following through with their plans). The Effort is a z-score of the
effort index that captures how much effort LO exerts on main work dimensions (enforcing repayments, marketing, and assessing clients). The variable
Objective Work Time is a z-score of self-reported working time. The variable Subjective Work Time is a z-score of the subjective work time index that
captures how much time LOs subjectively perceive they are working (e.g., often working overtime or skipping lunches). Odd columns (1), (3), (5), and
(7) show the results for the baseline value of the outcomes. Even columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) show the results for the endline value of the outcomes,
controlling for the baseline value of the outcomes. The z-scores at the endline are created using the mean and standard deviation of the endline indices.
Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.14: Perceptions and Leadership (excluding own rating)
Work Ease Fair & Support Job Anxiety
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mar–May Jun–Dec Mar–Oct Nov–Dec Mar–Oct Nov–Dec
Leadership 0.00567 -0.0141 0.00121 0.0120 0.0200∗ -0.0000445
(0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0116) (0.0142)
Observations 244 266 276 267 276 266
R2 0.000703 0.00379 0.0000361 0.00268 0.00929 3.70e-08
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing various work perception indices on leadership at the earlier and
later stages of the pandemic. Leadership is elicited through a self-reported questionnaire Global Transformational
Leadership (GTL), which consists of 8 items and has a range from 8 to 40. The independent variable Leadership
captures the manager’s average leadership rating from all other LOs (excluding own rating) within the branch. The
variable Work Ease is a z-score of the work ease index captures the perceived ease of working in our October survey
during the lockdown, i.e. for March-May 2020, and in our December survey after the lockdown, i.e. for June-December
2020. The variable Fair & Support is a z-score of the fair and support index captures the perceived fairness and support
in our October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for November-
December 2020. The variable Job Anxiety is a z-score of the job anxiety index captures the perceived job anxiety and
demotivation in our October survey since the lockdown, i.e. for March-October 2020, and in our December survey for
November-December 2020. All outcome variables are positively coded, i.e., a higher score indicates a higher perception.
The z-scores for the later months (in even columns 2, 4, and 6) are created using the mean and standard deviation of
the indices from our December survey. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions. Robust standard errors are
used in all regressions. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.1: Development of Covid cases in India (January 2020 - March 2021)
Source: Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/india?country=
~IND)
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Figure C.2: Parallel Trend of Performance Indicators (December 2018 - July 2020)
Notes: The figures show the trend of main performance indicators, namely total caseload, monthly acqui-
sition, collection percentage, PAR, and loan portfolio, over the period from December 2018 to July 2020,
separately for above and below median leadership. The red vertical line indicates the onset of covid in
March 2020. The indicator Total Caseload represents the total number of clients that LOs handle. The
variable Monthly Acquisition shows the number of clients being acquired each month, net of settled clients.
The variable PAR is the percentage of gross loan portfolio that is overdue by more than 30 days. The
variable Loan Portfolio is the accumulated outstanding loan (in Indian Rupees.) that has yet to be repaid.
C.1 Additional Tables and Figures 117
Figure C.3: Study Locations
1. Allahabd, 2. Gwalior, 3. Jabalpur, 4. Jaipur, 5. Lucknow, 6. Moradabad, 7. Saharanpur, 8. Varanasi.
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C.2 Description of Variables and their Sources
C.2.1 Mental Health
Subjective Well-Being Measured weekly for six week in June and July 2020 and once
in December 2020. The WHO-5 index is a self-reported measure of current subjective well-
being, first introduced in 1998 as part of the DEPCARE project on well-being measures
in primary health care. It has been found to have adequate validity in screening for
depression and in measuring well-being (Topp et al., 2015). The index consists of five
statements, which respondents rate according to the 0-5 scale. The total score thus ranges
from 0 to 25, with 0 representing the worst possible well-being and 25 representing the
best possible well-being. The wording is as follows:
“Over the last two weeks,
a. I have felt cheerful and in good spirits
b. I have felt calm and relaxed
c. I have felt active and vigorous
d. I woke up feeling fresh and rested
e. My daily life has been filled with things that interest me”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (at no time [0], some of the time [1], less than
half of the time [2], more than half of the time [3], most of the time [4], all of the time [5]).
Perceived Stress Measured weekly for six week in June and July 2020 and once in
December 2020. The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS), developed by Cohen, Kamarck and
Mermelstein (1983), is a self-reported measure. The short version, PSS-4, is a simple
psychological instrument to measure the degree to which one perceives current events in the
last week as stressful. Four items are designed to detect how unpredictable, uncontrollable,
and overloaded respondents find the situations in their lives. The total score ranges from 0
to 16, with the higher score indicating the more perceived stress. The wording is as follows:
“In the last week, how often have you felt
• . . . that you were unable to control the important things in your life?
• . . . confident about your ability to handle your personal problems?
• . . . that things were going your way?
• . . . difficulties were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (never [0], almost never [1], sometimes [2],
fairly often [3], very often [4]).
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C.2.2 Leadership
Leadership Measured at the baseline survey in December 2019 and at the endline survey
in December 2020. The Global Transformational Leadership scale (GTL) is a short and
practical self-reported instrument to measure the seven behaviours of transformational
leadership. It has been developed as a single construct of transformation leadership and is
validated to have satisfactory reliability by Carless, Wearing and Mann (2000). The index
consists of seven statements (one item for each behaviour), which respondents evaluate the
frequency of transformational leadership behaviours exhibited by their leader, according to
a 1-5 scale. The total score thus ranges from 5 to 35, with a higher score indicating more
engagement of leaders in transformational behaviours. The wording is as follows:
“How often/frequently does your Manager engage in the following activities?
i. communicates a clear and positive vision of the future
ii. treats BROs as individuals, supports and encourages their development
iii. gives encouragement and recognition to BROs
iv. fosters trust, involvement and cooperation among BROs in the branch
v. encourages thinking about problems in new ways and questions assumptions
vi. is clear about his/her values and practices which he/she preaches
vii. instills pride and respect in others and inspires me by being highly competent”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (rarely or never [1], once in a while [2],
sometimes [3], fairly often [4], very frequently, if not always [5]).
C.2.3 Working Styles
Planning Measured at the baseline survey in December 2019 and at the endline survey in
December 2020. The planning index captures the extent LOs plan their work and consists
of 5 items.
The wording is as follows:
“Would you agree or disagree to the following statements?
1. I plan my everyday work life.
2. I use checklists to organize my everyday work load.
3. I use reminders to manage my everyday work load.
4. It is difficult to stick to my work plan.
5. It is difficult for me to follow-through to reach the specific performance level I aimed
at. ”
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Responses are measured on a five-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Neutral [3],
Disagree [4], Strongly disagree [5]). Item 4 and 5 are recoded in inverse order before adding
up.
Effort Measured at the baseline survey in December 2019 and at the endline survey in
December 2020. The effort index captures the extent LOs exert effort in three main work
dimensions (repayment, marketing, and client assessment) and consists in total of 23 items.
The wording is as follows:
“Would you agree or disagree to the following statements?
Repayment
1. I actively try to gain information about members’ business activities.
2. I actively try to gain information about members’ loan usage/ on how a borrrower
has used the loan amount.
3. I encourage loan repayments by closely following over-due clients in their everyday
life to build up pressure.
4. I encourage loan repayments loan repayments by cautioning that no further loans
will be available for borrower if repayment is not made.
5. I ask group leaders for help in reminding defaulting members about repayment.
6. I ask other members for help in reminding defaulting members about repayment.
7. When a reason for non-repayment is genuine, I allow other group members to con-
tribute and submit a repayment for a defaulting borrower
8. I allow defaulters to repay their installment from the meeting directly at the branch
in the evening.
Marketing
9. I regularly provide your clients information about loan products available
10. I think about different ways how to best provide information on different loan prod-
ucts to all clients
11. I advertise utilities that MFI sells
12. I advertise other loan products, like home improvement loans or sanitation loans to
all clients.
13. I advertise other loan products, like home improvement loans or sanitation loans to
all clients.
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14. I identify clients who may be good candidates for other loan products available aside
from the standard loan, like home improvement loans, sanitation loans, or utility
products.
15. I only advertise other loan products, like home improvement loans or sanitation loans
to clients who may be good candidates for these.
16. I identify potential villages to expand services to.
17. I market MFI in new and existing areas.
18. I ask clients to encourage others to join MFI
Client Assessment
19. I inquire about client’s housing situation to see whether they may be interested in a
home improvement or sanitation loan.
20. I only assess client eligibility and do all necessary background checks, once a client
requests to switch from JL to IL.
21. I only assess client eligibility and do all necessary background checks, once a client
requests an additional loan product.
22. I go through the list of joint liability borrowers and mark who would be a good
candidate for an upgrade to an individual loan.
23. I actively approach aligible JL clients to switch to IL loans.”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Neutral [3],
Disagree [4], Strongly disagree [5]). Item 20 and 21 are recoded in inverse order before
adding up.
Subjective Work Time Measured at the baseline survey in December 2019 and at
the endline survey in December 2020. The subjective work time index captures how LOs
perceive their working time and consists of 4 items.
The wording is as follows:
“Would you agree or disagree to the following statements?
1. To improve my performance, I often work-after hours.
2. I often skip lunch breaks to get my work load done.
3. I try to work while I am traveling back and forth from clients.
4. I often work after regular working hours for LOs to get my workload done.”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Neutral [3],
Disagree [4], Strongly disagree [5]).
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C.2.4 Perceptions
Work Ease Measured once in October 2020 and once at the endline survey in December
2020. The work ease index captures how easy LOs work during Covid. The work ease index
in our October 2020 survey asks how easy LOs work during the lockdown, i.e., between
March and May. The work ease index in our December 2020 surveys asks how easy LOs
work after the lockdown is lifted, i.e., between June and December 2020.
The wording is as follows:
“On a scale of 1-5, with 1 being completely disagree and 5 being completely agree,
please state your level of agreement with the following statements.
1. I had a lot of new tasks for my work
2. As compared to before, I had less workload
3. As compared to before, my work was easier
4. I had a hard time concentrating on work
5. As compared to before, my work was more stressful
6. The interaction with clients has become easier
7. I faced technological difficulties completing my work as I lacked prop-er equipment
(like smartphones/laptops/printers etc)”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Neutral [3],
Disagree [4], Strongly disagree [5]). Item 1, 4, 5, and 7 are recoded in inverse order before
adding up.
Fair & Support Measured once in October 2020 and once at the endline survey in
December 2020. The fair & support index captures the extent LOs perceive they are
treated fairly and receive support. The fair & support index in our October 2020 survey
asks for LOs’ perception since the lockdown, i.e., between March and October 2020. The
fair & support index in our December 2020 surveys asks for LOs’ perception in the last
two months, i.e., between November and December 2020.
The wording is as follows:
“On a scale of 1-5, with 1 being completely disagree and 5 being completely agree,
please state your level of agreement with the following statements.
1. In these difficult times, the new tools/processes that MFI implemented are very
supportive.
2. My manager is very supportive.
3. Other LOs from my branch are very supportive.
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4. My performance assessment is fair during this period
5. It is fair that BROs will get paid 100% of their salary if they work.
6. It is fair that BROs will get paid lower salaries if they do not work.
7. It is fair that BROs might receive their salary payments quicker if they come to the
branch.”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Neutral [3],
Disagree [4], Strongly disagree [5]).
Job Anxiety Measured once in October 2020 and once at the endline survey in December
2020. The job anxiety index captures the extent LOs feel anxious about the job prospect.
The job anxiety index in our October 2020 survey asks for LOs’ perception since the
lockdown, i.e., between March and October 2020. The job anxiety index in our December
2020 surveys asks for LOs’ perception in the last two months, i.e., between November and
December 2020.
The wording is as follows:
“On a scale of 1-5, with 1 being completely disagree and 5 being completely agree,
please state your level of agreement with the following statements.
1. I face technological difficulties completing my work, because clients lack proper equip-
ment (like mobile phones)
2. I can help support clients in these difficult times
3. I feel demotivated during this period
4. I fear that Sonata might close its business
5. After the crisis, there will be more jobs than before for BROs”
Responses are measured on a five-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Neutral [3],
Disagree [4], Strongly disagree [5]). Item 2 and 5 are recoded in inverse order before adding
up.
C.2.5 Preferences and Abilities
Locus of Control Measured once at the baseline survey in December 2019. The Locus of
Control questionnaire is a self-reported instrument developed by Richter et al. (2013) and
frequently used in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The instrument measures
LOs’ locus of control and consists of 10 items, each item based on a four-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 "Strongly agree" to 4 "Strongly disagree". The total score thus ranges from
10 to 40, with a higher score indicating more internal locus of control. The wording is as
follows:
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“The following statements apply to different attitudes towards life and the future. To
what degree to you personally agree with the following statements?
1. How my life takes course depends on me
2. Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve
3. What a person achieves in life is a question of fate or luck
4. If a person is socially or politically active, he/she can have an effect on social condi-
tions
5. I often experience that others have a controlling influence over my life
6. One has to work hard in order to succeed
7. When I encounter difficulties in my life, I often doubt my own abilities
8. The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions
9. Innate abilities are more important than any efforts one can make
10. I have little control over the things that happen in my life ”
Responses are measured on a four-point scale (Strongly agree [1], Agree [2], Disagree [3],
Strongly disagree [4]). Item 1, 4, 6, and 9 are recoded in inverse order before adding up.
Financial Literacy Measured once in May 2020. The Financial Literacy index is based
on the OECD Financial Literacy questionnaire (INFE, 2011), which consists of 6 items
and is adjusted to the Indian context. The instrument measures LOs’ financial literacy,
each correct item counts as one point. The total score thus ranges from 0 to 6, with a
higher score indicating higher financial literacy. The wording is as follows:
1. Imagine that five brothers are given a gift of 10,000 Rs. If the brothers have to divide
the money equally, how much does each one get?
2. Now, imagine that the five brothers have to wait for one year to get the 10,000 Rs
and inflation amounts to 10%. In one year’s time will they be able to buy:
• More than they could today
• The same amount
• Less than they could today
3. You lend 2,500 Rs to a friend one evening and he gives you 2,500 Rs back the next
day. How much interest has he paid on this loan?
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4. Suppose you put 1,000 Rs into a savings account with a guaranteed interest rate of
2% per year and no fees. You don’t make any further payments into this account
and you don’t withdraw any money. How much would be in the account at the end
of the first year, after the interest payment is made?
5. And how much would be in the account at the end of five years [there are no fees]?
Would it be:
• more than 1100 Rs
• exactly 1100 Rs
• less than 1100 Rs
• or is it impossible to tell from the information given
6. Let’s assume that you saw a TV-set of the same model on sales in two different shops.
The initial retail price of it was 10,000 Rs. One shop offered a discount of 1500 Rs,
while the other one offered a 10% discount. Which one is a better bargain, a discount
of 1500 Rs or 10%?
• A discount of 1500 Rs
• They are the same
• A 10% discount
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